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For more than 5.5 million young people in the EU, finding a job is extremely difficult. 
In some southern European countries, more than half of all young adults able to  
work are unemployed. They are referred to as a “lost generation” for several reasons: 
if young people are unable to enter the job market, not only do their professional  
success and economic independence suffer, but they also lack an important key to 
social involvement, leading to devastating economic and social consequences for 
the countries in question. It is also a major strain on the development of unity in the 
European Union. As a foundation that has followed in the footsteps of its founder,  
Robert Bosch, for more than half a century by dedicating itself to promoting European 
understanding, education, and equal opportunity, we want to work with Robert 
Bosch GmbH to make a visible, concrete contribution to reducing unemployment 
among young people in the EU and, in particular, southern Europe. 
By supporting the Center for European Trainees (CET) at Bildungswerk der Baden-
Württembergischen Wirtschaft, we are establishing a central point of contact and 
service center in Baden-Württemberg that provides southern European young  
people, companies in Germany and southern Europe, associations, and educational  
institutions with advice and support when it comes to internationalizing career trai-
ning. Another project, Accelerating Social Entrepreneurship Solutions for Southern 
Europe, was developed in partnership with Ashoka Deutschland and aims to take 
social entrepreneurial ideas for boosting employment that have been successfully 
implemented in other countries and introduce them in Greece, Spain, and Italy.
With the study – Youth Unemployment in Europe. Appraisal and Policy Options – we 
are presenting a scientifically sound analysis of the concrete problems in southern 
Europe with a particular focus on Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Using a selection of  
private, national, and EU initiatives, the Centre for European Economic Research 
(ZEW) analyzes promising solutions and develops concrete recommendations,  
including the creation of more jobs particularly for entry-level candidates, adapta-
tion of training and qualifications based on the requirements of the job market, 
targeted use of labor policy instruments, promotion of international, job-related 
relocation, and integration of all relevant stakeholders into the process of developing 
national plans to combat unemployment among young people.
We would like to thank Prof. Holger Bonin and his team for conducting the study.  
We hope that it will generate interest among a greater range of specialists in the field 
and among decision makers in politics, associations, self-regulatory organizations, 
and companies, and thus encourage a fruitful discussion.
Dr. Ingrid Hamm





Der alarmierende Anstieg der Jugendarbeitslosigkeit infolge der jüngsten Wirt-
schaftskrise kann für die Arbeitsmarktpolitik auf nationaler und europäischer  
Ebene nicht ohne Folgen bleiben. Angesichts der Tatsache, dass in der EU über  
5,5 Millionen junge Menschen Schwierigkeiten haben, einen Arbeitsplatz zu finden, 
müssen Strategien zur Bekämpfung von Jugendarbeitslosigkeit entwickelt werden. 
Nur so kann verhindert werden, dass eine verlorene Generation von europäischen 
Jugendlichen entsteht, die auf dem Arbeitsmarkt und in der Gesellschaft dauerhaft 
benachteiligt sind.
Vor diesem Hintergrund hat die Robert Bosch Stiftung die vorliegende Studie beim 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) in Mannheim in Auftrag  
gegeben. Ziel dieser Studie ist es, die Entwicklung der Jugendarbeitslosigkeit in  
Europa zu untersuchen, die maßgeblichen institutionellen und ökonomischen  
Ursachen für Jugendarbeitslosigkeit zu identifizieren und die Maßnahmen zu dis-
kutieren, die ergriffen werden können, um eine bessere Arbeitsmarktintegration  
von jungen Erwachsenen zu erzielen.
Obgleich die Studie die Perspektive der EU-Mitgliedstaaten insgesamt abdeckt, legt 
sie den Schwerpunkt auf die südeuropäischen Länder, die in besonderem Maße von 
der aktuellen Jugendarbeitslosigkeitskrise betroffen sind. Den Hauptteil bilden drei 
Länderberichte, in denen die Lage in Italien, Spanien und Portugal im Detail darge-
stellt wird und aktuelle sowie mögliche zukünftige politische Initiativen untersucht 
werden, die zu einer Senkung der Jugendarbeitslosigkeit in diesen Ländern beitragen  
könnten.
Entwicklungen der Jugendarbeitslosigkeit in Europa
Im Zuge der Finanz- und Staatsschuldenkrise nahm die Jugendarbeitslosigkeit in 
allen EU-Mitgliedstaaten mit Ausnahme von Deutschland drastisch zu und erreichte 
in den südeuropäischen Ländern alarmierend hohe Quoten. Dennoch ist die Jugend-
arbeitslosigkeit kein junges Phänomen, das sich allein auf den letzten starken  
Wirtschaftseinbruch zurückführen lässt. Die meisten europäischen Länder haben 
seit vielen Jahren Schwierigkeiten, Jugendliche in den Arbeitsmarkt zu integrieren. 
Die Arbeitslosigkeit unter Jugendlichen ist in der Regel markant höher als unter 
Erwachsenen.
Besonders alarmierend ist die hohe Zahl an jungen Menschen, die abgehängt sind,  
da sie weder zur Schule gehen noch eine Arbeits- oder Lehrstelle haben. In Italien 
liegt der Anteil dieser Jugendlichen seit 2000 zwischen 15 und 20 %, Spanien und 
Griechenland haben dieses Niveau in den letzten Jahren ebenfalls erreicht. Alarmie-
rend ist auch, dass sich in einigen Ländern ein beträchtlicher Anteil der beschäftig-
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ten Jugendlichen lediglich in Zeitarbeitsverhältnissen befindet, die nicht mit einer 
Berufsausbildung verbunden sind und nur selten in einer Festanstellung münden. 
Das Risiko konjunkturbedingter Schwankungen am Arbeitsmarkt tragen hierdurch 
zu einem wesentlichen Anteil diejenigen, die am Anfang ihres Berufslebens stehen. 
Das Verhältnis der Arbeitlosenraten bei Jugendlichen und Erwachsenen fällt inner-
halb Europas sehr unterschiedlich aus. Daran zeigt sich, dass länderspezifische 
Strukturen und Institutionen eine wichtige Rolle beim Auftreten von Jugendarbeits-
losigkeit spielen. Ein weiteres Indiz hierfür ist die unterschiedlich starke Reaktion 
der Jugendarbeitsmärkte auf die wirtschaftlichen Krisen der letzten Jahre. Die 
Jugendarbeitslosigkeit fällt in Spanien und Griechenland sehr hoch aus, während 
Frankreich, Großbritannien und Deutschland sehr viel besser durch die Krise  
gekommen sind. 
EU-Politik zur Förderung der Jugendbeschäftigung
Die Europäische Kommission geht seit mehreren Jahren aktiv gegen Jugendarbeits-
losigkeit vor, die Kompetenzen in diesem Bereich liegen jedoch hauptsächlich bei 
den einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten. Kernziele der »Europa 2020«-Strategie sind der  
Abbau der Jugendarbeitslosigkeit und die Senkung des Anteils an Schulabbrechern. 
Zu diesem Zweck wird der Schwerpunkt auf die Verbesserung der Bildungssysteme 
und die Förderung der Mobilität von Jugendlichen innerhalb der EU gelegt. Die  
Plattform EURES (EURopean Employment Services) stellt dazu Informationen zu 
freien Arbeits- und Lehrstellen in allen europäischen Ländern bereit. Zudem fiel 
2013 der Startschuss für die Europäische Ausbildungsallianz, die dazu beitragen 
soll, die Ausbildungsqualität und das Angebot an Ausbildungsplätzen zu verbessern.
Als Antwort auf die jüngste Krise hat die EU eine Jugendgarantie ins Leben gerufen, 
die alle Mitgliedstaaten dazu auffordert, die notwendigen Maßnahmen zu ergreifen, 
damit jeder Jugendliche innerhalb von vier Monaten nach Abschluss der Schule 
oder Beginn einer Arbeitslosigkeit einen Ausbildungs- oder Arbeitsplatz angeboten 
bekommt. Die Jugendgarantie ist jedoch ein anspruchsvoller und potenziell kost-
spieliger Ansatz: Falsche oder mangelhaft konzipierte aktive arbeitsmarktpolitische 
Maßnahmen einzusetzen, kann für die Arbeitsmarktintegration der Jugendlichen 
auf Dauer schlechter sein, als nichts zu tun. Länder mit begrenztem finanziellen 
Spielraum, weniger gut entwickelten Arbeitsverwaltungen und geringer Erfahrung 
in der Gestaltung effizienter aktiver Arbeitsmarktmaßnahmen sollten sich eher auf 
zielgerichtete Instrumente konzentrieren, die speziell auf die bedürftigsten Gruppen 
ausgerichtet sind.
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Strukturelle Ursachen der Jugendarbeitslosigkeit
Für die Schwierigkeiten bei der Arbeitsmarktintegration von Jugendlichen sind  
mehrere strukturelle Faktoren bedeutsam.
Eine erste wichtige Ursache für Jugendarbeitslosigkeit sind Defizite im Bildungs- und 
Ausbildungssystem. Das Risiko der Arbeitslosigkeit bleibt auch in der aktuellen Lage 
für Jugendliche mit höherer Bildung geringer. Schulabbrecher1 und gering qualifi-
zierte Jugendliche tragen dagegen ein besonders hohes Risiko der Arbeitslosigkeit. 
Für die nachhaltige Bekämpfung der Jugendarbeitslosigkeit ist es deshalb funda-
mental, dafür zu sorgen, dass das Bildungssystem Jugendlichen vor dem Berufs- 
einstieg ein Mindestmaß an Qualifikation und Kompetenzen vermittelt. Darüber 
hinaus muss jedoch sichergestellt werden, dass die vermittelten Kompetenzen auch 
der Nachfrage auf dem Arbeitsmarkt entsprechen, um qualifikatorische Ungleich-
gewichte am Arbeitsmarkt zu vermeiden.
Ein zweiter bedeutsamer Faktor zur Erklärung von Unterschieden im Niveau der  
Jugendarbeitslosigkeit zwischen den EU-Ländern sind die länderspezifischen  
Arbeitsmarktregelungen. So können die Kosten des Kündigungsschutzes dazu  
führen, dass weniger Arbeitsplätze neu geschaffen werden. Sind betriebsbedingte 
Kündigungen bei den regulär Beschäftigten stark erschwert, haben die Unternehmen  
einen starken Anreiz, befristete Arbeitsverträge abzuschließen. Dies trägt zu einer 
Spaltung des Arbeitsmarkts bei, die Jugendliche vor besondere Probleme stellt, im 
Arbeitsmarkt Fuß zu fassen. In ähnlicher Weise wirken gesetzliche oder tarifliche 
Mindestlöhne, die altersbedingten Produktivitätsunterschieden nicht genügend 
Rechnung tragen.
Auch ineffektive aktive arbeitsmarktpolitische Instrumente können zur Jugend-
arbeitslosigkeit beitragen. Die empirische Evidenz spricht dafür, dass intensive 
Betreuung und Vermittlung eine besonders effektive Form der Unterstützung von 
Jugendlichen ist. Trainingsmaßnahmen werden zwar häufig eingesetzt, verbessern 
aber nur bei guter Qualität – und insbesondere in Kombination mit betrieblichen 
Praxisphasen – die Beschäftigungsraten der geförderten Jugendlichen nachhaltig. 
Die ebenfalls häufig eingesetzten Lohnsubventionen sind nach den vorhandenen 
Erfahrungen vielfach nicht über die Dauer der Förderung hinaus wirksam.
1  Auf eine durchgängige geschlechtsspezifische Unterteilung der Personenbenennung wird aus  
Gründen der Lesbarkeit verzichtet.
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Spanien: Reformen in die richtige Richtung
Vor dem massiven Wirtschaftseinbruch in Folge der Finanzkrise wuchs die spanische  
Wirtschaft jährlich mit einer Rate von über 3 %. Die Jugendarbeitslosenquote in  
Spanien entsprach dem Durchschnitt der europäischen Länder. Der spanische  
Arbeitsmarkt wurde dann jedoch besonders stark von der Finanzkrise getroffen. 
2012 erreichte die Jugendarbeitslosigkeit mit 53 % einen der Spitzenwerte in Europa.
 
Eine Erklärung für die besonders deutlich spürbare Reaktion des spanischen Jugend- 
arbeitsmarkts auf die Krise liegt im hohen Anteil der Jugendlichen in befristeter 
Beschäftigung. Dies ist das Resultat eines sehr strikten Kündigungsschutzes für 
unbefristet Beschäftigte in Verbindung mit einer weitgehenden Liberalisierung von 
befristeten Verträgen seit den 1990er Jahren. Jugendliche mit Zeitverträgen waren 
für viele Unternehmen ein Puffer beim rezessionsbedingten Arbeitsplatzabbau.  
Gefördert wurde dies noch durch die schwache gewerkschaftliche Vertretung  
befristet Beschäftigter. Weiterhin waren in Spanien viele geringqualifizierte junge 
Menschen im Bausektor beschäftigt, in dem es nach dem Platzen der Immobilien-
blase zu massiven Arbeitsplatzverlusten kam.
2012 wurde in Spanien eine ehrgeizige Arbeitsmarktreform verabschiedet, die die 
Beschäftigungsaussichten für Jugendliche verbessern kann. Neben der Gewährung 
von finanziellen Anreizen für kleine und mittelständische Unternehmen, die junge 
Menschen einstellen, wurde mit der Reform die Lohnfindung von der Branchen-
ebene auf die Firmenebene verlagert. Zudem wurden Unterschiede im Kündigungs-
schutz zwischen befristeter und unbefristeter Beschäftigung verkleinert: Betriebs-
bedingte Entlassungen wurden erleichtert, und die maximale Abfindungszahlung für 
ungerechtfertigte Kündigungen wurde gesenkt. Um die Arbeitsmarktposition von 
Jugendlichen noch weiter zu stärken, sollten jedoch auch die Regelungen für die  
befristete Beschäftigung, etwa durch Begrenzungen aufeinander folgender befriste-
ter Beschäftigungen im selben Betrieb, überprüft werden.
Weitere Ursachen für die Probleme Spaniens, junge Menschen in den Arbeitsmarkt 
zu intergrieren, liegen im Bildungssystem. Das spanische Bildungssystem ist stark 
universitär ausgerichtet und die Zahl der Hochschulabsolventen liegt über dem  
EU-Durchschnitt. Im beruflichen Bereich erfolgt die Ausbildung hauptsächlich  
schulisch. Lediglich 25 % der Ausbildungszeit werden im Betrieb verbracht. Das 
Ergebnis dieser Strukturen ist ein relativ hoher Anteil an überqualifizierten Jugend-
lichen, während die Arbeitgeber zugleich einen Mangel an praktischen Kompeten-
zen beklagen. Deshalb wäre es sinnvoll, das Ausbildungssystem in einer Weise zu 
entwickeln, dass es eine attraktive Alternative zum akademischen Zweig darstellt.
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Einen Beitrag dazu leistet die spanische Regierung durch den Aufbau von Zentren 
für die duale Ausbildung in Zusammenarbeit mit spanischen und internationalen  
Unternehmen. Vor allem im Baskenland wird die Einführung einer zertifizierten  
dualen Ausbildung sehr aktiv vorangetrieben. Ein darüber hinaus notwendiger 
Schritt wäre die Festlegung eines verbindlichen Rahmens, um die Qualität und die 
Inhalte der von Betrieben in den einzelnen Berufen angebotenen Ausbildungen 
festzulegen. Hierzu könnten die vorhandenen Subventionen für Betriebe zur Förde-
rung der Beschäftigung von Jugendlichen an die Beteiligung an zertifizierten Aus-
bildungsprogrammen geknüpft werden.
Italien: Unentschlossene Arbeitsmarkt- und Bildungspolitik
Italien verzeichnete schon in den Jahren vor der Finanz- und Schuldenkrise nur ein 
geringes Wirtschaftswachstum. Die Relation der Arbeitslosenraten bei Jugendlichen 
und Erwachsenen ist im europäischen Vergleich am schlechtesten, und der Anteil an 
Jugendlichen, die weder zur Schule gehen noch eine Arbeits- oder Lehrstelle haben, 
am höchsten. Die Schwierigkeiten der italienischen Jugendlichen beim Berufsein-
stieg sind unabhängig von den großen regionalen Unterschieden bei der Wirtschafts-
kraft spürbar, was auf strukturelle Probleme hinweist.
Die konfliktanfälligen Beziehungen zwischen Gewerkschaften und Arbeitgebern 
sowie strukturelle Verkrustungen, die in Italien die generelle wirtschaftliche und  
Beschäftigungsdynamik lähmen, belasten auch die Beschäftigungschancen der  
Jugendlichen. Hinzu kommt eine eher niedrige Qualität des Bildungssystems.
Italien ist das einzige Land in Europa, das seine Ausgaben für das Grund- und  
Sekundarschulwesen je Schüler seit 1995 nicht erhöht hat. Zwar gibt es im italieni-
schen Bildungssystem einen berufsbildenden Schulzweig, dieser ist dem allgemei-
nen Zweig jedoch sehr ähnlich. Die einzige berufspraktische Erfahrung sammeln  
italienische Schüler im Rahmen eines nicht einmal einmonatigen Betriebsprakti-
kums. Zuletzt hat die Bedeutung spezieller berufsbildender Agenturen und Schulen  
zugenommen, die auf regionaler Ebene koordiniert werden und eine stärker praxis-
orientierte Berufsbildung mit enger Beziehung zu Betrieben anbieten. Diese Zentren 
richten sich jedoch hauptsächlich an Schulabbrecher, ihre Qualität ist in der Regel 
gering und regional sehr unterschiedlich. Vertraglich vereinbarte betriebliche 
Ausbildungmöglichkeiten existieren zwar, Qualität und Inhalte sind jedoch nicht 
geregelt, so dass diese von den Jugendlichen kaum nachgefragt werden.
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Der Anteil an Hochschulabsolventen unter den 25- bis 64-Jährigen ist in Italien halb 
so hoch wie der OECD-Durchschnitt, wobei die Quote der Studienabbrecher höher 
ist als in anderen europäischen Ländern. Darüber hinaus haben Hochschulabsol-
venten in Italien nicht wesentlich bessere Beschäftigungschancen als Abgänger der 
Sekundarschulen. Die Bildungserträge sind demnach eher gering, was die Anreize 
schwächt, eine höhere Qualifikation zu erlangen.
Vor diesem Hintergrund wären in Italien mehr Investitionen auf allen Ebenen des 
Bildungssystems erforderlich, um qualifikationsbedingte Arbeitsmarktschwieirig-
keiten zu verringern. Zudem wären Ausbau und Normierung dualer Ausbildungwege 
mit klaren Vorgaben in Bezug auf Dauer und Qualität wichtige Schritte.
Italien wendet nur einen vergleichsweise geringen Teil seines Bruttoinlandsprodukts 
für aktive arbeitsmarktpolitische Maßnahmen auf. Zugleich vermittlen und beraten 
die Arbeitsverwaltungen vielfach nicht besonders gut. Deswegen könnten Arbeits-
lose von gezielt eingesetzten zusätzlichen Mitteln und besseren administrativen 
Routinen profitieren. Ein möglicher Ansatzpunkt für aktive Maßnahmen wäre die 
Förderung der – trotz großer Arbeitsmarktungleichgewichte innerhalb des Landes – 
nach wie vor niedrigen geografischen Mobilität von Jugendlichen.
Auch die italienischen Jugendlichen leiden unter einem gespaltenen Arbeitsmarkt 
durch strengen Kündigungsschutz. Anders als in Spanien oder Portugal hat Italien 
bislang jedoch keine klaren Schritte unternommen, um die Kluft zwischen befris- 
teten und unbefristeten Beschäftigungsverhältnissen zu verringern. Effektive  
Strukturreformen am Arbeitsmarkt, um etwa eine Senkung der Entlassungskosten 
zu erreichen, sind bisher in politischen Aushandlungsprozessen weitgehend  
gescheitert.
Portugal: Suche nach Wegen aus der Rezession
Die portugiesische Wirtschaft hat seit vielen Jahre strukturelle Probleme. Das Brutto-
inlandsprodukt pro Kopf ist im Vergleich der westeuropäischen Länder niedrig,  
und die Wachstumsraten sind in den letzten Jahren mehrfach ins Minus gerutscht. 
Die harten Sparmaßnahmen, die seit Beginn der aktuellen Wirtschaftskrise zum  
Abbau der Staatsverschuldung ergriffen werden mussten, belasten die wirtschaft-
liche Entwicklung zusätzlich. Um die Jugendarbeitslosigkeit erfolgreich zu bekämp-
fen, kommt der Steigerung der portugiesischen Wirtschafsleistung eine Schlüssel-
rolle zu, damit insgesamt mehr Arbeitsplätze entstehen.
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Portugal konnte zwar den Anteil an Hochschulabsolventen seit 2000 mehr als ver-
doppeln. Dagegen ist die Abbrecherquote im sekundären Bildungsbereich weiterhin 
eine der höchsten in Europa, so dass der Anteil an Absolventen mit höherer sekun-
därer Bildung im internationalen Vergleich niedrig ist. Es fehlt ein berufsbildender 
Bildungsweg mit verpflichtendem betrieblichen Ausbildungsteil. Somit gibt es in 
Portugal praktisch keine alternativen Bildungswege für die Jugendlichen, die den 
allgemeinen Sekundarabschluss nicht schaffen. Die Entwicklung eines beruflichen 
Ausbildungssystems unter Einbeziehung der Betriebe ist darum ein zentraler  
Ansatzpunkt, um das Qualifikationsniveau portugiesischer Jugendlicher beschäf-
tigungsorientiert zu heben.
Die portugiesische Politik hat bereits Initiativen gestartet, um den Anteil an Schul-
abbrechern zu reduzieren und die Qualität der Berufsbildung durch eine engere 
Verbindung zu den Betrieben zu verbessern. Da die Haushaltsspielräume eng sind, 
hängen diese Maßnahmen jedoch nahezu ausschließlich von der Finanzierung durch 
die EU ab. Die Unterstützung von der Arbeitgeberseite in Form von Investitionen 
in Ausbildung ist dagegen schwach. Eine vielversprechende, umfangreiche öffent-
liche Initiative (»Novas oportunidades«), die eine duale Ausbildung als Alternative 
zur allgemeinen Sekundarschulbildung anbot, musste 2013 eingestellt werden. Ein 
neues Programm im Rahmen der Jugendgarantie bietet eine duale Ausbildung mit 
verpflichtendem innerbetrieblichen Teil an. Hierbei fehlen jedoch Regelungen zur 
Sicherung der Qualität und Inhalte der in den Betrieben stattfindenden Ausbildungs-
elemente. Zudem bekommen Jugendliche als Vergütung für die Dauer der Ausbil-
dung lediglich einen symbolischen Betrag.
Die Lohnstruktur schafft in Portugal ein weiteres Beschäftigungshemmnis für  
Jugendliche. Der gesetzliche Mindestlohn, wenngleich an sich gering, liegt bei  
knapp 60 % des mittleren Einkommens und gilt für alle Arbeitnehmer unabhängig  
vom Alter. Darüber hinaus sind in Tarifverträgen teilweise Löhne oberhalb des  
Mindestlohns festgelegt, die beschäftigungshemmende Löhne für Berufseinsteiger  
entfalten, die wegen ihrer vielmals nur befristeten Beschäftigungsverhältnisse 
gewerkschaftlich schlecht repräsentiert sind. Tariföffnung und altersspezifische 
Mindestlöhne wären darum Möglichkeiten, die Beschäftigungschancen für junge 
Menschen zu verbessern.
Die Kombination von hohem Kündigungsschutz für unbefristet Beschäftigte und 
liberalen Regelungen für befristete Beschäftigung schafft in Portugal Hürden für 
Berufseinsteiger. Zwar hat eine Arbeitsmarktreform 2011 die Kosten des Kündi-
gungsschutzes für die Unternehmen verringert, Unterschiede im Kündigungschutz 
zwischen befristeter und unbefristeter Beschäftigung sollten jedoch weiter ver- 
kleinert werden, um die Position der Jugendlichen am Arbeitsmarkt zu stärken.
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Ein allgemeiner Handlungsplan für Europa
Strategien zur Bekämpfung von Jugendarbeitslosigkeit müssen auf nationaler Ebene 
ausgearbeitet und umgesetzt werden. Es lassen sich jedoch wesentliche Elemente 
festhalten, die für alle europäischen Länder relevant sind, wenn sie das Problem der 
Jugendarbeitslosigkeit in den Griff bekommen möchten. 
Erstens leiden junge Erwachsene ganz besonders unter dem derzeitigen Versagen 
ihrer Länder, mehr und bessere Arbeitsplätze zu schaffen. Aus diesem Grund sind 
Strukturreformen unerlässlich, um die globale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und die  
Dynamik der Entstehung zusätzlicher Jobs zu steigern. In den Ländern, in denen 
Berufseinsteiger nicht automatisch von mehr offenen Stellen in der Wirtschaft  
profitieren, müssen zusätzlich Strukturreformen angegangen werden, um die Kluft 
am Arbeitsmarkt zwischen Jüngeren und Älteren zu überwinden.
Zweitens sind die Schwierigkeiten, die sowohl ungelernte als auch qualifizierte 
Jugendliche bei der Arbeitsmarktintegration haben, ein Ausdruck von qualifikato-
rischem Mismatch: Für einen Teil des angebotenen Humankapitals innerhalb der 
jungen Generation haben die Arbeitgeber keinen Bedarf. Die Bekämpfung solcher 
Ungleichgewichte erfordert eine Modernisierung der Bildungs- und Ausbildungs-
systeme. Ein wesentliches Element hierbei ist, die Unternehmen stärker an Bildungs- 
und Qualifizierungsprozessen zu beteiligen.
Drittens können einzelne aktive arbeitsmarktpolitische Instrumente zwar wirksam 
dazu beitragen, junge Menschen in den Arbeitsmarkt zu integrieren. Die empirische 
Evidenz zur Wirksamkeit der vorhandenen Instrumente ist jedoch nicht ausrei-
chend, um eine generelle Jugendgarantie zu rechtfertigen. Stattdessen sollte aktive 
Arbeitsmarktpolitik selektiv eingesetzt werden. Individualisierung und die Kon-
zentration auf qualitativ hochwertige Instrumente, die innerhalb lokaler Strukturen 
umgesetzt werden, sind entscheidende Erfolgsfaktoren, die allzu leicht verloren 
gehen können, wenn aktive arbeitsmarktpolitische Maßnahmen zu schnell und zu 
umfassend ausgedehnt werden.
Viertens entfalten auf die Veränderung von Strukturen zielende wirtschafts-,  
arbeitsmarkt- und bildungspolitische Strategien zur Vermeidung von Jugend- 
arbeitslosigkeit ihre Wirkung nur langsam, so dass als Ergänzung kurzfristige  
Entlastungsmaßnahmen erforderlich sind. Dabei wäre die Verbesserung der räum-
lichen Mobilität von Arbeitskräften ein besonders effektiver Ansatz. Da die  
Wanderungen innerhalb der EU trotz des gemeinsamen europäischen Arbeits- 
marktes weiterhin auf geringem Niveau verharren, erfordert diese Möglichkeit  
jedoch zusätzliche Anstrengungen auf allen Ebenen.
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Fünftens setzen erfolgreiche Strategien zur Jugendbeschäftigung die Beteiligung 
aller relevanten Stakeholder voraus – einschließlich der jungen Menschen selbst.  
Teil der Herausforderung ist die Strukturierung und Koordination der Aktivitäten 
von Arbeitgebern, Tarifpartnern, Fallmanagern, Bildungseinrichtungen usw. Regie-
rungen müssen bei der Koordinierung und Finanzierung von partnerschaftlichen 
Handlungsmodellen die Führungsrolle übernehmen. Dennoch müssen sich auch  
die Stakeholder aktiv einbringen, damit ihre Interessen und Erfahrungen bei der 
Ausgestaltung einer umfassenden Agenda zur Bekämpfung von Jugendarbeitslosig-
keit berücksichtigt werden. Dieser Prozess könnte durch Nichtregierungsorganisa-
tionen unterstützt werden, die als Vermittler und Moderatoren agieren.
Ein allgemeiner Handlungsplan gegen die Jugendarbeitslosigkeit in Europa
1.  Mehr Arbeitsplätze für Berufseinsteiger schaffen 
– Wirtschaftswachstum fördern, das zu mehr und besseren Arbeitsplätzen führt 
– Spaltung des Arbeitsmarkts für ältere und jüngere Arbeitnehmer bekämpfen 
– Hohe Einstiegsgehälter senken und Einstellungsanreize durch Lohnsubventionen fördern
2.  Qualifikatorischen Mismatch bekämpfen 
– Schulabbrecherquoten verringern 
– Qualität der Berufsbildung durch bessere (duale) Ausbildung im Betrieb steigern 
– Stärker praxisbezogene Lehrpläne an Universitäten
3.  Aktive arbeitsmarktpolitische Instrumente zielgenau einsetzen 
– Berufsberatung und Arbeitsvermittlung verbessern 
– Ausbildung für junge Arbeitslose auf Arbeitsplätzen in Unternehmen bezuschussen 
– Keine Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen
4.  Grenzüberschreitende Mobilität fördern 
– Internationale Mobilität zur Ausbildung oder Beschäftigung in Mangelberufen unterstützen 
– Information über Beschäftigungschancen in Europa verbessern 
– Sprachliche und psychologische Mobilitätsbarrieren senken
5.  Relevante Stakeholder involvieren 
– Kooperative Beziehungen zwischen Gewerkschaften und Arbeitgebern aufbauen 
– Betriebe zur Einführung dualer Ausbildungsstrukturen anregen 




Subject of the Study
The alarming rise of youth unemployment rates following the recent economic  
turmoil has challenged national as well as European labour market policies. With 
more than 5.5 million young people in the EU struggling to find jobs, there is an 
urgent need to develop strategies for combatting youth unemployment, in order to 
avoid a lost generation of European youths threatened by lasting disadvantages in 
terms of labour market and social position.
Against this background, the Robert Bosch Stiftung has commissioned the present 
study from the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim. Its aims 
are to survey the development of youth unemployment in Europe, to identify the 
relevant institutional and economic drivers and to discuss the necessary courses of 
action to achieve a better integration of young adults into the labour market.
While the study covers the perspective of the EU member states as a whole, it strongly  
focusses on southern European countries, which are especially suffering from the 
current youth unemployment crisis. Its core part is comprised of three country 
reports which detail the situation in Italy, Spain and Portugal, and review current and 
potential future policy initiatives that could help in reducing youth unemployment.
Trends in European Youth Unemployment
Following the financial and debt crisis, youth unemployment sharply increased in  
all EU member states except Germany and reached alarmingly high levels in the  
southern European countries. Nevertheless, youth unemployment is not a recent 
phenomenon that can be ascribed only to the Great Recession. Most European  
countries have faced difficulties in integrating youths in the labour market for many 
years, and youth unemployment rates are generally higher than adult unemployment 
rates.
A particularly alarming feature of some youth labour markets are the high rates of 
young people that are disconnected, as they are neither in education, employment  
or training. In Italy, the proportion of such disconnected youths has ranged between  
15 – 20 % since 2000, and Greece and Spain have reached this level in recent years, 
too. Another alarming feature is that in some countries, especially in Southern 
Europe, a huge proportion of young workers are employed on temporary contracts 
that are not related to apprenticeships and require very long periods to make the 
transition to permanent positions. Thus, youth are highly at risk to bear most of the 




Still, the ratio of youth and adult unemployment rates varies markedly across Europe,  
which indicates that national economic and policy structures play an important role 
in explaining the incidence of youth unemployment. Another indicator is the very 
different intensity of youth employment responses to the recession and subsequent 
economic recovery associated with the sovereign debt crisis. Spain and Greece were 
hit hardest by the Great Recession in terms of youth employment, whereas France, 
the United Kingdom and Germany were less affected. 
EU Policies to Promote Youth Employment
The European Commission has been active in working against youth unemployment 
for several years, although responsibilities remain mainly at the member state level. 
In the Europe 2020 strategy, reducing youth unemployment and dropout rates from 
secondary education are featured as central goals. To achieve them, focus is put on 
developing dual vocational education and increasing the mobility of youths between 
member states. The EURES platform provides information on job and apprenticeship 
opportunities in all European countries. Moreover, a European Alliance for Appren-
ticeships was launched in 2013 to improve the quality and supply of apprenticeships.
In response to the recent crisis, the EU has launched a Youth Guarantee, which asks 
all member states to implement the necessary measures to ensure that all youths are 
in employment or in education within four months after leaving school or becoming 
unemployed. Although the Youth Guarantee is backed by financial means drawn from 
the EU, the resources assigned per capita of the young unemployed remain rather 
small. Youth guarantees may help connect young people to labour markets, but they 
are challenging and costly – hence, subjecting agents to wrong or poorly designed 
active measures can be worse than doing nothing. As a result, countries with limited 
financial means, less-developed public employment services and little experience 
with design of efficient active labour market measures should use more targeted 
approaches which focus on the most needy groups.
Structural Sources of Youth Unemployment
Several structural factors play an important role in ensuring the labour market  
integration of youths.
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A first source of youth unemployment are deficits in the education and training 
system. At the individual level, higher and better education significantly reduces the 
probability of becoming unemployed. Secondary school dropouts and low-qualified 
youths are most at risk of becoming unemployed. Warranting that the educational 
system provides youths with a minimum level of qualification and skills before  
entering the labour market is therefore essential to tackle youth unemployment.  
In addition, it is important to ensure that the provided skills are in line with the  
demands of the labour market in order to avoid skills mismatch.
Besides the features of educational systems, labour market institutions also play a 
role in explaining the differences in youth unemployment across countries. The costs 
associated with the dismissal of permanent workers can be a constraint on job  
creation. If the legal setting makes dismissal for economic reasons too burdensome, 
firms will increase the use of either temporary contracts or service provision con-
tracts. This contributes to the duality of labour markets, and makes it difficult for 
youths to obtain regular positions on the labour market. General or sector-specific 
minimum wages that do not take into account differences in productivity related to 
experience are a further constraint on the successful integration of youths into the 
labour market.
Ineffective active labour market policies are a further source of youth unemploy-
ment. Empirical evidence shows that individual job search assistance is the most 
effective form of support for unemployed youths. In practice, the most common form 
of support are training measures. However, only high-quality training, preferably 
within firms, can improve the employment probabilities in the medium run. Financial 
incentives to the private sector for hiring youths are also commonly used but prove 
effective only for the duration of the subsidies.
Spain: Continuing the Reform Agenda
Before the Great Recession, the Spanish economy grew at an annual rate of more  
than 3 % and youth unemployment rates were in line with the average in European 
countries. However, the Spanish labour market was heavily affected by the Great 
Recession. In 2012, the youth unemployment rate reached 53 %, a much higher rate 
than the ones reached in Portugal or Italy. 
One important explanation behind the particularly strong employment losses among 
youths starting with the Great Recession in Spain is the high proportion of tem-
porary contracts among youths. Of all countries considered, the incidence of tem-
porary employment among 25- to 29-year-olds is the highest in Spain together with 
Portugal. Moreover, the transition rate into permanent jobs is very low. This is the 
result of high employment protection of permanent workers and the liberalisation 
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of the use of temporary contracts in the nineties. Working with temporary contracts 
makes youths very vulnerable to job loss in the case of a recession. This process is 
reinforced by the lack of representation of temporary and unemployed workers in 
trade unions. Moreover, the bust of a construction and real estate bubble during the 
financial crisis reinforced job loss in the construction sector.
An ambitious labour market reform was implemented in 2012. Besides providing  
generous financial incentives to small- and medium-sized firms to hire young  
workers, the reform has decentralised wage-setting from the sectoral to the firm level 
and reduced firing costs. Economic reasons for dismissal were redefined in favour 
of firms and maximum severance payments for unfair dismissal were reduced. The 
reform should contribute to increasing the hiring rate. However, further measures 
should be taken to reduce the employment protection gap between permanent and 
temporary contracts. For instance, a maximum cumulated duration of temporary 
contracts in the same firm should be imposed and severance payments in the case of 
dismissal for economic reasons could be further reduced. 
The Spanish educational system is strongly academic-oriented and higher education 
graduation rates are above the EU average. In the vocational secondary school track, 
education is mostly school-based as only 25 % of the time is spent in the firm doing 
on-the-job training. Moreover, there is no legal framework for the content and  
quality of training provided in firms. As a result, there is a relatively high proportion  
of overqualification and employers complain about the lack of practical skills of 
youths. Of all countries considered, dropout rates from secondary school are the 
highest in Spain together with Portugal. It would make sense to expand the vocational  
educational system in a way that it provides an attractive alternative to the academic  
track. The Spanish government is effectively pushing the development of dual  
vocational training centres in cooperation with Spanish and international firms. The 
Basque Country in particular has been very active in promoting the implementation 
of certified dual vocational training. 
A necessary further step would be the development of a legal framework for the 
content and quality of the training provided by firms for each occupation. Existing 
subsidies for youth employment could be made conditional on participation in such  
a certified apprenticeship scheme. This would give firms an incentive to contribute  
to increasing the quality of vocational training.
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Italy: Coordinating Policy Measures
Italy faced weak annual growth rates during the last ten years before being hit  
strongly by the Great Recession. It has also had the worst youth-to-adult unemploy-
ment ratio as well as the highest proportion of youths not in employment, education 
or training since 2000. Moreover, it lags behind in terms of labour market policy as 
well as educational policies to fight youth unemployment. Italian youths face struc-
tural difficulties in entering the labour market across all regions, regardless of the 
large regional economic differences. These structural problems largely originate in 
the low quality of education and the absence of alternatives to the academic track. 
But the conflict-prone relations between insider unions and employers as well as  
the lack of adequate policy initiatives and structural reforms contribute to the  
burden of unemployment for youths.
Italy is the only country that has not increased its spending per student in primary 
and secondary education since 1995. The educational system has a vocational secon-
dary school track, but the programme is very similar to the general track and the only 
on-the-job experience that pupils generally obtain is an internship of less than one 
month. Vocational training agencies and schools (Istruzione e Formazione Profes-
sionale – IFP) coordinated at a regional level, which provide more practice-oriented 
secondary vocational education with a stronger connection to firms, are recently 
gaining importance. However, these centres mostly address early school-leavers and 
their quality of education is generally low and very heterogeneous across regions. 
Apprenticeship contracts are also available but there is no legal framework for the 
quality and content of the training that firms must provide. As a result, the average 
quality of training is low and apprenticeship contracts are not attractive for youths.
The proportion of higher education graduates (15 %) among 25- to 64-year-olds is 
half the OECD average and dropout rates from tertiary education are higher than in 
other European countries as well. Moreover, higher education graduates do not have 
much higher employment probabilities than secondary education graduates in Italy. 
Returns to education in Italy are thus very low, so that there are often few incentives 
to obtain educational qualification. It is therefore necessary to invest in the educa-
tional system at all levels in Italy. In addition, a legal framework for dual vocational 
training should be developed with clear requirements concerning the duration and 
quality of on-the-job training. 
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Similar to Spain and Portugal, Italy has a dual labour market and a problem of insider 
unions. As a consequence, youths bore the largest proportion of job losses after the 
Great Recession and face the risk of remaining in precarious employment for a  
prolonged period of time. Labour market policies have until now not clearly focussed 
on reducing the duality of employment protection. A structural labour market reform 
that reduces and defines clear rules for dismissal costs would be in order.
Finally, interregional mobility of workers is very limited and Italy invests a relatively 
small proportion of its gross domestic product in active labour market policy. There 
is certainly scope for improving public employment services and promoting inter-
regional mobility within Italy.
Portugal: Finding Ways Out of the Recession
The Portuguese economy has been facing structural problems for many years. Of 
all countries considered, Portugal’s gross domestic product per capita has been the 
lowest since 1995, and the growth rate plummeted to negative values twice since  
the start of the Great Recession. The harsh austerity measures taken since then to  
reduce public deficits led to significant reductions of already tight public budgets 
and threaten to worsen the recession.
The first priority to tackle youth unemployment in Portugal should therefore be to 
increase overall job creation and relaunch the economy.
Portugal has made considerable progress in increasing the level of education and 
the proportion of tertiary education graduates has more than doubled since 2000. 
Nevertheless, dropout rates from secondary education (21% in 2012) remain among 
the highest in Europe and the proportion of upper secondary graduates is still low in 
international comparison. Moreover, there is no vocational secondary school track 
with compulsory on-the-job training. This means that there are virtually no educa-
tional alternatives for youths who do not manage to obtain the general secondary 
degree. Developing a high-quality vocational education with a sizeable proportion of 
certified on-the-job training could be an effective way to further increase the quali-
fication level of Portuguese youths.
Several policies initiatives were taken to improve the quality of vocational training 
through a stronger link with firms, and to reduce dropout rates, but these policies 
rely almost exclusively on EU and private funding initiatives. There is not a strong 
support from the side of employers to invest in apprenticeship training beyond these 
EU measures. The harsh budget cuts following the financial and debt crisis are an 
additional constraint on public and private investment in dual vocational training. 
A promising large-scale public initiative (Novas Oportunidades) that provided dual 
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vocational training as an alternative to the general secondary education was stopped  
in 2013. A new programme in the framework of the Youth Guarantee provides dual 
vocational education with compulsory on-the-job training. However, there is no 
legal framework for the content or quality of the training to be provided by firms and 
youths are paid only a symbolic amount for the duration of the training.
The rigidity of labour costs is thought to be a further constraint on youth employment 
in Portugal. The minimum wage, though small in absolute terms, represents close to 
60% of the median wage and applies to all workers regardless of their age. Moreover, 
collective agreements may set wages above the minimum wage level without taking 
into account possible detrimental effects on youth employment. Allowing firms to opt 
out from collective agreements would give them more flexibility in setting wages in 
line with their firm-specific constraints.
The lack of representation of youths’ interests in collective agreements is related to 
the large proportion of youths on temporary contracts. The high dismissal costs of 
workers with high tenure combined with the liberalisation of temporary contracts is 
at the origin of the high proportion of temporary employment of youths. The labour 
market reform of 2011 can be expected to have a favourable effect on job creation, 
because it reduced the dismissal costs for permanent workers and set a maximum 
amount of severance payments. Nevertheless, further measures such as regulating 
the use of service provision contracts are necessary to limit the employment protec-
tion gap between permanent and temporary employment.
A General Course of Action for European Countries
While strategies for tackling youth unemployment need to be developed and  
implemented at the national level, some key elements are relevant for all European 
countries seeking to tackle the youth unemployment problem. In particular, it is 
essential to address five key issues.
First, young adults in particular are suffering from the current failure of countries 
to create new and better jobs in sufficient numbers. Structural reforms aimed at 
improving global competitiveness and the dynamics of job creation are therefore 
fundamental. Where labour market entrants will not benefit from more job openings 
becoming available in the economy, additional structural measures to overcome the 
labour market divide between younger and older workers are in order.
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Second, the difficulties among both unskilled and skilled young people to integrate 
into the labour market are a reflection of skill mismatch: part of human capital  
embedded in the young generation is not in accord with the demand of employers.  
Working against skill mismatch requires modernising education and training 
systems. A key element in this is to bring human capital development closer to the 
private sector.
Third, while some active labour market policies seem to be effective in integrating 
young people into the labour market, the evidence is not satisfactorily strong to 
warrant youth guarantees on a large scale. Instead, active labour market policies 
need to be selective. Individual targeting and quality measures implemented within 
local structures are key success factors, which may easily get lost when active labour 
market policies are extended quickly and on a large scale.
Fourth, strategies of adapting general economic, labour market and education  
policies that aim at reducing youth unemployment will unfold their effects slowly.  
Therefore, complementary measures that could have a short-term alleviating effect, 
are in order. Among these, geographic mobility is probably the most effective short-
term valve. It requires additional support at all levels, as geographical mobility 
remains low despite a unified European labour market.
Fifth, successful youth employment strategies require involving all relevant stake-
holders, including the young people themselves. Part of the challenge is to structure 
and organise activities among employers, social partners, case managers, education 
providers, etc. Obstacles to cooperation call governments to take the lead in coordi-
nating and financing partnership models. Still stakeholders must actively engage 
themselves to identify their interests and contribute their experience in respect  
to setting up a comprehensive policy agenda to fight youth unemployment.  
Non-governmental organisations may support the process by acting as mediators 
and moderators.
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A General Course of Action for Tackling Youth Unemployment in Europe
1.  Create More Jobs for Labour Market Entrants 
– Ensure economic growth that leads to more and better jobs 
– Fight segmentation between older and younger workers in the labour market 
– Lower high entry wages and strengthen hiring incentives through wage subsidies
2.  Better Align Skills and Labour Market Needs 
– Fight early school-leaving 
– Foster the quality of vocational education by stronger (dual) training at the workplace 
– Make academic training more applied
3.  Use a Careful Selection of Active Labour Market Policies 
– Improve upon counselling and job search assistance 
– Provide publicly sponsored training to unemployed youth, if possible at real workplaces 
– Avoid public job creation
4.  Support Mobility Across Borders 
– Encourage international mobility for training and employment in scarce occupations 
– Improve upon information 
– Lower language and psychological barriers to mobility
5.  Involve All Relevant Stakeholders 
– Establish cooperative industrial relations 
– Engage firms in setting up dual vocational training structures 
– Set up and monitor comprehensive youth employment strategies
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Youth unemployment is not a new phenomenon in many member states of the  
European Union. The southern European countries in particular have been marred 
by high youth unemployment rates well before the onset of the crisis, a reflection  
of structural rather than cyclical problems related to education and labour market 
institutions. Still, the alarming rise of youth unemployment rates following the  
recent economic turmoil has challenged national as well as European labour market 
policies. With more than 5.5 million young people in the EU struggling to find jobs, 
there is an urgent need to find policy responses to combat youth unemployment and 
to avoid a “lost generation” of European youths.
Successful investment in such policies could in fact generate substantial returns. At 
the individual level, periods of unemployment at a young age bear the potential of 
deep scarring effects. There is ample evidence that youth unemployment translates 
into significantly higher propensities of unemployment and significantly lowers  
earnings and financial stability later in life. This could lead to social exclusion not 
only in economic terms, but also in social and cultural terms. Further risks associated 
with youth unemployment include deskilling, degradation of physical and mental 
health, and a lasting reduction in life satisfaction.
At the macroeconomic level, failing to integrate the young generation implies a loss 
of production, productivity and probably also innovation potential. In addition to  
the associated loss of gross domestic product (GDP), there is a fiscal cost of youth 
unemployment due to increased welfare payments and loss of tax revenues.  
According to estimates by Eurofound (2012) for the EU-27, the direct macroeconomic  
cost of those young people aged 15 to 29 not in employment, education or training, 
i.e. the NEET population, amounted to more than 150 billion euros in 2011, or  
roughly 1.2 per cent of European GDP.
While these numbers derive from a rather simple calculus supposing that one could 
fully integrate each young European into the labour market, they still point to the 
quite substantial economic losses for societies faced with high youth unemployment. 
And from a societal perspective, the losses are probably even larger than the pure 
economic costs. The personal effects on health and social stability may translate into 
greater pressure on public services, such as health, welfare and integration services. 
Besides, survey results by Eurofound (2012) suggest that a growing NEET popula-
tion can be associated with a decline in trust with regard to social institutions, and 
less political engagement and participation. Provided that the disconnected youth 
blames decision-makers for their situation, this is a serious threat to the acceptance 




In response to these threats, fighting youth unemployment has been put at the top 
of the political agenda in many European countries and at the level of the European 
Union. The European Parliament stressed the importance of measures guaranteeing 
that young people are either employed, in education or training within four months 
after becoming unemployed or leaving formal education. The corresponding “Youth 
Guarantee” was adopted in the resolution on Youth Opportunities Initiative in 2012 
and endorsed by the member states in April 2013. In this framework, the EU supports 
national initiatives that focus on reducing the number of secondary school dropouts 
and the development of vocational education and training.
The aim of the present study is to provide an overview of the mechanisms behind 
youth unemployment in Europe before and during the crisis, and to describe existing 
policies and their expected effectiveness in order to outline necessary further policy 
initiatives in Southern Europe. This includes further actions from the side of govern-
ments but also possible interventions by other stakeholders such as employers’ 
organisations and unions. 
To this purpose, we first present an overview of the state of youth employment for 
seven different EU countries in the last decade. We compare developments in Italy, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain that had the highest youth unemployment rates in 2012, 
with countries overall less affected by youth unemployment previous to the crisis 
such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom. In a second part, we then give an 
overview of the most important structural and institutional factors in the education 
systems and on the labour market that can contribute to youth unemployment.  
In a third part, we describe the combination of institutional and macroeconomic  
determinants that are specific to three countries particularly affected by youth  
unemployment: Italy, Portugal and Spain. For these countries, we also present the 
policies implemented to reduce youth unemployment since the Great Recession  
and we assess their expected effectiveness. Moreover, we provide country-specific 
recommendations on the need for further initiatives by governments and other  
stakeholders. We chose to focus on these three countries because they cover a  
broad spectrum of different institutional and labour market features. Similar combi- 
nations of structural determinants of youth unemployment and the following policy 
recommendations can therefore give insights for other countries not included in the  
analysis such as France or Greece.
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2.1 Overview
In this chapter, we describe the development of unemployment in Europe in the last 
decade and we present the initiatives that the EU has taken so far to tackle youth  
unemployment. In particular, we highlight the heterogeneous reactions of labour 
markets to the recession and outline the relevance of structural reasons behind 
youth unemployment rates. Beside the European Union as a whole, we focus on  
seven European countries that cover a large bandwidth of industrial structures, 
labour market institutions and educational systems: Germany, Greece, France, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
Youth unemployment sharply increased in all countries (except Germany) following 
the financial and debt crisis and reached alarmingly high levels in the southern  
European countries. Nevertheless, youth unemployment is not a recent phenomenon 
that can be ascribed only to the Great Recession. 
Except Germany, Portugal and the United Kingdom, all countries have faced difficul-
ties in integrating youths in the labour market for many years, and youth unemploy-
ment rates are typically much higher than adult ones. Italy has had one of the worst-
performing youth labour markets among the EU-15 countries since 2000. Germany, 
Portugal and the United Kingdom have on average relatively low youth unemploy-
ment rates as compared to the other countries, but youth unemployment rates are 
higher than adult unemployment rates in these countries as well. 
The intensity of the reaction of youth unemployment to the decrease in economic 
growth was very different between countries. Spain and Greece were hit hardest by 
the recession in terms of employment whereas France, the United Kingdom and  
Germany were less affected. This indicates that country-specific institutions and 
policies play an important role in explaining the occurrence of youth unemployment. 
The high rate of youths who are not in education, employment or training since 2000 
in Italy also points to structural issues in integrating youths into the labour market.
As a further indicator of the labour market integration of youths, we focus on the 
frequency of temporary employment contracts. France, Italy, Spain and Portugal 
display proportions of 25- to 29-year-olds in temporary employment of over 50 %. 
Contrary to what we observe in Germany, these temporary contracts are not related 
to apprenticeships but to the lack of possibilities to obtain permanent contracts and 
make youths vulnerable to decreases in the demand for labour such as during the 
Great Recession. 
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Through the Youth Guarantee, which recommends that the member states take all 
necessary measures to ensure that youths are in employment or training within four 
months after leaving school, the EU provides financial support to national projects 
that tackle youth unemployment. The two main focuses of the Youth Guarantee in 
practice are projects supporting the mobility of youths and the development of dual 
vocational training. Moreover, the EURES network aims to provide a platform for job 
searchs at the European level and the European Commission supports the develop-
ment of high-quality apprenticeships with the European Alliance for Apprentice-
ships.
2.2 The Development of Youth Unemployment 
Table 2-1 shows the development of the unemployment rate of the under 25-Year-
Olds between 2000 and 2012. The youth unemployment is defined as the number of 
youths (15- to 24-Year-Olds) who are unemployed divided by the number of youths 
who are either employed or unemployed (see Box 2-1 for a more detailed definition 
of unemployment and the unemployment rate).
Youth unemployment rates already diverged strongly between countries in 2000: 
Italy, Greece and Spain had youth unemployment rates over 25 %, whereas youth 
unemployment rates were below 10 % in Germany and in Portugal.
Table 2-1: Youth (15- to 24-Year-Olds) Unemployment Rate by Country, 2000 – 2012.
EU-27 EU-15 Germany Greece Spain France Italy Portugal United 
Kingdom
2000 18.3 16.1 8.5 29.2 25.3 20.6 31.5 8.2 12.0
2001 17.3 14.1 7.8 28.0 20.7 18.0 27.8 8.9 10.3
2002 17.9 14.7 9.3 26.1 21.6 18.9 27.1 10.4 10.9
2003 18.1 15.3 11.0 25.7 22.3 17.5 26.8 13.4 11.4
2004 18.6 16.0 13.0 26.5 22.4 20.1 24.6 14.0 10.7
2005 18.6 16.6 15.5 26.0 19.7 20.6 24.0 16.1 12.8
2006 17.3 15.9 13.8 25.2 17.9 21.6 21.6 16.3 14.0
2007 15.5 14.9 11.9 22.9 18.2 19.1 20.3 16.6 14.3
2008 15.6 15.4 10.6 22.1 24.6 18.6 21.3 16.4 15.0
2009 19.9 19.6 11.2 25.8 37.8 23.2 25.4 20.0 19.1
2010 20.9 20.2 9.9 32.9 41.6 22.8 27.8 22.4 19.6
2011 21.3 20.6 8.6 44.4 46.4 22.0 29.1 30.1 21.1
2012 22.8 22.2 8.1 55.3 53.2 23.8 35.3 37.7 21.0
Note: The youth unemployment rate is the percentage proportion of youths who are unemployed  
compared to those who are in the labour force (employed + unemployed). Individuals are counted as  
unemployed if they have looked for work at some point during the past four weeks and are available to 
start working within the next two weeks. Source: EUROSTAT online database, unemployment rates by  
age (%).
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Youth unemployment rates decreased in most countries considered in the years 
before the financial crisis only to increase sharply starting from 2009, especially in 
southern European countries. In 2012, youth unemployment rates soared to alarm-
ingly high levels of over 30 % in Italy and Portugal and more than 50 % in Greece  
and in Spain. Not all countries reacted in a similar way to the Great Recession.  
Whereas youth unemployment doubled in Greece and Spain between 2006 and 2012, 
the Italian youth unemployment rate was not much higher in 2012 than in 2000.  
Portugal and the United Kingdom have faced a continuous increase in their youth  
unemployment rate since 2000. Finally, Germany has had the lowest youth unemploy- 
ment of all considered countries since 2001 and the youth unemployment rate has 
even decreased since 2006.
Box 2-1: Definitions of Unemployment Measures
Unemployment Rate
The unemployment definition utilised by Eurostat is based on the International Labour Organi-
sation (ILO) definition and specifies an unemployed person as “someone aged 15 to 64 without 
work during the reference week who is available to start work within the next two weeks and who 
has actively sought employment at some time during the last four weeks” or “has found a job and 
will start work within the next three months”. All people “aged 15 and over” who have worked 
for at least one hour during the reference week “for pay, profit or family gain” are counted as 
employed. The labour force consists of the employed and unemployed and is the economically 
active population.
The unemployment rate is calculated by dividing the number of unemployed people in the  
population by the labour force. The size of the labour force is determined by the number of  
people unemployed and thus available for work and those employed. Hence, this definition fails 
to capture those who are discouraged and exit the labour force by not searching for work in a  
given reference week. For example, even if the unemployment rate may appear low, the number 
of inactive persons may be high. This can especially be the case when a high number of job-
seekers rely on informal search mechanisms and do not register as unemployed at the public 
employment service.
Youth and Adult Unemployment Rate
The youth unemployment rate is calculated analogously to the overall unemployment rate.  
The youth unemployment rate is defined by the ratio of unemployed in the age group 15 – 24 to 
the sum of the employed and the unemployed in the 15 – 24 age group (Eurostat web youth  
unemployment). The adult unemployment rate is calculated in a similar way, but taking the age 
group 25 – 64 as the reference category.
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Table 2-2 shows the total numbers of unemployed individuals by country and year, 
clearly depicting how many youngsters are suffering from unemployment in Europe.  
In 2012, the number of unemployed youth in the European Union (27 countries) 
reached the unprecedented value of 5.5 million. Changes in countries ranking by 
relative size reflect not only differences in population sizes, but also cross-country 
differences in the percentage of youth who are in the labour force (either employed 
or unemployed). The highest numbers of unemployed youth are found in the United 
Kingdom and Spain (more than 900,000), where the number of unemployed doubled 
from 2007 to 2012 similarly to unemployment rates. While the number of unem-
ployed youth increased dramatically also in Italy, it remained lower than in France. 
In 2012, the number of unemployed youth in Greece and Portugal was lower than 
200,000, reflecting the smaller population in these countries.
Table 2-2: Number of Unemployed Youths (18- to 24-Year-Olds) in Thousands  
by Country, 2000 – 2012
EU-27 EU-15 Germany Greece Spain France Italy Portugal United 
Kingdom
2000 5048 3452 382 164 631 520 806 54 517
2001 4751 2995 349 146 498 468 658 60 440
2002 4875 3141 418 130 521 513 612 69 478
2003 4852 3273 495 120 537 484 595 82 501
2004 4940 3395 570 126 536 551 543 81 485
2005 5018 3637 745 108 490 592 490 91 596
2006 4649 3498 667 99 443 623 425 89 666
2007 4133 3272 586 84 443 552 380 86 682
2008 4140 3394 517 77 593 535 399 84 722
2009 5157 4197 537 89 842 686 450 93 892
2010 5253 4199 460 110 852 665 480 95 904
2011 5256 4231 407 141 889 627 482 134 963
2012 5524 4510 370 174 945 668 611 161 963
Source: EUROSTAT online database, unemployment by age (1,000).
A decrease in economic growth, especially if it is not anticipated, is likely to lead to a 
reduction in the demand for labour. Youth unemployment rates, in particular, have a 
strong responsiveness to aggregate demand and are more sensitive to business-cycle 
conditions than the adult unemployment rate (OECD 2008a). This is because youth 
under 25 are on average less experienced and therefore less attached to their work-
place than adults, but also because they less often have permanent contracts (Clark 
and Summers 1982).
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Table 2-3 presents gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates over time for the 
considered countries. Economic growth has plummeted in all EU countries in 2009 as 
a result of the financial crisis. However, whereas some countries recovered relatively 
fast, such as the UK, France and Germany, the other countries still face negative 
growth rates in 2012. The debt crisis in 2012 led to a second wave of negative growth 
in Italy, Spain and Portugal, while countries as Germany and the UK faced low but 
positive growth rates in the same year.
Table 2-3: GDP Growth by Country, 2000 – 2012
EU-27 EU-15 Germany Greece Spain France Italy Portugal United 
Kingdom
2000 3.9 3.9 3.1 4.5 5.0 3.7 3.7 3.9 4.4
2001 2.0 2.0 1.5 4.2 3.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.2
2002 1.3 1.2 0.0 3.4 2.7 0.9 0.5 0.8 2.3
2003 1.5 1.3 -  0.4 5.9 3.1 0.9 0.0 -  0.9 3.9
2004 2.6 2.4 1.2 4.4 3.3 2.5 1.7 1.6 3.2
2005 2.2 2.0 0.7 2.3 3.6 1.8 0.9 0.8 3.2
2006 3.4 3.2 3.7 5.5 4.1 2.5 2.2 1.4 2.8
2007 3.2 3.0 3.3 3.5 3.5 2.3 1.7 2.4 3.4
2008 0.4 0.1 1.1 -  0.2 0.9 -  0.1 -  1.2 0.0 -  0.8
2009 -  4.5 -  4.6 -  5.1 -  3.1 -  3.8 -  3.1 -  5.5 -  2.9 -  5.2
2010 2.0 2.0 4.0 -  4.9 -  0.2 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.7
2011 1.7 1.5 3.3 -  7.1 0.1 2.0 0.4 -  1.3 1.1
2012 -  0.4 -  0.5 0.7 -  7.0 -  1.6 0.0 -  2.4 -  3.2 0.3
Note: The change in nominal GDP specifies the percentage change on the previous period for a given 
year. The impact of the economic crisis led to a plunge in the GDPs in 2009 across all countries. Source: 
EUROSTAT online database, GDP and main components – volumes.
Figure 2-1 shows the change in unemployment rate and economic growth rate of the 
EU-27 countries between 2000 and 2012. As expected, an inverse relation can be ob-
served between the economic growth rate and the change in youth unemployment. 
However, the elasticity of youth unemployment to the growth rate varies between 
countries. Spain had the largest increase in youth unemployment, although the  
GDP decreased less than in Italy or Portugal. This indicates that country-specific  
institutions and economic structures are relevant to explain youth unemployment.
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Figure 2-1: Change in Gross Domestic Product and Change in Youth Unemployment 
Rate 2000 – 2012, EU-27
Note: The change in the youth unemployment rate is given by the difference in the unemployment rates in 
a given year minus the unemployment rate in the previous year. The percentage change in the GDP on the 
previous period gives the change in the GDP. Source: EUROSTAT online database, unemployment rates by 
age (%) and GDP and main components – volumes, own calculations.
2.3 The Situation of Youth Compared to Adults
Figure 2-2 shows the development of the youth and the adult unemployment rates 
for the EU (27 countries) since 2000. Even before the Great Recession, youth unem-
ployment rates were already more than twice as high as adult unemployment rates. 
We also observe that both adult and youth unemployment rates increased starting in 















































































Figure 2-2: Unemployment Rates by Age 2000 – 2012, EU-27
Source: EUROSTAT online database, unemployment rates by age (%).
Figure 2-3 therefore presents the ratio of the youth (15- to 24-Year-Olds) to the adult 
(25- to 64-Year-Olds) unemployment rate before and after the start of the Great  
Recession by country. While youths were more than three times as likely to be un-
employed as adults in Italy, the UK and Greece, the youth unemployment rate was 
only 1.4 times the adult unemployment rate in Germany. Germany is the country 
where the youth unemployment rate is closest to the adult unemployment rate.  
The ranking of the countries according to the youth-to-adult unemployment ratio 
barely changed during the Great Recession. These figures indicate that there are  
specific issues for 15- to 24-Year-Olds in some countries, which structurally and  
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Figure 2-3: Ratio of Youth (15- to 24-Year-Olds) to Adult (25- to 64-Year-Olds)  
Unemployment Rates by Country, in 2006 and 2012
Note: The youth-to-adult unemployment ratio is obtained by dividing the youth (15- to 24-Year-Olds)  
unemployment rate by the adult (25- to 64-Year-Olds) unemployment rate. A higher ratio indicates that the  
employment prospects of youths are worse than those of adults who participate in the labour market. 
Source: EUROSTAT online database, unemployment rates by sex, age and nationality (%), own calculations.
A considerable proportion of youths aged 15 to 24 still attends school or is in tertiary 
education, and is therefore not counted as unemployed. Moreover, some may have 
given up looking for a job and are therefore not counted as unemployed in the usual 
definition either. In addition, youths tend to work more often under temporary em-
ployment contracts which make them more vulnerable to decreases in the demand 
for labour. We therefore consider two more measures of youth occupational status: 
the proportion of youth who are not in employment, education or training and the 
proportion of temporary employment.
The NEET concept – youths “Not in Employment, Education or Training” – includes 
unemployed youths but also inactive youths in the sense that they are neither in any 
kind of training or education nor in employment. The NEET rate is the proportion of 
youths not in employment, education or training in an age group (see Box 2-2 for a 


















Box 2-2: Definition of NEET Rate
Youths who are “Not in Education, Employment or Training” are called NEET. The NEET concept 
is often considered to be more appropriate to assess the occupational status of youth than 
unemployment, because a considerable proportion of this age group is still attending school or 
university. The NEET rate includes the unemployed but also those individuals who are inactive 
and not involved in any education or training activity, thereby not investing in qualifications 
that are relevant for their future careers. The NEET rate is calculated by dividing the number of 
individuals in NEET status in a given age group by the total population in that age group. Note 
that individuals who are unemployed but participating in training programmes are not counted as 
NEET. Therefore, while typically the NEET rate is higher than the unemployment ratio, this need 
not always be the case. A precise description of the NEET concept can be found in Eurofound 
(2012), pp. 19 – 41.
Figure 2-4 presents the NEET rates among 15- to 24-Year-Olds by country since 2000. 
NEET rates are highest in Greece, Italy and Spain, where about 20 % of youth aged 
15 – 24 were not in education, training or employment in 2012. However, whereas 
the Spanish and Greek NEET rate shows an especially stark increase since 2008, 
the Italian NEET rate has been over 15 % for ten years. In line with the time constant 
youth-to-adult unemployment ratio, this fact also points to the existence of structural 
problems in the labour market entry of young people in Italy. In contrast, NEET rates 
in the United Kingdom and France have been much less affected by the recession, 
and in Germany, the NEET rate has even decreased since 2005. 
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Figure 2-4: NEET Rates 15- to 24-Year-Olds by Country, 2000 – 2012
Note: The NEET rate is the percentage of the youths who are not in education, employment or training. 
Source: EUROSTAT online database, young people neither in employment nor in education and training  
by sex and NUTS 2 regions (NEET rates).
Focussing on 15- to 24-Year-Olds we cannot observe what happens to youths after 
finishing tertiary education. Therefore, in Figure 2-5 we present the employment 
and educational status of 25- to 29-Year-Olds by country. We find similar NEET rates 
among 25- to 29-Year-Olds as well as among 15- to 24-Year-Olds. NEET rates are  
highest in Greece, Italy and Spain; the same countries as those where NEET rates 
among 15- to 24-Year-Olds are highest. Spain and Italy also have the highest propor-
tions of youths (25 – 29) still in education or training. The difficulties of labour market 
integration in these countries are therefore not restricted to the youngest school-















































Figure 2-5: Labour Market Status of 25- to 29-Year-Olds in 2012, by Country
Note: The graph shows the proportions of youths aged 25 – 29 who are in employment, in education,  
or not in employment, education or training (NEET). Source: EUROSTAT online database, Young people  
neither in employment nor in education and training by sex, age and educational attainment level  
(in % points of NEET rates), youth employment rate by sex, age and country of birth, own calculations.
The type of employment contract constitutes a further measure of the labour market  
integration of youths. While young workers are more likely to hold a temporary 
contract than adults in all considered European countries, the proportion of workers 
with temporary contracts differs largely between countries.
Figure 2-6 shows the proportion of employees with a temporary contract by age 
group in 2012. As new entrants in the labour market, young workers are over- 
represented in temporary contracts. The proportion of temporary contracts is three 
to ten times higher for youth aged 15 to 24 and two to four times higher for youths 
aged 25 to 29 than among adults. A high proportion of temporary contracts for young 
workers aged 25 to 29 can point to possible structural difficulties of youths to obtain  
a permanent contract. Compared to the other countries, the UK has a relatively low 
proportion of temporary employment for all age groups. Conversely, Spain and 
Portugal exhibit the highest proportions of temporary workers for all age groups. 
The proportion of temporary employment of 15 to 24-Year-Olds is over 50 % in most 
considered countries. However, this proportion drops to around 20 % for youth aged 
25 to 29 in all countries, except Spain, Portugal, France and Italy. The proportion of 
temporary employment among 15- to 24-Year-Olds is relatively stable over time and 
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Figure 2-6: Proportion of Temporary Employment by Age Groups in 2012, by Country
Source: EUROSTAT online database, temporary employees as a percentage of the total number of  
employees, by sex and age (%).
The high proportions of temporary contracts for youth under 25 are not a similar  
reason of concern in all countries, because in some countries these contracts might 
be apprenticeships. As can be observed in Figure 2-7, there are different reasons why 
youths have temporary contracts in the various countries. Whereas the majority of 
15- to 24-Year-Olds in Spain, Portugal and Greece indicate that they have a temporary 
contract because they could not obtain a permanent contract. In Germany 80% of 
youths have temporary contracts because they are in training. In France and in Italy, 
about half of youths indicate that they are in temporary employment due to training, 
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Figure 2-7: Main Reason for Temporary Employment for the 15- to 24-Years-Olds  
by Country, 2012
Note: The proportions shown in the table do not sum up to 100 % since two other possible reasons are 
omitted, namely “did not want a permanent job” and “probationary period”. Source: EUROSTAT online 
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2.4 EU Policies to Tackle Youth Unemployment
Reducing youth unemployment is a key priority of EU policy. Increasing employment  
rates and improving educational attainment are two of the five targets that the EU 
aims to reach in the next decade as part of its Europe 2020 strategy of achieving 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. Whereas the objective of smart growth aims 
to invest in education and research to foster innovation, inclusive growth under-
lines the necessity to support economic and social inclusion and to reduce inequali-
ties. Both of these goals are coherent with a reduction in youth unemployment. For 
instance, an explicit target is to reach a 75 % employment rate for the working-age 
population. This cannot be achieved without tackling youth unemployment and 
increasing the youth employment rate. Another target is to reduce dropout rates 
from secondary education to below 10 % and policy initiatives supporting education 
should also contribute to lower youth unemployment rates.
The Youth Guarantee, adopted in 2012, is a recommendation to the member states 
that they aim to offer all young people up to age 25 a quality job, education or  
apprenticeship within four months of leaving formal education or becoming  
unemployed. The initiative is based on similar programmes already existing is  
some EU member states, such as Austria and Finland. The implementation is to be 
done at the level of the member states and the EU gives financial support to reduce 
the fiscal burden of the required investments. 
A budget of 6 billion euros has been approved for the Youth Guarantee. Half this 
financial support is provided by the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI) that has 
been created specifically for the Youth Guarantee and concentrates on regions with 
more than 25 % youth unemployment rates and NEET. The other half of the funding 
is provided through national allocations of the already existing European Social 
Fund (ESF). The intensity in which the funds of the Youth Guarantee are used varies 
between countries depending on the local projects that are being developed. The 
funding of the YEI has been allocated among member states with the requirement 
to match these with at least the same amount of funding from their European Social 
Fund allocations. Spain will receive the highest amount of YEI funding with 29 % of 
the total budget, followed by Italy 18 % and France 10 %. The UK will receive 6 % of 
the funding, Greece and Portugal about 5 % each, whilst Germany does not qualify for 
receiving funding from the programme. 
The advantage of the decentralised implementation of the Youth Guarantee is that 
countries can develop projects specific to their needs. However, there is a risk that 
funds are dispersed between small projects of variable effectiveness. Aware that the 
Youth Guarantee cannot be successfully implemented with EU funding alone, the 
European Commission has recommended national investments in structural reforms 
49
to modernise employment, social and education services for young persons. Each 
member state was requested to publish their implementation plans for the Youth 
Guarantee between December 2013 (for countries receiving YEI funds) and spring 
2014. In practice, policy initiatives will mostly focus on giving more resources to 
employment services and on promoting dual vocational education.
The European Commission also supports the mobility of young people by providing 
information and advice on job opportunities in other EU countries with the EURES 
job search network. Set up in 1993, EURES is a cooperation network between the 
European Commission and the Public Employment Services of the EU member states. 
Through its portal in 25 languages, it provides access to more than 1.4 million job 
vacancies and 1.1 million CVs. According to the EU, the EURES network accounts 
for approximately 150,000 placements per year, but is in need of reforms to become 
more effective. In particular, the number of posted vacancies is to be increased, for 
instance, though a better cooperation with national job posting institutions. More-
over, the network is to provide mobility support to facilitate recruitment from other 
EU states for employers. 
The EU Study Visits programme is coordinated by the Cedefop (European Centre for 
the Development of Vocational Training) and financed by the EU’s Lifelong Learning 
Programme (LLP). It finances and organises three- to five-day visits of stakeholders 
from the educational or the private sector to discover aspects of lifelong learning and 
apprenticeship systems in other EU countries.
Finally, the European Commission launched a European Alliance for Apprentice-
ships to improve the quality and supply of apprenticeships in 2013. The Alliance 
supports the establishment of bilateral and national agreements between social 
partners, businesses, Chambers of Commerce and VET (Vocational Education and 
Training) providers in order to promote apprenticeship systems.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
The descriptive evidence presented in this chapter shows that high youth unem-
ployment rates were an issue in many European countries already before the Great 
Recession and that in Southern Europe youth unemployed soared to unprecedented 
levels afterwards. In the next chapter, we investigate the structural and institutional 
factors that contributed either to the high youth unemployment before the crisis or  




The Great Recession was not the only determinant of high youth unemployment; 
country-specific structural factors also seem to play an important role in ensuring 
the labour market integration of youths. This chapter therefore aims to provide an 
overview of the different educational and labour market institutions that jointly  
determine the risk of youth unemployment.
A first focus will be the role of education and training systems in ensuring that  
youths have a smooth transition into the labour market. Second, we highlight how 
differences in the employment protection legislation, wage-setting institutions and 
the negotiation culture between employers’ organisations and unions are relevant  
for the prevalence of youth unemployment. Third, we assess the role of demographic 
changes, migration and the lack of geographic mobility for youth unemployment.
Lower educated youths are most strongly affected by unemployment. It is thus  
essential that the educational system provides youths with a minimum level of  
qualification and skills that match the needs of employers.
Dropout rates from secondary education have decreased in all considered countries 
in the last years. However, dropout rates in Spain and Portugal remain twice as high 
as in Germany (11% in 2012). Besides increasing the age of compulsory schooling, 
a diversified offer of secondary school tracks including a more practice-oriented 
vocational track has been shown to improve secondary graduation rates. Financial 
incentives for pupils to stay in school have also proved effective in the United King-
dom but are very costly.
In most European countries, secondary education is academic-oriented. When a  
vocational track exists, it is generally strongly school-based and dedicated to a 
minority of lower-performing pupils. However, it has been shown that youths with 
a dual vocational education that combines experience in a firm with school-based 
education have better perspectives on the labour market than youths with a general 
secondary education degree at most. Firms can also benefit from a dual vocational 
education track because they can train youths to have the practical skills that they 
need. A legal framework that defines the time spent in class and on the job as well as 
standards for the on-the-job training by occupation is important in order to warrant 
the quality of the training provided by firms.
3 
Structural Sources of  
Youth Unemployment
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An increasing proportion of youths in the European countries obtains a university 
degree. From an individual perspective, a higher education degree on average leads 
to a higher employment probability. But it is less clear what the optimal proportion 
of tertiary education graduates should be. Depending on the demand for skills by the 
economy, related to the sectoral specialisation, a lack of vocationally trained youths 
may also lead to youth unemployment. 
Besides the features of educational systems, labour market institutions also play 
a role in explaining differences in youth unemployment across countries. The costs 
associated with the dismissal of permanent workers can be a constraint on job  
creation. If the legal setting makes dismissal for economic reasons too burdensome, 
firms will increase the use of either temporary contracts or service provision  
contracts and may be reluctant to hire new employees altogether. 
However, employment protection of permanent contracts is very strict in Germany  
as well, and no empirical evidence has been provided as yet that employment pro-
tection in itself reduced job creation. It is clear, however, that youths with temporary 
contracts are more at risk of losing their jobs than older workers with permanent 
contracts when a recession occurs.
The fact that temporary workers and the unemployed are barely represented in 
unions and collective agreement negotiations certainly contributes to the strong 
negative employment effects of the recession in Southern Europe as well. Wage  
restrictions and reductions in working time in order to preserve employment  
creation are certainly much less likely to occur when insider unions negotiate with 
employers. In addition, the lack of a compromise-oriented negotiation culture  
between unions and employers’ organisations can increase the threat of high  
administrative costs at dismissal and thereby reduce job creation.
The presence of a minimum wage that automatically applies to all workers and firms 
regardless of regional, sectoral and firm constraints can also contribute to increasing 
youth unemployment if set at too high a level. This is because youths have on average 
less experience and a lower productivity. 
Structural Sources of Youth Unemployment
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Active labour market policy refers to a set of policies to assist the unemployed in 
finding a job, such as public counselling and guidance services as well as training 
programmes for the unemployed. Large differences exist between countries in the 
amount that they spend on active labour market policies. France, Spain and Germany 
invest the largest amounts in active labour market policies, whereas Italy and Greece 
lag behind. Empirical evidence shows that together with private sector incentives, 
job search assistance appears to be most effective in supporting the unemployed in 
the short run. However, with the exception of the United Kingdom, all considered 
countries invest more financial means in training measures rather than job search 
assistance.
Finally, whereas changes in the relative proportion of youths in the workforce and 
immigration from outside the EU have only a small impact on youth unemployment 
according to existing evidence, the lack of geographical mobility of youths  
contributes to the large local differences in youth unemployment observed. Geo-
graphic mobility of youths between European countries and between regions within 
countries is much lower than in the US and mobility is lowest in the countries with the 
highest youth unemployment rates. Supporting the geographical mobility of youths, 
as the EU does in the framework of the EURES network, could thus help to reduce 
youth unemployment in regions that are strongly affected.
3.2 Education and Training Systems
Educational achievement is an important determinant of the probability to be  
employed, and youth unemployment rates are higher for lower educated youths in  
all countries. 
Figure 3-1 presents the unemployment rates by level of education of 25- to 29-Year-
Olds in the considered countries in 2012 (see Box 3-3 for a definition of the educatio-
nal levels based on the International Standard Classification of Education – ISCED). 
In most considered countries and in the EU-27 on average, youths without an upper 
secondary education face unemployment rates of between 20 % and 40 % in all  
considered countries. This is at least twice more than the better educated youths.
France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom present the largest differences 
in unemployment between upper secondary and tertiary education graduates. In 
these countries, the unemployment rates for higher education graduates is at least 
10 percentage points lower than that for youths with an upper secondary education. 
Greece, Portugal and Italy have high unemployment rates for all levels of educational 
attainment.
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Figure 3-1: Unemployment Rates by Educational Attainment of 25- to 29-Year-Olds  
in 2012, by Country
Note: ISCED 0–2: up to lower secondary education, ISCED 3–4: upper secondary education or post- 
secondary non-tertiary education, ISCED 5–6: tertiary education. See Box 3-1 for a definition of  
secondary and tertiary education. Source: EUROSTAT online database, unemployment rates by sex,  
age and highest level of education attained (%).
The educational system managing to provide youths with the necessary skills and 
qualifications thus seems essential for their successful integration into the labour 
market. In the following sections, we focus on secondary education dropouts, on the 
quantity and quality of vocational education as well as on skill mismatch of tertiary 
graduates.
Box 3-1: ISCED Classification of Educational Levels
ISCED (International Standard Classification of Education) is an international classification  
system which enables the comparison of educational systems across countries. Below we  
provide a definition of the ISCED educational levels that are relevant for the present study.
Lower secondary education (ISCED 2): second stage of basic education, typically ending at age 
15 – 16.
Upper secondary education (ISCED 3): final stage of secondary education preparing for tertiary 
education and/or providing skills relevant to employment.
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3.2.1 Early School-Leavers
Early school-leavers are youths aged 18- to 24-year-olds having attained at most 
lower secondary education and not being involved in further education or training. 
Early school-leavers face a significantly higher risk of unemployment in all European 
countries. Increasing upper secondary graduation rates is therefore an important 
goal of national educational policies and one of the two key targets of the EU 2020 
strategy. 
The European countries have made important progress in reducing secondary 
school dropout rates in the last decade but large differences across countries remain. 
Portugal and Spain had the highest proportion of early school-leavers in 2006 with 
respectively 40 % and 30 % of early school-leavers among 18- to 24-Year-Olds. The 
rate of early school-leavers in the European Union (27 countries) dropped from  
17 % in 2002 to less than 13 % in 2012. The rate of early school-leavers in Portugal  
decreased from 45 % in 2002 to 21% by 2012. The Spanish rate of early school-leavers  
dropped to 25 % in the same time period. Nevertheless, this is still much higher  
than the early school-leavers’ rate of around 11% in Germany or less than 10 % in 
Scandinavian countries.
The most straightforward measure to reduce the number of early school-leavers is to 
increase the compulsory schooling age. Increasing the number of years of compulso-
ry schooling has been shown to significantly improve secondary school completion 
rates. Angrist and Krueger (1991), for instance, find that 25 % of potential dropouts 
in the US stayed longer in school because of compulsory schooling laws. Cabus and 
De Witte (2005) evaluate the impact of a one-year increase in the compulsory school-
leaving age on dropout rates in the Netherlands in 2007. They find that dropout rates 
decreased significantly after the reform. In all countries considered, the compulsory 
school-leaving age is 16 years of age. The only exception is Portugal which in 2009 
recently increased the school-leaving age from 15 to 18.
Existing evidence also indicates that a diversified offer of different tracks or special-
isations can contribute to reducing dropout rates. Countries that offer a vocational 
secondary school track instead of only an academic track have on average lower 
school dropout rates (Lamb 2011). There is also a positive correlation between 
the age at which tracking into different secondary school types and specialisation 
courses takes place and the percentage of early school-leavers (Brunello 2010). The 
earlier pupils are separated into different tracks, the lower the dropout rate from 
secondary school.
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Furthermore, several countries have tried to give pupils financial incentives to stay 
in school or to reduce dropout rates for schools or regional authorities. Financial 
incentives for schools, teachers or regions do not seem to yield a reduction in drop-
out rates so far. Elk et al. (2013) evaluate the effect of a financial incentive scheme 
for regional educational authorities on school dropout rates in the Netherlands. The 
programme had no effect on school dropout rates. In addition, they find suggestive 
evidence for manipulation of outcomes in response to the programme. Empirical 
evidence on the effectiveness of financial incentives for students to stay in school is 
more positive. Dearden et al. (2009) evaluate a United Kingdom programme of con-
ditional cash transfers paid to 16- to 18-Year-Olds for staying in full-time education. 
The Education Maintenance Allowance gave weekly payments of around 40 euros to 
young people whose parents’ annual incomes were 15,000 euros. At the end of a term 
of regular attendance, the child would receive a non-means-tested retention bonus 
of between 60 and 95 euros. The study concludes that these incentives had a positive 
effect on participation in education. However, no evidence is available as yet on  
the benefits from longer school attendance or graduation for the pupils in these  
programmes. Financial incentive schemes are also costly. 
Finally, recent initiatives fostering non-cognitive skills and parental involvement  
targeted specifically at youth at risk of dropping out of secondary school have yielded 
promising results. One intervention in Chicago aimed to provide disadvantaged 
youths in a difficult neighbourhood with better non-cognitive skills based on cogni-
tive behavioural therapy. The programme was found to be cost-effective and reduced 
dropout whilst increasing math test scores (Cook et al. 2014). Experimental evidence 
from France by Avvisati et al. (2014) has shown that information sessions for parents 
in deprived neighbourhoods in Paris on the relevance of parental involvement for 
pupil effort succeeded in improving pupil’s behaviour in class as well as long-term 
parental involvement.
3.2.2 Vocational Education 
In all European countries except Austria, Denmark, Germany and Switzerland, the 
vast majority of secondary school pupils attend a general track that aims to prepare 
them for tertiary education. Only a minority of pupils attends the vocational track, 
and this track is mostly school-based. If on-the-job training is compulsory, it is  
generally very limited in time.
In contrast, in the dual vocational training system prevailing in Austria, Denmark, 
Germany and Switzerland, the on-the-job training typically represents more than 
half of the overall time in vocational education. 
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Moreover, the educational authorities take responsibility for providing and certify-
ing the school-based part of vocational education whilst firms provide on-the-job 
training. Such a vocational education system is called “dual” because of the equiva-
lent proportion of teaching in school and in the firm. In these countries, the dual vo-
cational track is attended by a considerable proportion of secondary school pupils. 
One of the advantages of having a more developed vocational secondary school track 
is that it offers a more practical alternative to young people who may find it difficult to 
complete the academic track. It may thereby contribute to reducing dropout rates. 
Countries with a high proportion of early school-leavers should thus consider  
offering curricula that are differentiated enough to accommodate youth with  
different skills and aspirations. Moreover, giving the possibility of extended on- 
the-job training periods within vocational education could significantly improve  
the school-to-work transition. Empirical evidence has shown that dual vocational  
training facilitates the integration of youths into the labour market as compared  
with school-based vocational training (see Scarpetta et al. 2010, Biavaschi et al. 2012 
for an overview of this literature). There is also some evidence that dual apprentice-
ship training compared to school-based vocational training leads to faster and more 
structured labour market integration during the early career (Parey 2009).
 
In Germany, 70 % of apprentices initially stay in the same firm at the end of their 
apprenticeship (Euwals and Winkelmann 2001). On average, across OECD countries, 
employment rates are higher for individuals with at most a vocational upper secon-
dary education than among those with only a general upper secondary qualification 
(OECD 2013a).
Apprenticeship training in firms combined with school-based vocational education 
presents the advantage for firms that they provide young workers with practical 
skills that they cannot easily obtain in a school-based secondary education. More-
over, apprenticeships provide youths with first working experience and give firms 
the opportunity to select the best apprentices for staying in the firm at a relatively 
low wage. 
It remains unclear as yet what conditions exactly are to be fulfilled for the successful  
implementation of a dual vocational education system. But the legal definition of 
what an apprenticeship training should cover for a given occupation is certainly  
one relevant attribute of such a system. In Germany, the Vocational Training Act  
provides the legal framework for the regulation of training quality. In countries  
that have such a legal framework, it defines the time allocated to training on the job 
and in school. Moreover, a Ministry is typically given the formal responsibility of 
overseeing apprenticeships (Ryan 2000). In countries without a legal framework for 
58
apprenticeships, such as the United Kingdom, any training programme may  
be called an apprenticeship. In such a system, there are no incentives for firms to 
provide high-quality training and the obtained degree has little value on the labour 
market for youths.
In addition, from the point of view of firms, it is important that apprenticeship  
contracts are not too short. In effect, empirical evidence for Germany shows that 
apprentices in the manufacturing sector lead to net training costs during the  
apprenticeship period but firms gain by the long-term employment of their graduate 
apprentices (Mohrenweiser and Zwick 2009). 
3.2.3 Tertiary Education
Tertiary graduates are the least at risk of becoming unemployed. This may be related 
to the relatively high demand for skilled labour due to skill-biased technological 
change (Autor et al. 2003). More educated workers should, for instance, have more 
facility in exerting tasks that are complementary to those performed by computers. 
Such skills are called “non-routine” skills and include communication skills, advan-
ced  
literacy as well as analytical skills. Moreover, higher educated workers can be  
expected to adapt more easily to new tasks. Employers use educational attainment  
as a signal for skills that cannot be observed directly in the hiring process. 
In the European Union (27 countries), tertiary education attainment for individuals  
aged 30 to 35 increased from 22 % in 2000 to 30 % in 2007 and to 36 % in 2012.  
Preparing for tertiary education is the main objective of secondary education in 
Spain and Portugal and the proportion of tertiary education graduates has increased 
fast in recent years. In Portugal, the proportion of graduates increased from around 
11% in 2000 to 20 % in 2007 and 27 % in 2012, in Spain from 29 % in 2000 to 40 % in 
2007 (and remained almost constant afterwards). The recession may have contri-
buted to this phenomenon as youths are driven into higher education by the lack of 
employment perspectives on the labour market. Nevertheless, differences between 
countries exist. In Ireland, the majority of the 2012 cohort of 30- to 35-Year-Olds had 
a university degree, whilst this proportion was only 22 % in Italy. 
Increasing the proportion of higher education graduates in a cohort to 40% is also 
one of the EU’s Horizon 2020 objectives. It remains unclear, however, what the  
optimal proportion of higher education graduates is.
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A high proportion of higher education graduates may be beneficial if the demand for 
highly skilled workers is high. But it may also be inefficient and result in a high level 
of overqualification if the economy demands other skills. Overqualification, that is 
higher education graduates working in positions for which they actually would not 
need a tertiary degree, can be problematic for several reasons. First, the educational 
investment made by the state does not pay off because the acquired skills are not 
employed in later occupation. Moreover, overqualification may make it more difficult 
for lower-qualified workers to obtain the positions for which they have been trained. 
Last but not least, firms may need workers with practical skills that are not acquired 
in higher academic education.
There seems to be a positive correlation between the proportion of tertiary graduates  
and overqualification of graduates, but there are exceptions. In 2005, about 27 %  
of graduates in Spain reported being overqualified for their job five years after  
graduation (Verhaest and van der Velden 2012). The overqualification rate was  
19 % in Italy and 14 % in Germany. Whilst there are no comparable statistics for  
individuals graduating in more recent years, it is very likely that the incidence of  
skill mismatch and overqualification increased from the onset of the crisis. There is 
in fact empirical evidence of a negative correlation between the business cycle and 
skills mismatch, and that graduating in a recession has a persistent effect on the  
likelihood to be mismatched along the career path (Liu et al. 2012). According to 
Eurostat (Labour Force Survey) statistics based on individuals aged 20 to 64, the 
overqualification incidence between 2009 and 2011 increased in Greece from 31% 
to 33 %, in Italy from 16 % to 20 % and in Spain from 33 % to 36 %, whilst it did not 
change much for Portugal (12 % in 2011), France (20 % in 2011), Germany (21% in 
2010) and the UK (24 % in 2011).
3.3 Institutions of the Labour Market
The legal framework and the institutions of the labour market constitute the environ-
ment in which job search and job matches take place. This framework may be more 
or less favourable to youth employment as it provides incentives to firms to use  
specific types of contracts and workers. In the following, we focus on the different  
aspects of the institutional framework that may affect youth employment. This  
includes the degree of employment protection legislation for different types of  
contracts and the wage-setting flexibility, but also the nature of the relations between 
employers and worker representatives and active labour market policies.
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3.3.1 Employment Protection Legislation (EPL)
The rules governing the hiring and firing of workers have typically been developed  
to increase job stability and protect workers from unfair dismissal. Because these 
rules impose firing costs on firms, they may also reduce the hiring rate and in parti-
cular push firms to use types of working contracts that are less restrictive. Empirical 
evidence on the impact of total employment protection legislation (EPL) on aggregate 
employment is inconclusive (see OECD 2013d for a survey). It therefore remains 
unclear whether stronger employment protection contributes to overall lower job 
creation. 
Nevertheless, many European countries implemented or deregulated the use of 
temporary contracts with the aim of increasing employment in the nineties. The 
expected result was that thanks to the use of temporary contracts firms would hire 
more workers because they can more easily adapt the size of their workforce (Boeri 
and Garibaldi 2007). 
However, the high level of employment protection of permanent contracts in  
southern European countries was left unchanged. This led to the creation of so-
called dual labour markets. These are characterised by the coexistence of two types 
of employment contracts: different types of temporary contracts with little employ-
ment protection on the one hand, and permanent contracts that are often impossible 
to undo at reasonable cost for firms on the other. Because of the high dismissal costs 
of permanent workers, the transition rate of temporary workers into permanent 
contracts is low.
As a consequence, countries differ in the transition rate from temporary to perma-
nent contracts. Whilst finding a first permanent job takes youths less than two years 
in Denmark, it takes them nearly six years in Spain (Dolado et al. 2013). This is not 
only problematic for the concerned youths. An overly high turnover of employees 
in firms can be detrimental to productivity. Employers have little incentive to pro-
vide training to temporary workers and the latter have limited incentive to invest in 
firm-specific human capital. Moreover, the motivation and engagement of workers 
declines with the lack of career perspectives (Dolado 2008). 
Figure 3-2 shows the indicator of employment protection of permanent contracts  
developed by the OECD in 2013. It measures the degree of regulation of individual 
and collective dismissals based on procedural inconveniences that employers face  
in cases of dismissal, notice periods and severance payments as well as the circum-
stances that allow dismissal and compensation and reinstatement rules if dismissal  
is found to be unfair. According to this indicator, Germany and France are the  
countries with the strictest employment protection of permanent contracts. In 
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France, it has become increasingly difficult since the nineties to fire someone for 
economic motives. The law prescribes very strict conditions defining the situations 
in which firms can fire employees due to economic reasons. Additionally, layoffs of 
more than ten employees must always be approved by the state administration. It is 
important to note that employment protection legislation was decreased in Spain  
and Portugal with the recent reforms. Between 2009 and 2013, the employment  
protection indicator decreased respectively from 2.66 to 2.28 in Spain and from  
3.51 to 2.69 in Portugal.
Figure 3-2: Protection of Permanent Workers against Individual and  
Collective Dismissals, 2013
Note: The employment protection indicator measures the degree of regulation of individual and collective 
dismissals based on procedural inconveniences that employers face in case of dismissal of permanent 
workers, notice periods and severance payments. The scale of the index is 0 – 6. Source: OECD  
Employment Outlook 2013.
However, these indicators do not take into account opening clauses to these rules in 
case of economic hardship. For instance in Germany, the concept of “Kurzarbeit” or 
“reduced working hours” allows firms to impose a reduction in the number of wor-
king hours of employees with corresponding reductions in wage, instead of reducing 
the number of employees in case of an economic downturn. This measure limits the  
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Moreover, to understand the detrimental effects of differences in EPL between types 
of contracts on the employment of youths, it is necessary to take into account the 
judicial enforcement of the rules (Bertola et al. 2000). In France, Germany and Spain, 
more than 0.5 % of employees brought a dismissal case before court in 1995, as  
compared with less than 0.1% in Austria or Denmark.
Figure 3-3 presents the OECD indicator for employment protection of temporary 
contracts. It takes into account the regulations for hiring under temporary contracts, 
constraints on the number of allowed renewals and cumulative durations. Looking at 
employment protection for temporary contracts, it appears that Germany has one of 
the lowest employment protection levels together with the United Kingdom.
Figure 3-3: Regulation on Temporary Contracts, by Country, 2013
Note: The index of EPL for temporary contracts is based on the regulations for hiring under temporary 
contracts, constraints on the number of allowed renewals and cumulative duration. The scale of the index 
is 0 – 6. Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2013.
These figures make clear that the level of employment protection per se is not the  
explanation for high youth unemployment rates. The duality of employment pro-
tection can, however, become problematic in combination with other factors, such  
as insider unions and the lack of opening clauses in collective agreements, that we 
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3.3.2 Wage-Setting Institutions
In all countries – except Germany until January 2015 and Italy – we consider a mini-
mum wage applies to all firms and workers, but large differences in the level of  
minimum wages can be observed. France has the highest relative minimum wages 
as it amounts to 60 % of median wages. While in France and the UK a lower minimum 
wage applies for workers under 18 and 20 respectively, in Portugal and Spain there 
are no such minimums for young workers. In Italy, wages are bargained at the  
national level and apply to all firms and workers. This means that firms have little  
flexibility in setting wages, although there is no minimum wage (Dustmann et al. 
2014).
Economic theory predicts that if a worker’s productivity lies below his wage, he will 
not be hired or lose his job. Having less experience and being less productive, youths 
earn on average lower wages and are more likely to be negatively affected by mini-
mum wage legislation than adults (Gorry 2013).
In line with theory, empirical evidence as to the overall employment effects of mini-
mum wages depends on a workers’ productivity, and significant negative effects are 
often found for the least skilled (Neumark and Wascher 2007). The negative employ-
ment effect of minimum wages for lowskilled workers should be more pronounced 
the higher the level of the minimum wage is.
But the level of the minimum wage is only a crude measure of the constraints that  
labour costs represent for firms. A further relevant feature of the wage-setting 
process for its employment effects is the level at which wages are negotiated and to 
whom they apply. A key element is whether the legally set minimum wage applies to 
all firms and workers automatically and whether opening clauses are allowed.
In Germany and Italy, which until now do not have a national minimum wage, wages 
are negotiated at sectoral level. However, in Italy, wage floors resulting from sectoral 
collective bargaining automatically apply to all firms and workers in the respective 
sector, which is not necessarily the case in Germany. The fact that firms can take into 
account sectoral and firm-specific characteristics in determining wages is deemed 
to be one of the key explanations of the recent German “jobs miracle” (Dustmann et 
al. 2014). In Germany, a national minimum wage is to be implemented starting as of 
January 2015. Deviations at the sectoral level will be allowed until the end of 2016. 
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The negotiation culture between worker representatives and employers’ organisa-
tions is a further essential element in the way collective agreements and employment 
protection legislation affect hiring rates and wages. A consensus-based negotiation 
culture between employers’ organisations, government and unions allows greater 
flexibility in reaching common goals. For instance, it may reduce the threat of facing 
a court decision in the case of dismissal for economic reasons or allow the preserving 
of jobs through wage limitations or an adaptation of working hours. 
As pointed out by Dustmann et al. (2014), in Germany, negotiations between em- 
ployers’ organisations, unions and works councils are usually consensus-based and 
less confrontational than in other countries. Unions and employers’ organisations  
in France, Italy, Portugal or Spain do not share such a culture of common interest  
but compete and oppose each other’s interests (Vranceanu 2013, Baglioni and  
Mota 2013). This is reflected in the number of work days lost per 1,000 employees 
because of strikes and lockouts. Whereas Germany lost only five days of work each 
year on average between 2000 and 2007, Italy lost 93, France lost 103 and Spain 173 
(Lesch 2009). 
In a dual labour market, unions tend to primarily defend the interests of workers 
with permanent contracts, the so-called “insiders”. As a result, unions do not pursue 
the goal of creating jobs for the unemployed and merely focus on insiders’ wages and 
employment interests (see Vranceanu 2013 for the case of France). 
3.3.3 Labour Market Policies
Labour market policies are the set of public policies in favour of unemployed persons 
which are aimed at assisting these persons in their job search and improving the 
match between jobseekers and firms. A distinction is often made between passive 
labour market policies, such as unemployment benefits that give financial support 
to the unemployed, and active labour market policies (ALMPs) which are aimed at 
increasing the employability of individuals and at facilitating the transition from 
unemployment to work. 
Unemployment benefits provide replacement income to unemployed individuals. 
Economic theory predicts an ambiguous effect of the generosity of unemployment 
benefits on the duration of unemployment. On the one hand, unemployment benefits 
allow workers to focus on the job search without having to worry about their econo-
mic conditions. On the other hand, they increase the reservation wage of individuals, 
i. e. the lowest wage at which they are willing to accept a job. If too generous, some 
individuals could prefer to remain unemployed than to accept a low-paid job and the 
individual job effort could decrease (Boeri and van Ours 2013).
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In two-thirds of OECD countries school-leavers are not eligible for unemployment 
benefits unless they have worked a certain period of time (Scarpetta et al., 2010).  
Moreover, typically the duration of the benefits depends on previous work experi-
ence. For these reasons, the negative effects of unemployment benefits on the job 
search are usually lower for youths. By the same token, youth might suffer more than 
adults from unemployment, since they are less likely to receive any unemployment 
benefits.
There are considerable differences among European countries regarding the gener-
osity of unemployment benefits and whether youths are eligible for receiving those 
benefits. Comparing the generosity of different systems is not straightforward since 
net replacement rates, i.e. unemployment benefits expressed as the proportion of 
past net wage earned, depend on individuals’ previous wage as well as on whether 
they are married and have children. Comparing a single individual without children 
earning the average wage directly after losing his / her job, net replacement rates in 
2012 were of 75 % in Portugal, 66 % in France, 59 % in Germany, 58 % in Spain, 56 % 
in Italy, 26 % in Greece and 14 % in the UK (OECD statistics). However, whilst benefits 
are relatively generous in Portugal, they are comparable to those in Germany, Spain 
and Italy. Moreover, in Southern Europe, only a small fraction of the unemployed  
(Boeri and van Ours 2013) are covered by unemployment benefits. In particular, 
many of the youth who were employed with atypical contracts (e. g. temporary, 
service provision, seasonal, short part-time jobs) do not qualify for unemployment 
benefits (Scarpetta et al 2010).
Overall, there are thus theoretical arguments predicting that unemployment benefits 
can have a negative impact on the unemployment duration and job search. However, 
these negative effects should be limited for youth, who are often not covered by the 
benefits, especially in southern European countries.
The most commonly used set of active labour market policies (ALMPs) are training 
schemes, private-sector incentive schemes, direct job creation and public em-
ployment services (PES) providing job search assistance. Private-sector incentive 
schemes mainly consist of wage subsidies or tax credits to encourage firms to hire 
unemployed individuals and start-up or self-employment grants to encourage  
unemployed individuals to start their own business. Direct job creation typically  
consists of the creation of public works targeting frequently long-term unemployed 
and more disadvantaged individuals. Public employment schemes include job  
search courses, vocational guidance counselling and monitoring and aim to assist 
unemployed individuals in their job search and to improve the match between job-
seekers and firms.
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Government expenditure for active labour market policies has been relatively stable 
over time as compared with passive labour market policies. This is because passive  
labour market policies include unemployment benefits that react directly to the 
number of unemployed. The expenditure on ALMP decreased somewhat in the years 
before the Great Recession and then slightly increased. Large differences in the  
expenditure on ALMP exist between European countries, however. In 2011, the 
expenditure on ALMP as a proportion of the GDP was of 0.93 % in France, 0.81% in 
Spain, 0.8 % in Germany, 0.57 % in Portugal and 0.35 % in Italy. 
Moreover, countries differ in the type of ALMPs they invest in most. Eurostat dis-
tinguishes between services and measures. Services include public employment 
services providing job search assistance, job search courses, vocational guidance 
counselling and monitoring, whereas measures include all types of training and  
internship programmes. In all countries except the UK, the largest amount of  
expenditure on ALMP is dedicated to measures rather than to counselling services. 
France and Spain spend the most on training measures for the unemployed (0.7 %  
of their gross domestic product). In contrast, Greece and Italy respectively only 
spend 0.2 % and 0.3 % of their GDP on measures for the unemployed. 
Despite a huge body of economic literature on evaluating these programmes, no 
clear-cut answer emerges about what measures are the most effective (Kluve 2010; 
Card et al. 2010). Overall the less effective programme seems to be the direct creation 
of public jobs. The effectiveness of training programmes depends very much on the 
quality of the training offered and on the skills of unemployed individuals. They are 
typically more effective in the medium and long term (after two years) than in the 
short term. Meta-analysis of active labour market programme evaluation studies 
in Europe, such as Kluve (2010) and Card et al. (2010), suggest that in the short run 
private-sector incentive schemes can be effective for improving the labour market 
integration of the unemployed. However, the increase in the employment rate fades 
away at the end of the subsidy period. 
While active labour market policies are important tools in fighting youth unemploy-
ment, especially in economic downturns, most of them do not address the structural 
sources of youth unemployment. A more comprehensive strategy focussing also on 
strengthening educational institutions and reforming other labour market institu-
tions is needed in the medium and long term.
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3.4 Demographic Change, Migration and Mobility
Changes in the size of the younger cohorts, migration and geographic mobility are all 
factors that can have an impact on youth unemployment. 
All countries in the European Union are experiencing an ageing process and a  
shrinking proportion of young workers in the population. Forecasts for the period 
2000 to 2050 predict that the numbers of people aged 65 or more compared with the 
15- to 64-Year-Olds are to more than double across the OECD (OECD 2008a).
Economic theory predicts that the relative scarcity of young cohorts in the labour 
market should positively affect the employment perspectives of the young new 
entrants in the labour force (Freeman and Wise 1982). The ageing of the population 
should thus help in creating jobs for youths as older cohorts retire. However, the 
sharp decline in the proportion of youth in the European population did not seem to 
reduce youth unemployment in a strong way in the last 30 years. In fact, the relative  
labour market performance of youth deteriorated in the 1980s and 1990s notwith-
standing the decline in the size of young cohorts (Bell and Blanchflower 2011). 
Empirical studies find that youth cohort size has a positive but small effect on the 
youth unemployment rate (Korenman and Neumark 2000; Jimeno and Rodriguez-
Palenzuela 2002). Therefore, even if relative cohort sizes are not the most important 
determinant of unemployment, youth unemployment rates could be even higher in 
some countries without population ageing.
The low mobility of youths reinforces structurally high youth unemployment in 
southern European countries. The degree of geographic mobility between European 
countries is very low. For instance, in 2010, only 0.35 % of the working-age popu-
lation moved from one EU country to another (OECD 2012a). Language and cultural 
barriers as well as lack of information on employment opportunities in other  
member states are an important constraint on intercountry mobility of youths. 
However, regional mobility within EU member states remains fairly low as well  
when compared for instance to the US. In 2010, mobility within EU member states  
(15 countries) amounted to only one per cent each year, whilst in the same year the 
mobility between US states was about 2.4 % (OECD 2012a). There are large cross-
country differences in the European Union in the degree of regional mobility within 
countries and local mobility (e. g. commuting). Countries with a low internal mobility  
rate face larger regional imbalances in unemployment rates (Bonin et al. 2008). 
Moreover, southern European countries with a high structural youth unemployment 
rate are among the European countries with the lowest degree of internal mobility 
(Bonin et al. 2008).
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A higher degree of geographic mobility of youth could help reduce imbalances  
across regions and even decrease overall unemployment through better job-worker 
matches. Programmes such as the EU’s “Youth on the Move” initiative provide infor-
mation on grants to study in other EU countries, as well as training and job vacancies 
abroad (for instance through the EURES platform). Policies aimed at enhancing  
mobility within countries might be more effective than those focussing on inter- 
national mobility because of the lower language and information barriers.
The southern European countries are most affected by inflows of low-qualified non-
EU immigrants (Eurostat 2011). Migration could be expected to have a negative effect 
on youth unemployment if immigrants take up low-skilled jobs at a lower wages than 
natives. Nevertheless, empirical evidence shows that immigration has a very small 
or insignificant effect on natives’ labour market outcomes (see Martins et al 2012 or 
Blanchflower and Shadforth 2009 for an overview of this literature). 
3.5 Concluding Remarks
A country’s educational and labour market institutions contribute to the creation  
of a context more or less favourable to youth employment. In the following chapter, 
we highlight the macroeconomic and structural factors that explain the increase  
in youth unemployment rates in Spain, Italy and Portugal, which have reached  
alarmingly high levels. For each country, we describe and assess the major policy  
measures that were recently implemented and we provide recommendations on 
further interventions to reduce youth unemployment in the future.
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4.1 Spain
4.1.1 Overview and Policy Recommendations
Although they were close to the EU average in 2006, both youth and adult unemploy-
ment rapidly increased during the Great Recession in Spain. Youths in particular 
were strongly affected by employment loss after the financial and debt crisis and the 
bust of the real estate bubble. As a result, unemployment rates of 15- to 24-Year-Olds 
soared from 18 % in 2006 to 56 % in 2013.
We argue that the strong reaction of employment to the recession is related to the 
institutions of the Spanish labour market and the educational system. The combinati-
on of the collective bargaining system with the differences in employment protection 
legislation by type of contract as well as the limited scope and quality of vocational 
education are the main institutional factors causing youth unemployment in Spain. 
Spain and Portugal have the highest proportion of temporary employment among  
25- to 29-Year-Olds. Tough employment protection of permanent contracts combined 
with a lack of regulations on the use and number of renewals of temporary contracts 
is an important reason behind the high proportion of temporary employment of 
youths. During the Great Recession, temporary workers, which were mostly young, 
were hit hardest by job losses. The negative employment effects of the recession were 
reinforced by the presence of insider unions that mostly represent the interests of 
permanent workers in all negotiations with employers. As a result, collective agree-
ments tend to favour wage increases at the expense of job creation.
In addition, centralised wage-setting can reduce job creation because it gives firms little 
flexibility to set wages in accordance with their firm- and region-specific constraints. 
In Spain, collective bargaining determines wages at the sectoral level that are above 
the minimum wage and that often apply to all workers within the level of agreement. 
Policy Recommendations
::  Further reduce the employment protection gap between permanent and temporary contracts. 
In particular, a maximum cumulated duration of temporary contracts in the same firm should be 
set.
::  Continue the development of dual vocational education centres initiated in 2013.
::  Work towards a central standard of vocational education degrees to ensure that the degrees 
are recognised in the whole country.
::  Transfer ALMP resources from subsidies for hiring specific workers (such as youths and women)  




An ambitious labour market reform was implemented in 2012 that made real pro-
gress in decentralising collective bargaining and decreasing employment protection 
of permanent contracts. For instance, economic reasons for dismissals were rede- 
fined in favour of firms and maximum severance payments were reduced. According 
to a first evaluation of the modifications to collective bargaining rules and the changes  
in employment protection legislation in the 2012 reform, the decentralisation of 
wage setting from the sectoral to the firm level reduced the duration of unemploy-
ment spells and provided some evidence of a reduction in separations, particularly 
for temporary workers. 
Another important aspect of the reform consists of employment subsidies to hire 
young workers for firms with fewer than 250 workers. Although the effect of these 
specific subsidies has not been evaluated yet, existing empirical evidence from other 
countries shows that employment subsidies seem to have only moderate short-run 
effects on employment creation. Using the subsidies to create incentives for firms to 
support certified apprenticeship contracts could be one way to increase the long-
term effectiveness of the subsidies. For instance, only firms that cooperate with dual 
vocational training centres and that comply with minimum quality standards should 
receive the subsidy. This would create an incentive for firms to increase their training 
quality while reducing costs for hiring youths. 
In light of the high dropout rates from secondary education and the lack of practical 
skills of tertiary education graduates, improving the practical relevance and reco-
gnition of vocational education on the labour market is another priority of the  
Spanish government. The willingness of the federal government to improve the 
quality of vocational education in Spain is much more pronounced than in Italy or 
in Portugal and corresponding policy initiatives are being implemented. Promising 
pilot programmes of dual vocational education have been started in several regions 
and the number of centres of dual vocational education and cooperating firms has 
plummeted in the last year. In particular the “Hezibi” apprenticeship scheme in the 
Basque Country which offers dual vocational education in cooperation with partici-
pating firms and education centres seems promising.
There is certainly scope for supporting these favourable developments from the side 
of firms and vocational training centres in other Spanish regions. More firms need  
to be involved in cooperations with the vocational training centres and planning  
the curricula of these vocational trainings (Biavaschi et al. 2012). Moreover, a  
central quality control of dual vocational education and apprenticeships should be 
implemented to increase the quality of the on-the-job training. 
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Finally, the Spanish Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs actively supports the 
MobiPro-EU programme with Germany to facilitate the mobility of apprentices.  
Increasing the mobility of Spanish apprentices can be a way to integrate young  
Spanish unemployed into the labour market but it faces important limits. The  
current number of participants in the programme is too low to have an effect on 
youth unemployment and the budget for the MobiPro-EU programme has already 
been exhausted. In order to raise the number of Spanish apprentices in Germany 
significantly, the budget for the MobiPro-EU programme should be increased. 
4.1.2 The Macroeconomic Context and the Effects of the Crisis
The Spanish economy was strongly affected by the consequences of the financial and 
debt crisis. Spanish firms relied heavily on bank credit before the crisis and were 
badly hit by the reduction in bank lending following the recession. Bentolila et al. 
(2013) show that firms with a relatively large exposure to weak banks at the start of 
the crisis had to make a greater proportion of job cuts than other firms between the 
years 2006 and 2010.
Moreover, during the construction boom at the beginning of the 2000s, many low-
qualified temporary jobs were created in the construction sector. These jobs were 
relatively well-paid and reduced incentives for youths to pursue further education. 
When housing prices dropped after the financial crisis, this led to enormous employ-
ment losses for youths on temporary contracts. Employment of 15- to 24-Year-Olds 
in the construction sector decreased by 83 % between 2008 and 2012 as compared to 
a decrease of 50 % among adults (25- to 64-Year-Olds) in the same time period. The 
construction boom and bust was thus a second important reason why so many youths 
on temporary contracts lost their jobs in recent years. 
The fluctuation in unemployment in Spain is strongly correlated with the fluctuation  
in the GDP growth as can be observed in Figure 4-1. This result is in line with  
findings by Boulhol and Sicari (2013), who report that Spain and France have the 
highest sensitivity of youth unemployment to business cycles. Youth unemployment 
is therefore not a recent phenomenon in Spain. The Spanish youth unemployment 
rate has been subject to important variation over the last decades. It reached a peak 
of 42 % in 1994 and dropped to 18 % in 2007. We argue that the strong sensitivity of 
youth unemployment to business cycles is related to the institutional context.
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Figure 4-1: Change in Youth (15- to 24-Year-Olds) Unemployment Rate and  
Change in GDP 1990 – 2012, Spain
Note: The change in the youth unemployment rate is given by the difference in the unemployment rates in 
a given year minus the unemployment rate in the previous year. The percentage change in the GDP on the 
previous period gives the change in the GDP. Source: EUROSTAT online database, unemployment rates by 
age (%) and GDP and main components – volumes, own calculations.
The macroeconomic figures also show considerable differences between regions 
in regards to the regional domestic product, the educational level and youth un-
employment. The North and Eastern regions such as the Basque Country, Navarre, 
Catalonia or Aragon and Madrid have higher regional domestic products per capita, 
lower youth unemployment rates and higher average educational attainment levels. 
This means that they have a larger proportion of higher education graduates, lower 
dropout rates in secondary education and higher proportions of pupils attending the 
vocational educational track. In particular, the Basque Country stands out with the 
lowest youth unemployment rate, the best educational performance and graduation 
rates between 20 % and 40 % above the Spanish average at all levels of education.  
Table 4-1 shows the regional youth unemployment rates in 2013. Youth unemploy-
ment is 49 % or more in all Spanish macro-regions. However, the Canary Islands and 














































































Table 4-1: Regional Youth Unemployment Rates (15- to 24-Year-Olds) in Spain, 2013
Region Youth Unemployment Rate
Canary Island 65 %
South: Andalusia, Murcía, Ceuta, Melilla 64 %
Centre: Castilla y León, Castilla-la Mancha, Extremadura 57 %
Spain 56 %
East: Catalunia, Valencia, Balearic Islands 52 %
Northwest: Galicia, Cantabria, Asturias 51 %
Madrid 49 %
Northeast: Basque Country, Navarra, La Rioja, Aragon 49 %
Source: EUROSTAT online database, unemployment rates by sex, age and NUTS 2 regions (%)
4.1.3 Duality of the Labour Market
The Spanish labour market is characterised by the coexistence of two types of em-
ployment contracts. Until the transition to democracy in the late 1970s, 90 % of all 
contracts were permanent contracts with strict employment protection. Temporary 
contracts could only be used in seasonal jobs. The use of temporary contracts was 
allowed on a broader scale starting in 1983 with the aim of achieving higher labour 
market flexibility and thereby increasing employment (Boeri and Garibaldi 2007).  
As a result, in the 1990s, the proportion of employees with a temporary contract  
soared to more than 70 % for youth aged 15 to 25 and more than 30 % for all  
employees aged 25 to 64. However, the strict employment protection legislation of 
permanent contracts remained mostly unchanged. 
Table 4-2 presents the severance payments in the event of dismissal by type of 
contract in Spain. Even after the latest labour market reform in 2012, which reduced 
employment protection, permanent contracts are subject to severance payment of 
up to one year’s wage in cases of fair dismissal, and also in cases of dismissal for eco-
nomic reasons. In contrast, temporary contracts can be terminated at no cost upon 
expiration. Moreover, no constraints have been imposed on the number of renewals 
of a temporary contract in the same firm. As a result of the costly dismissal procedure 
of permanent workers, firms have a clear incentive to repeatedly hire under short-
term temporary contracts. In fact, in 2007, 95 % of fixed-term contracts signed yearly 
lasted less than six months and 52 % lasted less than one month (Eurofound 2010).
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Table 4-2: Severance Payments by Type of Contract in Spain
Permanent contract Temporary contract
Fair  
dismissal
20 days per year of seniority. 





45 days per year of seniority. 
Maximum of 42 monthly wages. 
After 2012: 
33 days per year of seniority. 
Maximum of 24 months.
12 days per year of seniority. 
None at the expiration of the contract.
A significant part of the younger generation (40 % of 25- to 29-Year-Olds) in effect 
works under repeated temporary contracts, whereas the older generation mostly 
holds permanent jobs (15 % of 40- to 64-Year-Olds have temporary contracts).  
The conversion rate of temporary into permanent jobs was only 18 % in 1987 and 
dropped to 4 % in 2000 (Bentolila et al. 2012). Finding a first permanent job after 
entering the labour market takes youths on average about two years in Denmark, 
whereas Spanish youths need close to six years (Dolado et al. 2013) .
The high proportion of repeated temporary contracts is not only an issue because 
of the higher frequency of unemployment spells for the concerned youths. Recent 
evidence shows that the high worker turnover decreases the productivity of Spanish 
firms because of a reduction in worker effort (Dolado 2008). Moreover, employers 
are reluctant to provide training for their temporary employees and the employees 
themselves are less likely to invest in firm-specific human capital (OECD 2012b). 
4.1.4 The Educational System
In Spain, compulsory basic education lasts until age 16 and leads to the ESO  
(Educación Secundaria Obligatoria) school-leaving certificate. In 2010, 74 % of the 
population had obtained at least the ESO level of education. After the ESO, pupils  
may attend an academic high school (Bachillerato) to prepare for university or a 
vocational high school (Formacion Profesional de Grado Medio). Higher education 
consists of university and so-called vocational colleges.
The Spanish educational system is strongly academic-oriented. The proportion of 
tertiary education graduates is among the highest in Europe. About 70 % of pupils opt 
for the academic high school that gives access to vocational college and/or university. 
The vocational college (Ciclos formativos de grado superior) is attended by about 
14 % of all tertiary education students. 
As a result, in 2012, only 8 % of adults had a vocational secondary school degree  
as their highest qualification. This compares with 30 % in France, 32 % in Italy and  
56 % in Germany (OECD 2013a). 
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Figure 4-2: The Spanish Educational System
In the vocational track, training is school-based with only up to 25 % of the time  
spent in the firm doing on-the-job training. The on-the-job part can be waived with 
previous work experience related to the content of the programme (Lopez-Mayan 
and Nicodemo 2012). According to Eurostat figures, only 4 % of pupils in vocational 
upper secondary education in Spain combine school and work-based training as 
compared with 74 % in Germany. 
Nevertheless, even such short apprenticeships significantly increase the probability 
of employment (Lopez-Mayan and Nicodemo 2012). This indicates that increasing 
the proportion of on-the-job training in vocational degrees should be a promising 
strategy to reduce youth unemployment in Spain.
In Spain, having a tertiary education yields lower unemployment rates and 40 % 
higher earnings than an upper secondary education. However, the returns to tertiary 
education have dropped since the nineties and the proportion of overqualified  
workers with a tertiary education degree has increased (Biavaschi et al. 2012).  
Moreover, employer surveys indicate that firms consider university graduates to lack 
required practical skills (Freire et al. 2013, Teijeiro et al. 2013). These are indications 
that there may be an excess supply of college-educated workers in Spain and that 














4.1.5 Wage-Setting Institutions and Demographic Changes
Wage-setting institutions such as the national minimum wage and immigration inflows 
are also likely to have a negative effect on unemployment of the least skilled youth. 
Nevertheless, their contribution to the structural youth unemployment rate appears 
to be less important than the education system and employment protection legislation.
Spain has a minimum wage but it is only 45 % of the average wage, a low number 
in comparison to other countries. However, collective bargaining of wages at the 
sectoral level often applies to all workers within the level of agreement (province 
or industry). The wages set in these agreements are generally set well above the 
statutory minimum wage and may therefore result in high entry wages that limit the 
employment of youths (Dolado et al. 1997). The negative effects of these collective 
agreements on youth employment may be reinforced by the fact that unions mostly 
represent the permanent workers in all negotiations with employers and tend to 
favour wage increases at the expense of job creation. 
In Spain, young cohorts are substantially smaller than older cohorts. The current 
youth population (15- to 24-Year-Olds) is namely more than one-quarter smaller 
than in the early nineties (Dolado et al. 2013). This could positively affect the labour 
market outcomes of youth, because of their relative scarcity. However, there is little 
evidence of such a positive effect in Spain in the last decade (Dolado et al. 2013).  
Despite the ageing of the national population, the total working-age population  
increased by 14.3 % in Spain between 2000 and 2010 due to massive immigration  
inflows. This has caused an increase in the population of individuals aged 25 to 34, 
but has not countervailed the decrease in the population of the under-25-Year-Olds. 
There is evidence that the recent crisis has affected the less educated immigrant 
workers in a stronger way (Dolado et al. 2013). However, the youth unemployment 
rate among natives turns out to be only slightly lower than the overall youth unem-
ployment (less than 1% in 2012).
4.1.6 Survey of Policies and Initiatives
Labour Market Reform 
In 2012, the Spanish government approved a large labour market reform. It includes 
a consistent set of measures that considerably changed the labour market institu-
tions. Its main aim being to restore the competitiveness of the Spanish economy 
through wage flexibility, the 2012 reform first made progress towards decentralising 
wage-setting. It gave priority to collective bargaining agreements at the firm level 
over those at the sector or regional level, so that collective agreements could adjust 
more closely to the specific needs of a firm (OECD 2013b). Moreover, firms can now 
opt out more easily from a collective agreement and these can be prolonged only for 
one year after their end date.
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In addition, the reform of 2012 made dismissal for economic reasons somewhat 
easier for firms. It clarifies the conditions under which a dismissal can be considered 
as fair for economic reasons and eliminates the need for administrative authorisation 
of collective dismissal. A first evaluation of the reform by the OECD (2013b) suggests 
that the decentralisation of wage-setting from the sectoral to the firm level appears  
to have reduced the duration of unemployment spells. 
The labour market reform has achieved a significant improvement of the labour  
market institutions and given more possibilities to firms to adapt to economic 
downturns. This is testified, for instance, by the decrease in the OECD employment 
protection indicators for permanent contracts as well as for collective dismissals that 
decreased respectively from 2.56 to 2.28 and 3.75 to 3.13 between 2012 and 2013. 
However, fair dismissal remains associated with considerable severance payments, 
limiting the incentives for firms to offer permanent contracts. Moreover, a limit on 
the cumulated duration of temporary contracts in the same firm should be imposed.
Besides affecting labour market institutions, the reform also provides financial 
incentives to support youth employment. Financial incentives are provided for firms 
that hire workers under 30 years of age and are particularly strong for small firms. 
The focus on small and medium enterprises (SME) is relevant because SMEs make up 
over 99 % of Spanish firms and constitute the vast majority of the productive sector in 
Spain. In 2009, they covered 87 % of all Spanish employees (Sanz de Miguel, 2013). 
Reductions in social security contributions are given to firms that hire apprentices, 
women and workers younger than 30 or above 45. Firms with fewer than 250 workers 
that hire an individual with a training (apprenticeship) type of contract receive a full 
deduction of the social security contributions. The deduction is 75 % for firms with 
250 employees and more. 
If the firm converts an apprenticeship contract into a permanent contract, it can 
benefit from a reduction in the social security contribution of 1,500 euros per year 
during the following three years. The corresponding reduction for hiring female 
apprentices is 1,800 euros per year.
Furthermore, a new type of permanent contract for firms with fewer than 50 em- 
ployees was created with additional fiscal advantages. If the newly hired employee  
is less than 30 years of age, firms with fewer than 50 employees benefit from a  
fiscal deduction of 3,000 euros. In addition, the firm will be granted a three-year 
deduction in the social security contributions, starting with 83.33 euros per month 
(1,000 euros per year) in the first year, 91.67 euros in the second year and 100 euros 
in the third year (1,200 euros per year). Additional reductions apply for hiring women  
and workers older than 45. The impact of the employment subsidies implemented by 
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the 2012 reform has not yet been evaluated but existing empirical evidence for  
other countries points to deadweight losses and substitution effects of employment 
sub-sidies of around 90 %. This implies that out of 100 jobs created with the subsidy, 
only ten would not have been created without the subsidy (Martin and Grubb 2001). 
Similar results are found for former employment subsidies in Spain. Garcia et al. 
(2013), for instance, conclude that subsidies provided since 1997 for new permanent 
contracts in certain Spanish regions barely affected the probability of a transition to 
a permanent job and that the labour demand by contract type in Spain hardly varies 
with wage subsidies on new permanent contracts. 
Besides the 2012 labour market reform, Spain also increased expenditures in other 
active labour market policies, focussing mostly on higher incentives in the private 
sector, such as financial support for start-ups and self-employment (OECD 2013b). 
Evidence from the United States suggests that such schemes result in employment 
gains for men with relatively high levels of education (Martin and Grubb 2001).
Initiatives to Support the Development of Dual Vocational Education
Spain has recently pushed the development of dual vocational training. Since 2013, 
the number of centres for vocational training has doubled and the number of  
cooperating firms has tripled. According to figures from the Ministry of Education, 
Culture and Sports, the number of pupils in dual vocational training increased from 
4,292 to 9,555 between 2013 and 2014. In particular, the Basque Country, Catalonia, 
Castilla-La Mancha and Valencia opened many new centres for vocational training 
(Formación Profesional Dual). 
Firms can make a cooperation contract with the professional training centres  
(Centros de Formacion Professional) through the Regional Ministries of Education 
to provide dual vocational education. Many Spanish and international firms have 
recently started such cooperations to propose dual vocational training. Examples  
are ALDI, Buderus BOSCH, LIDL, SIEMENS, Repsol or BASF. 
Moreover, a royal decree extended training contracts from two years to three years, 
and training will amount to at least one-third instead of 15 % of the overall duration 
of the training period. (OECD 2012b).
The Basque government has been particularly dynamic in promoting dual vocational 
education. Based on the German apprenticeship model, employers’ organisations 
pushed the development of dual vocational training previous to the crisis. This  
resulted in the HEZIBI programme of apprenticeship scheme which was approved  
in 2013 by the Basque government. 
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The programme is a framework agreement between the Basque government, the 
Basque Employers’ Confederation CONFEBASK, the Associations of Directors of 
Publicly Run Vocational Training Centres IKASLAN ARABA, IKASLAN BIZKAIA, 
IKASLAN GIPUZKOA and the Association of Grant-Aided, Social-Initiative Private 
Vocational Training Centres HETEL for setting up high-level vocational training.
The programme is intended to help young people aged 16 to 30 in obtaining voca-
tional training qualification, in which their time is split between education in the  
training centre and in-company work experience. Similar to the apprenticeship  
system in Germany, a pilot programme started in 2013 combining school-based  
education with on-the-job training to 600 unemployed vocational training quali-
fication holders. 
Lanbide, the Basque employment service, is to fund the training costs associated with 
the relevant certificate of professional standards. Lanbide is also to finance work 
carried out by companies in relation to the training and work experience contracts in 
which they partake under this programme.
In addition, in March 2014, the Basque government entered into a pilot dual voca-
tional training programme with Mercedes-Benz Spain (El Mundo 2014). This pro-
gramme will provide 3,000 hours of apprenticeship training in the firm as compared 
with the usual 1,000 hours in regular Basque vocational training programmes. This 
training will be combined with centrally certified vocational training in vocational 
schools. It thus fulfils the elements that are considered relevant for the successful 
implementation of dual vocational training (a large proportion of on-the-job training 
and centrally certified school-based training). 
Several promising regional and national public initiatives thus support the develop-
ment of dual vocational education in Spain. Local and private initiatives rather focus 
on reducing dropout rates from secondary school, supporting the geographical 
mobility of graduates or the creation of startups. Table 4-3 provides some examples 
of such smaller scale initiatives.
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Table 4-3: Local and Private Initiatives to Tackle Youth Unemployment in Spain
Initiative / Programme Who is offered? Organiser
Acción Tutorial Individual coaching of potential 
dropouts in secondary school, 
promoting parental involvement.
Municipality of Salamanca
Aula 15 Workshops on vocational  
occupations, individual  
coaching, private teaching. 
About 30 pupils participate  
in the programm per year.
Municipality of Villa Seca, 
Tarragona
Becas Erasmus 
Kutxabank 2014 / 2015
500 Scholarships to study 
abroad for higher education and 
vocational training graduates.
Kuxtabank (100 scholarships) 
and Basque Government
Le Mejora del éxito escolar Workshops for secondary school 
pupils: communication skills, 
social skills, science and  
technology, maths, health.
Municipality of Barcelona
Prevención y control del  
absentismo escolar
Promotion of early childcare for 
disfavored children, individual 
coaching (32 coaches),  
information campaigns.
Municipality of Madrid
Spain Startup Summit Yearly start-up conference. In 
2013 it brought together 4,000 
participants, 350 investors and 
30 companies.
Spain Startup and IE Business 
School
Youth Business Spain Programm started in 2013 to 
provide integrated support for 
youth to start a new business. 
It has the aim of supporting the 
creation of 5,000 new business 
and 10,000 new jobs for youths 
over a period of 5 years.
Youth Business international 
with Fundación Tomillo and 
CP’AC – Catalonia
Source: Miñaca and Hervás (2013)
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Initiatives to Increase the Mobility of Spanish Youth
The Spanish Ministry of Labour signed an agreement with the German Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs to support the mobility of Spanish apprentices with the  
“Job of My Life” programme (MobiPro-EU) in 2013. The aim of the agreement is to 
provide around 5,000 Spanish youth with an apprenticeship or regular employment 
position in Germany within the next four years. The programme offers financial  
support for language courses and travel costs for youths aged 18 to 35 who wish to  
do an apprenticeship in Germany. 
In practice, the programme works as follows. The employment agencies in Germany  
report vacant vocational training positions in their regions to the International 
Placement Services (Zentrale Auslands- und Fachvermittlung, ZAV). The ZAV then 
looks for suitable candidates in cooperation with their European network partners. 
The programme is planned to last three years with a total budget of 139 million 
euros. Unfortunately, as of April 2014, the acceptance of new apprentices under this 
programme has been temporarily halted due to the unexpectedly large number of 
applications received (a total of 9,000 apprenticeship applications had been received 
from all countries by March 2013). 
In addition, many small local initiatives specifically support the hiring and vocational 
training of young, qualified Spanish workers in Germany, especially in the service 
and health-care sector but also for technical professions (see Table 4-4). These 
programmes are often developed by German Chambers of Commerce, employers 
or regional governments to tackle the lack of skilled labour in specific occupations 
and regions. Some examples are presented in the table below. The disadvantage of 
so many small initiatives (with an average of around 30 participants) is the resulting 
lack of transparency and the limited number of opportunities created for potential 
candidates. 
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Table 4-4: German Apprenticeships Programs for Spanish Youths
Initiative / Programme What is offered? Organiser
Adelante! – Ausbildungs- und  
Berufsperspektiven für  
spanische Jugendliche
Dual Education and Employment 
in technical occupations.
IHK Hannover, Caritasverband 
Hannover, Region Hannover





Dual vocational training  
(technical occupations) for  
50 Spanish apprentices.
Bosch
CAREER in Baden-Württemberg Qualified workers in MINT in 
particular Engineers
Bildungswerk der Baden- 
Württembergischen Wirtschaft
Ems-Achse: Die internationale 
Ausbildungsinitiative
Dual education Ems-Achse Jobmotor Nordwest 
in the framework of MobiPro
europeans@Siemens2012 / 2013 Dual Education in the field of 
electronics and mechatronics.
Siemens Berlin
Make it in Germany Information Platform on  
available apprenticeship  
positions for EU youths
BMWi, BMAS, BA
Spanische Auszubildende für die 
Landkreise Cham und Wunsiedel 
(Fichtelgebirge)
Dual Education vbw-Vereinigung der bayerischen 
Wirtschaft und bayerische 
Metall- und Elektroarbeitgeber 
(in Verbindung mit MobiPro-EU, 
bei fehlender Förderfähigkeit 
ergänzende Unterstützung).
Spanische Fachkräfte für das 
Handwerk
Employment of qualified workers 






Spanische Fachkräfte für das 
Handwerk in Oberbayern
Employment of Qualified Youths 
with continous training and 
language courses
Chamber of Commerce München 
and Upper Bavaria
Spanische Pflegekräfte am  
Universitätsklinikum Erlangen





4.2.1 Overview and Policy Recommendations
Italy has faced low growth rates for a decade now and was strongly hit by the Great 
Recession. Thus, structural economic problems certainly contribute to unemploy-
ment for all age groups. Important regional differences in youth unemployment can 
be observed: the South has youth unemployment rates nearly twice as high as the 
North. Nevertheless, the large difference between youth and adult unemployment  
rates over the last decade, as well as the very high rates of youth who are not in em-
ployment, education or training (NEET), can be observed in all regions. In addition 
to the overall lack of job creation, Italian youths thus face specific structural issues 
when entering the labour market in all regions.
A major structural problem affecting youth unemployment is that the education  
system fails to provide youth with the skills required in the labour market. Although 
in principle a vocational secondary school track exists, the time spent on the job  
is very limited. No legal framework regulates the content and time spent in school-
based education for apprenticeship contracts and the quality of the training  
provided by firms varies strongly. 
A second concern is the strong labour market divide between youths and adults. 
Youths are strongly over-represented in temporary and atypical contracts, explaining  
why almost all job cuts made during the recent recession affected younger genera-
tions. In the case of dismissals, firms face strong employment protection legislation 
of permanent contracts combined with the conflict-prone relation between emplo-
yers and trade unions. This situation often makes it difficult for firms to achieve the 
necessary workforce turnover to adapt to changing economic circumstances using 
regular working contracts. As a result, this contributes to a lower hiring rate and an 
increase in the proportion of service provision contracts and self-employment. 
The few reforms made so far to the education system and labour market institutions 
in Italy did not bring about any clear progress to date and are unlikely to do so in the 
future. The 2012 Fornero Reform, for example, does not seem to have achieved any 
clear change in the imbalances in employment protection legislation between  
permanent and temporary contracts. While it succeeded in making service provision  
contracts stricter, it did not create incentives for job creation. To reduce labour  
market dualism, several researchers recommend the introduction of a single contract 
with severance payments that increase with tenure (Garibaldi and Taddei 2013). Here, 
it would be necessary to introduce a structural reform of the labour market to estab-
lish clear rules for severance payments and leave less room for judicial procedures in 
the case of dismissals due to economic reasons. Moreover, employment protection of 
workers under all types of service provision contracts should be increased.
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Policy Recommendations
::  Invest more finances in secondary and tertiary education.
::  Foster applied vocational education and applied university programs, by developing central 
standards for the quality of vocational training and minimum requirements on time spent in the 
firm by occupation.
::  Implement a structural labour market reform, reducing the precariousness of temporary and 
service provision jobs and setting clear rules for reasonable dismissal costs in the case of 
dismissals for economic reasons.
::  Strengthen active labour market policies by providing better services and information to the 
unemployed as well as incentives for geographic mobility.
As compared to other European countries, public spending in active labour market  
policies is relatively low in Italy and has not increased much during the recession.  
Potential to increase the employment probability of youths in Italy exists by 
strengthening public employment services and providing better incentives for the 
creation of start-ups. Due to the very low regional mobility, programmes aimed at 
reducing mobility barriers are also likely to foster employment. 
Italy has a relatively low proportion of university degree graduates as compared to 
the OECD average; it also has high university dropout rates. In addition, university 
graduates do not face a much lower risk of unemployment compared to the lower 
qualified. The absence of sizeable returns to education is a strong incentive not to 
invest in education. The very low number of university graduates, combined with  
a relatively high number of upper secondary graduates from schools providing  
general education, suggest that it is essential to invest in vocational education to  
provide skills that are more strongly demanded by the labour market. 
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Despite state intentions to develop vocational training and apprenticeship pro-
grammes, the investment in educational policies has been very limited over the 
last decade. Vocational training agencies and schools (Istruzione e Formazione 
Professionale – IFP) coordinated at a regional level provide more practice-oriented 
secondary vocational education with a stronger connection to firms. These pro-
grammes have been expanded in recent years. They are a step in the right direction, 
even if the programmes are still small at the present time and mostly address early 
school-leavers. However, there is no central certification of quality and quantity for 
on-the-job training provided in firms and the quality of school-based training is very 
heterogeneous across regions. While the 2011 Consolidated Act on Apprentice-
ships was on the right path to making apprenticeship programmes more structured 
through compulsory off-the-job training, a recent decree cancelled these changes. 
Without a legal framework regulating the standards for on-the-job training for each 
occupation, it is unlikely that such a vocational qualification will become attractive to 
firms and youths. Unions, firms and employers’ associations could certainly support 
this process by engaging in stronger cooperation with regions to ensure high-quality 
training during apprenticeships. 
4.2.2 The Macroeconomic Context and the Effects of the Crisis
Italy’s growth per capita has been the weakest of all OECD countries over the past 
decade (OECD 2013c). Productivity growth has been very low since 2000 and Italy 
has lost competitiveness in terms of relative unit labour costs with respect to other 
European countries (Dustmann et al. 2014). This means that previous to the crisis  
the relationship between labour costs and labour productivity has worsened signi-
ficantly in Italy as compared to other countries in the euro area. 
Although the growth rate plummeted to - 7 % in 2009, Italy seemed to recover quicker 
from the Great Recession than Spain and Portugal, as it had positive GDP growth 
in 2010 and 2011. But the country’s economy was strongly hit by the subsequent 
sovereign debt crisis and again had strongly negative growth rates in 2012 and 2013. 
Figure 4-3 shows the development of the youth unemployment rate and GDP since 
2000. We observe that, similarly to Spain, youth unemployment is strongly inversely 
correlated with economic growth reaching two peaks in 2009 and 2012.
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Figure 4-3: Change in Youth (15- to 24-Year Olds) Unemployment Rate and  
Change in GDP 1990 – 2012, Italy
Note: The change in the youth unemployment rate is given by the difference in the unemployment rates in 
a given year minus the unemployment rate in the previous year. The percentage change in the GDP on the 
previous period gives the change in the GDP. Source: EUROSTAT online database, unemployment rates by 
age (%) and GDP and main components – volumes, own calculations.
The pension reform in 2011 may have also contributed to the problem of youth 
unemployment in that it basically suppressed the possibility of early retirement. The 
retirement age was set at 66 years (from 65 years for men and gradually until 2018 
for women from 60 years). Moreover, retirement before the specified age due to a 
given work experience was converted to early retirement with much lower pension 
benefits. Italian firms traditionally used early retirement as a soft way to downsize 
their workforce. Since the reform, this is no longer an option and firms have to keep 
their older workers with relatively high wage costs for several years more (Garibaldi 
and Taddei 2013). This may leave firms with less financial capacity for hiring young 
people. 
Not all sectors were affected in the same way by the Great Recession. The decrease 
in employment between 2008 and 2012 has been about 24 % for youth under 25 and 
less than 1% for adults. In terms of employment losses, the crisis has especially hit 
the manufacturing sector, where employment decreased by 40 % for 15- to 24-Year-
Olds, and the construction sector, where youth employment decreased by 36 %. In 
contrast, employment increased for both youths and adults in the accommodation 
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Figure 4-4 shows the existence of very large differences in youth unemployment 
rates across the three main Italian macro-regions. In the “South and Islands” regions, 
youth unemployment was at very high levels (over 30 %) even before the crisis. In the 
north of the country, the youth unemployment rate was relatively low (below 15 %) 
before 2008 and increased to more than 25 % in recent years. Lower job creation  
and a lower quality of the education system are major problems in the south of the 
country (Pastore 2012).
However, the integration of youths in the labour market was a reason of concern even 
before the Great Recession in all Italian regions. 
Italy has had the highest ratio of youth unemployment to adult unemployment in 
Europe for years. In all regions, young workers were on average more than three 
times more likely to be unemployed than adults long before the crisis and NEET rates 
have been around 20 % for ten years. It thus seems that even in the more prosperous 
northern regions, Italian youths face structural difficulties upon entering the labour 
market.
Figure 4-4: Youth (15- to 24-Year-Olds) Unemployment Rate by Region in Italy, 
2000 – 2012








































4.2.3 The Educational System
Education is compulsory for ten years, from six to 16 years of age, and includes the 
eight-year first cycle of education (five years of primary school and three years of 
lower secondary school) and the first two years of the upper secondary school. At  
the end of lower secondary schools (age 14), pupils attend either the state upper 
secondary schools (i. e. Lyceum, technical and professional schools) for five years, 
or vocational education and training courses. Vocational education and training 
courses fall under the competence of the regions and have a duration of three or four 
years. Degrees in state upper secondary schools enable direct access to university. 
Table 4-5 presents an overview of the main educational stages and institutions in 
Italy.
Table 4-5: The Italian Educational System
Age 6 – 13 Age 14 – 19 Age 19 and higher
Primary education 
and lower secondary 
education
Uper secondary education: 
:: Lyceum 
:: Technical institutes 
:: Professional institutes 
:: Vocational training centres
:: Universities 
::  Training courses organised by the 
Regions (e. g. for apprenticeships)
:: Instituti Tecnici Superiori (ITS)
In Italy, there are two main types of vocational training, namely school-based vo-
cational education and professional apprenticeships. In both programmes youths 
typically spend some time in educational institutions and in firms, but the intensity  
of on-the-job training is very low. 
School-based vocational training is mainly provided in technical and professional 
institutes, which are high schools attended by the majority of pupils in Italy between  
the ages of 14 and 19. The school programmes of both technical institutes and  
professional institutes have become increasingly similar over time to the Lyceum, 
which provides general education suited to future university education. Both school 
types usually provide an internship in firms that typically does not last more than 
one month (Ballarino and Checchi 2013, for example, report that 95 % of internships 
done in 2005 were carried out in the Lombardy region and lasted between three and 
four weeks).
More recently, another type of school-based vocational training is gaining impor-
tance, namely vocational training agencies and schools (Istruzione e Formazione 
Professionale – IFP) coordinated at a regional level. In 2011, about 8 % of youth  
aged between 14 and 17 attended these types of programmes (ISFOL 2012a). Most 
programmes last three years and award a vocational certificate at the end of the 
programme. Recently some regions have introduced the possibility to attend a fourth 
year with the aim of gaining a professional school diploma, but less than 10,000 
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students took up this offer in 2012 (ISFOL 2013a). The training provided in these 
institutions is more specific and the cooperation with firms is stronger. However,  
participants are typically pupils who drop out from secondary education and the 
quality of education is generally poor (Ballarino and Checchi 2013). Moreover, there 
is also a greater heterogeneity in the quality of education and in the time spent in 
internships, with larger problems encountered in southern regions (ISFOL 2012a). 
Further, only 68 % of pupils in vocational training agencies and 46 % of pupils in  
vocational training schools finished the programmes and earnined a vocational  
certificate in 2012 (ISFOL 2013a).
The overall skills provided by school-based vocational training are typically  
considered of low quality or not specific enough by firms. South Tyrol is an exception  
however. As seen in Box 4-1, it has a well-functioning dual vocational education  
system.
Box 4-1: The Dual Vocational Education System in the Province of South Tyrol
The autonomous province of South Tyrol stands out as it has a much lower youth unemployment 
rate than other Italian regions. The youth unemployment rate was 11.6 % in 2012 and has  
remained lower than 10 % in the years before 2012, in contrast to all other Italian regions which 
have had a youth unemployment rate of more than 20 % in recent years (see the Iatest online 
database). 
One of the key determinants of the better youth labour market outcomes is the dual vocational 
education system, which involves more than 10 % of youth aged between 16 and 18 (ASTAT 
2013). The system has been in place since 1955 and is very similar to the dual education system 
in place in Germany or in Austria. Apprentices spend almost 400 hours per year in vocational 
schools and the rest of the time in a company. At the end of the programme, which typically lasts 
three or four years, apprentices earn a professional qualification (Berufsbefähigungszeugnis) 
or a professional diploma for the four-year programme. The dual apprenticeship in the region, 
which is mostly characterised by service-oriented small industries, is particularly widespread for 
professions in craftsmanship, as well as in the catering and hotel industry. 
The dual education system in South Tyrol is very different from other vocational education in the 
rest of Italy, which is almost entirely school-based. While a new type of dual vocational education 
was recently introduced by law (Apprendistato per la qualifica e per il diploma professionale), 
only a small number of pilot programmes have been introduced in a few regions (i. e. Piedmont, 
Lombardy and Veneto) within the context of this framework and have involved less than one 
hundred pupils each (ISFOL 2013b).
More information on the apprenticeship system in South Tyrol can be found on the province’s 
website (www.provinz.bz.it/berufsbildung).
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Professional apprenticeships are contracts between firms and individuals aged  
18 to 29 that have a length between two and six years. In principle, these contracts 
were established to combine on-the-job training with external training courses in 
accredited institutes sponsored by the regions. They allow for lower social security 
contributions to compensate firms for the training costs they incur. However,  
because of a lack of public funding and infrastructures, as well as subsequent  
reforms, only between 20 % and 30 % of apprentices participated in external training 
courses in recent years (ISFOL 2012b). Moreover, the quality of external training is 
very heterogeneous across regions. 
Italy overall has a relatively low proportion of tertiary education graduates. Only 
15 % of 25- to 64-Year-Olds have a university degree as compared to the OECD  
average of 32 %. Entry rates to university decreased to 48 % in 2011 as compared  
with 56 % in 2006. Moreover, Italy is the OECD country with the highest university 
dropout rate, since about 55 % of the individuals enrolling to university in 2006 did 
not get a degree compared to the OECD average of 31% (OECD 2008b). In addition, 
the majority of university graduates take longer than expected to get a degree  
(Aina et al. 2013). 
The low participation in higher education may be related to the uncertain returns 
from education that prevail in Italy. Italy and Portugal are the only countries among 
those we consider where graduates of tertiary education do not benefit from lower 
unemployment rates than the others. Moreover, 25- to 34-year-old Italians with a 
tertiary degree earn on average only 22 % more than those with an upper secondary 
degree. The OECD average is 40 % (OECD 2013a).
As in Spain and Portugal, the skill mismatch of tertiary education graduates is also 
problematic in Italy. First, it seems that there is an overproduction of graduates in 
subjects (such as arts, humanities and social sciences) that are less demanded in 
the labour market as compared to technical ones. Indeed, overqualification and 
skills mismatch is found to be higher for these subjects (Caroleo and Pastore 2013). 
Second, the education system focusses mostly on theoretical knowledge and not 
enough on practical applications and on fostering problem-solving skills (Eichhorst 
and Neder 2014). Incorporating internships in firms into academic curricula and 
developing more applied tertiary programmes would help in reducing the existing 
skill mismatch.
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4.2.4 Duality of the Labour Market
The division of the labour market represents a growing concern in Italy and the  
increased use of temporary contracts is an important reason why the recent eco-
nomic crisis affected youth much more strongly than adults. The ratio between the 
proportion of employees with a temporary contract under age 25 and the same  
proportion among adults (between 40 and 65 of age) has increased rapidly over  
recent years. While in 2000 this proportion was lower than the EU-15 average  
(4.4 vs. 5.9), it has rapidly increased in the past years, reaching a level above the  
EU-15 average (6.7 vs. 6) in 2012. 
This is mainly because of recent reforms which between 1997 and 2003 eased the 
restrictions for temporary contracts and introduced new forms of atypical contracts. 
The decree of 2001 abolished the list of specific reasons for using temporary con-
tracts and led to an increased use of fixed-term contracts “at the margin”, namely 
affecting only new entrants in the labour market (Boeri and Garibaldi 2007).
The flexibilisation of the use of temporary contracts was not accompanied by serious 
reforms of the unemployment benefit system, so that many youth are not covered by 
unemployment insurance and often have to rely on informal, family-based assistance 
during unemployment spells (Garibaldi and Taddei 2013).
Italian employers may use many different forms of temporary contracts with  
different characteristics: apprenticeship contracts and fixed-term contracts but  
also service provision (or collaboration) contracts, which are subject to less strict  
employment protection (for an overview on contract types in Italy see Tealdi 2011).
The strong employment protection legislation of permanent and fixed-term con-
tracts is one reason why firms may prefer to hire under collaboration contracts. The 
main constraint for dismissing permanent workers lies in the length and uncertainty 
of the court trials judging whether a dismissal is unfair or not. Faced with the threat 
of high dismissal costs, firms thus have an incentive to opt for fixed-term and atypical 
contracts. Conflict-prone negotiations between employers’ organisations and unions 
in Italy most likely contribute to the risk of being taken to court in the case of dis-
missals of permanent workers.
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The result is that the Italian labour market remains divided between the older  
generations with a permanent job and the younger generations, who are typically 
locked for a long time into temporary and often “precarious” employment. This is  
also reflected in the high proportion of self-employment and collaboration contracts. 
Table 4-6 shows employment shares and social security contributions by contract 
type in 2011. The table clearly shows that the majority of young workers aged 18 – 29 
(unfortunately these data are not available for 18- to 24-Year-Olds) were not employed 
with a permanent contract. What is especially striking, however, is the high pro-
portion of workers employed with collaboration contracts (14 %), higher than both 
fixed-term contracts (11%) and apprenticeship contracts (6 %). 
Table 4-6: Employment and Social Security Contribution by Contract Type in 2011, 
Italy
Employment in 2011 (in %) Social security  
contributions (in %)Total Youth (18 – 29)
Permanent 64.4 44.7 31
Fixed-term 5.9 10.6 31
Apprenticeship 1 5.9 10
Collaboration 5.8 13.9 17
Self-employed 17.2 11.2
Other 5.7 13.7
Total employment 100 100
Note: Social security contributions shown are percentages of gross earnings. Individuals with colla- 
boration contracts are categorised as self-employed. The total self-employed proportion is thus higher 
than shown in the table. Source: ISFOL (2013). Rapporto di monitoraggio del mercato del lavoro 2012. 
ISFOL: Rome.
As a consequence, youths are much more affected by dismissals when a recession  
comes along than adults on permanent contracts. This in itself would not be an issue 
if there were consensus-based relations between unions and employers that also  
take the level of employment into account. This is not the case in Italy, as insiders 
with permanent contracts are particularly well represented by the largest unions,  
which tend to strongly defend their own interests in confrontation with employers  
(Baglioni and Mota 2013).
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4.2.5 The Lack of Geographic Mobility
Another contributing factor explaining the high youth unemployment rates in Italy is 
the low degree of geographic mobility of youth. Italy is among the European countries  
with the lowest regional and local mobility rates in the EU (Bonin et al. 2008). Italian 
youths tend to live longer with their parents than their European counterparts. While 
81% of Italian men aged 16 – 29 still lived with their parents in 2012, the proportions 
are about 78 % for Portugal, 77 % for Spain and less than 70 % for France, Germany 
and the UK (Eurostat online database). One explanation is that the safety net system 
is very informal and family-based in Italy, especially concerning programmes for the 
youth. Typically young workers with little labour market experience are not eligible  
for unemployment benefits. Moreover, housing costs are high in Italy compared  
to wages (Giannelli and Monfardini 2003). Given the existence of extremely high  
regional differences in unemployment rates, programmes aimed at reducing mobility 
barriers and helping Italian youths to leave the parental nest earlier have a great  
potential to reduce the very high structural youth unemployment rates in Italy. 
4.2.6 Survey of Policies and Initiatives
Labour Market Policies
The Italian government’s recent policies against youth unemployment focus mostly 
on financial incentives for firms to hire youths with open-ended contracts. 
First, in 2010 the “Diritto al Futuro” initiative was launched, providing among other 
things, a 5,000 euro bonus to companies which offer young parents, who are unem-
ployed or on atypical contracts, a permanent contract (Eurofound 2011). Second, a 
decree issued in 2013 (D.L. 76/2013) provided a one-year tax reduction of up to  
650 euros per month to firms that hire workers under 30 (unemployed and / or indi-
viduals without secondary education degree) with an open-ended contract. The 
same applies for firms converting temporary contracts into open-ended ones. The 
total budget allocated to this programme is 1.5 billion euros.
Within the EU Youth Guarantee framework further funding of about 1.5 billion euros 
will be invested in the years 2014 – 2018 to provide employment and training to  
youth under 25 who are either unemployed or not in employment education or 
training (NEET) (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali 2014a). The system 
of employment services is going to undertake the major role of assisting youth and 
intermediating between education institutions and the labour market. This might be 
an important occasion to strengthen the currently inadequate system of employment 
services. Otherwise, it is unlikely that the programme will be successful.
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The 2012 “Fornero Reform” has tried to decrease the duality in the Italian labour 
market by addressing the differences in employment protection between permanent 
and temporary contracts and decreasing the incentives for firms to hire through 
atypical contracts. However, changes in the employment protection legislation rules 
for permanent workers have only been marginal and it is unlikely that they made it 
more attractive for firms to employ youths with permanent contracts (Garibaldi and 
Taddei 2013).
Before the 2012 “Fornero Reform”, permanent contracts could de facto hardly be 
ended. Economic reasons were generally not accepted as reasons for fair dismissal. 
Workers dismissed unfairly could decide between full reinstatement in the firm or 
high severance payments (15 months plus months from dismissal). Since the intro-
duction of the Fornero Reform, economic reasons are accepted as a reason for dis-
missal, but higher severance payment of 12 – 24 months are to be paid if a dismissal 
is ruled to be unfair (court decision). No severance payment applies for fixed-term 
contracts and thereby gives firms much more flexibility. The confrontational negoti-
ation culture among trade unions and employers’ representatives may contribute to 
reinforcing the threat of major costs and uncertainties in the dismissal procedure. 
One of the reform’s achievement was that it succeeded in decreasing new hiring 
through collaboration contracts, by making the rules under which firms could use 
these contracts stricter. Whilst there is some evidence of a shift towards standard 
fixed-term contracts, job creation might have been reduced (Ministero del Lavoro e 
delle Politiche Sociali 2014b). This is considered a positive change to decrease labour 
market dualism, but the timing of the reform – in the midst of the sovereign debt  
crisis – is likely to have negative effects on overall employment.
In 2011, Italy spent only 0.4 % of the GDP on active labour market policies – a much 
lower proportion compared to other EU countries, such as Germany (0.8 %), France 
(0.9 %) or Spain (0.9 %). Moreover, the composition of this expenditure is unbalanced. 
The majority of the spending goes towards training and private sector incentives. Not 
much is invested in the system of employment services (“Centri per l’impiego”) that 
should be strengthened to improve the match between jobseekers and employers.  
In Italy, only about 3 % of the new employment is channelled through public and  
private employment services (Pastore 2012). Compared internationally, the incen-
tives for the creation of start-ups and employment incentives directed to individuals 
are very low. These measures are among the active labour market policies that are 
found to be more effective in the short run (Card et al. 2010). In the current difficult 
economic situation, higher funding on these measures could contribute to job  
creation for youth.
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Educational Policies and Initiatives to Improve Vocational Education
Contrary to Portugal, Italy has not made major policy efforts to increase the level of 
educational attainment. It is the only OECD country that has not increased spending 
per student in primary and secondary education since 1995 (OECD 2013a). Despite 
the expansion of educational attainment provided by vocational training institutions 
at a regional level, the overall quality of the programmes is poor and they do not 
seem to have contributed to a substantial reduction in the number of early school-
leavers amounting to about 18 % in 2012. There is a consensus among Italian re- 
searchers that the training provided by the vocational programmes of secondary 
schools is generally inadequate and that the cooperation among public institutions 
and firms should be enhanced. 
The importance of apprenticeship contracts has increased in the past ten years 
and there is a general political consensus to make them a major channel of labour 
market entrance of young workers. However, legislators in Italy have often changed 
their mind concerning the nature of the off-the-job training to be provided. First, 
the “Biagi Law” of 2003 further liberalised the already very flexible apprenticeship 
contracts. It abolished the certification of qualifications, abolished the obligation of 
school-based training and extended the scope of the contracts to include persons up 
to 30 years of age where the previous age limit was 25 (Cappellari et al. 2012). Then 
the Consolidated Act on Apprenticeships of 2011 re-established the obligation of the 
provision of school-based training, but a law of March 2014 (D.L. 34/2014) cancelled 
it again. However, these vocational qualifications are unlikely to be acknowledged by 
employers and pupils, if there is no central standard for the quality of the training  
provided in firms for each occupation. 
A new form of higher technical institutes (Istituti Tecnici Superiori – ITS) was intro-
duced in Italy in 2011. ITS are institutes offering post-secondary vocational edu-
cation. The courses offered during the last two years and have a very applied focus, 
which is ensured by the fact that half of the instructors are professionals from private 
firms or external public institutions. The approach is promising because of the better 
link to practice. Compulsory internships are organised for 30 % of the time spent in 
these programmes. Currently 63 ITS have been set up with about 5,000 students  
(for further information on ITS consult the website of the Ministry of Education and 
Research). The development of these programmes is still at an initial stage and it is 
too early to provide any evaluation. In addition, some interesting initiatives at the 
local level have been started up by public institutions as well as by private firms and 
employers’ associations. Table 4-7 provides an overview of the most interesting  
initiatives which focus on supporting training and on improving the cooperation 
between educational institutions and private firms at the local level.
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Table 4-7: Local and Private Initiatives to Tackle Youth Unemployment in Italy
Initiative / Programme What is offered? Organiser
Sistema dote Among other things provides an 
“apprenticeship dowry” of up 
to 6,000 Euros per apprentice. 
This amount can be used for 
training services of the regional 
vocational education during 
apprenticeships.
Lombardy region
Ausbildungspraktikum für  
arbeitslose Jugendliche
Formation internship offered  
to unemployed youths with a 
compensation of three to five 
Euros per hour. 264 internships 
were offered in 2013.
South Tyrol province
Reti di imprese per l’istruzione 
tecnica
Improve school-to-work 
transitions through stronger 
interchange between firms and 
school teachers / students of 
technical institutes. More than 
20 schools and 30 firms  
participated to the initiative 
which started in 2010.
Assolombarda (employers’  
confederation of the Milan area)
Orientagiovani Aimed at students in schools 
and universities, an orientation 
day is hosted in all italian pro-
vinces. It provides information 
about companies and the edu- 
cational profiles requested in the 
labour market. Almost 40,000 
youth are reached nationwide.
Confindustria (largest  
employers’ association in Italy)
YouthSpark Set of initiatives providing trai-
ning for youth starting in 2013. 
The programs “Youth & Employ-
ment – IT as an enabler” and 
“Meet no NEET” have provided 
IT training to about 9,000 youth 
so far. “Startup Revolutionary 
Road”, which aims at providing 
training and mentorship for st-
arting a new business, involved 
2,500 youth and enabled the 
creation of 80 start-ups in 2013.
Microsoft (private company)  
in collaboration with public  
institutions, non-profit orga-
nisations and private firms
Innovation Hub Genova A pilot programme launched in 
2014 involving private firms and 
research institutions. It provides  
mentoring and industrial tutoring 
to assist innovative start-ups. 
High-quality training is planned 
for 60 youth in Genova, while 
further innovation hubs are 
planned in other 25 – 30 Italian 
cities.




4.3.1 Overview and Policy Recommendations
Macroeconomic issues are particularly pronounced in Portugal. The structural lack 
of economic growth and the tough austerity measures taken because of the sovereign 
debt crisis are important reasons behind (youth) unemployment. A first priority to 
improve employment perspectives for Portuguese youth is therefore to tackle the 
overall economic situation and to increase competitiveness in order to create new 
jobs. 
However, institutional factors have contributed to the increase in unemployment as 
well, especially for youths. In particular, the rigidity of wage-setting institutions, the 
strong employment protection of both permanent and fixed-term contracts as well 
as the strongly school-based secondary education system make the transition from 
school to work even more difficult.
More so than in Spain and Italy, rigid entry wages are thought to contribute to youth 
unemployment in Portugal. In addition to the minimum wage that applies to workers 
of all age groups, collective agreements at the sectoral and regional level set wages 
above the minimum wage for all firms and workers. The lower minimum wage levels 
for youths were abolished in 1987. Decentralising wage-setting or at least allowing 
firms to opt out from these collective agreements to take into account firm-specific 
constraints, as was done in Spain with the 2012 reform, may help to reduce the  
burden of high labour costs and increase the hiring rates in Portugal.
As in Spain, the proportion of temporary employment among youths is very high 
in Portugal, making the youth very vulnerable to job losses in case of a recession. 
Moreover, an average youth can expect to wait more than four years before finding 
a permanent job after leaving school which is the longest duration as compared to 
the other countries considered. Employment protection legislation remains strong 
for both permanent and temporary contracts in Portugal, although the 2011 reform 
succeeded in imposing a maximum on the severance payments in the case of dis- 
missals of permanent workers. This is particularly relevant for workers with high 
tenure who could previously not be dismissed at reasonable cost. High dismissal 




:: Foster economic growth in order to create more jobs.
:: Allow firms to opt out from collective agreements.
:: Regulate the use of service provisions contracts.
::  Increase the practical relevance of vocational education through partnerships between firms 
and publicly financed education centres.
::  Regulate apprenticeships: work towards developing central standards for vocational training 
and minimum requirements on time spent in the firm.
In recent years, a major effort has been made to increase the level of educational  
attainment, leading to a significant increase in the proportion of upper secondary 
and tertiary education graduates. Nevertheless, the proportion of early school-
leavers remains seven percentage points higher than the EU average. EPIS, a private 
sector initiative, provides coaching and training of non-cognitive skills to 15,000 
pupils in order to reduce school dropout rates. The programme has been effective  
in reducing dropout rates and is an example of effective intervention to reduce  
dropouts that could be extended to include more pupils.
In spite of the political willingness and repeated attempts to increase the practical 
relevance of vocational education, no clear results have been yielded thus far. A  
promising large-scale project that provided dual vocational education to around 
55,000 youths and adults each year since 2000 has been recently stopped. A new 
project started within the framework of the Youth Guarantee to provide dual voca- 
tional education and programmes for school dropouts. However, no standards are set 
for the quality of the apprenticeships in firms and youths are paid only the symbolic 
amount of 40 euros per month during the three-year programme.
Partly because of the industrial structure, which is rather service-oriented and 
therefore requires less practical technical skills, firms are reluctant to invest in  
apprenticeships. Without the support of employers, it is unlikely that governmental  
initiatives will succeed in increasing the quality of vocational education and its 
practical relevance. 
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4.3.2 The Macroeconomic Context and the Effects of the Crisis
The Portuguese economy already faced structural problems before the financial 
crisis, and was then strongly affected by the Great Recession.
The Portuguese GDP per capita has been the lowest of all considered countries since 
1995 and the growth rate averaged 0.4 % between 1988 and 2013. It decreased to 
- 3 % in 2009 after the financial crisis and again after the debt crisis in 2012. Regional  
differences are not very pronounced in Portugal. All regions had youth (15- to 
24-Year-Olds) unemployment rates above 30 % in 2013. The densely populated urban 
areas along the coast are somewhat better off than the declining low-density rural 
areas concentrated in the country’s interior (OECD 2010).
The Portuguese economy suffered amongst other things from the liberalisation of 
textile trade. The expiration in 2005 of the Multi Fibre Agreement, which imposed 
quotas on the amount of textile that developing countries could export to developed 
countries, led to the increased delocalisation of the textile industry to Eastern Europe  
and Asia.
Despite increasing exports since 2010, the average proportion of exports to GDP  
remains lower than in the rest of the OECD (37 % in Portugal versus 43 % in the OECD 
in 2011). Investments have largely been directed towards the non-tradable sector 
with little effect on productivity growth (OECD 2012c).
Harsh austerity measures were then taken by the Portuguese government in the  
aftermath of the financial and debt crisis in order to cut public deficits and in ex-
change for the bailout by the International Monetary Fund, European Commission 
and European Central Bank. The current account balance was thereby improved 
from - 11% to - 2 % of GDP between 2009 and 2013 (OECD 2013), but this was achieved  
with tough reductions in public expenditure. These budget cuts threatened to  
worsen the recession and reduced the possibilities for active labour market policies 
or investments in education. Accordingly, additional resources devoted to social  
support in Portugal were less than a third of the OECD average between 2007 and 
2012 (OECD 2014) although unemployment rates doubled.
In addition, the Portuguese public budget is also constrained for structural reasons. 
Expenditures on pensions and health represent important and increasing propor-
tions of the public budget as the Portuguese population is ageing rapidly. According 
to predictions by the OECD (2014), there will be around 1.4 people of active age per 
retiree in 2050 compared to around 3.3 currently.
100 Country Briefs
Similar to Spanish firms, Portuguese firms had high levels of leverage before the 
crisis. Following the financial crisis and the austerity measures taken by the govern-
ment, firms faced severe credit constraints and had to cut down employment and 
refrain from hiring. Finally, Portugal faced a construction boom and bust, though to  
a lesser extent than Spain.
As a result of these structural economic problems and the Great Recession, the 
unemployment rate has been increasing since 2000 and the increase accelerated 
starting in 2008. Figure 4-5 shows the development of the unemployment rates over 
time for youths and for adults. Youth and overall unemployment rates were already 
increasing since 2000 and doubled between 2008 and 2012. Youth unemployment 
reached 38 % in 2012. Employment fell by 700,000 since 2008, of which 154,000 were 
youths (15- to 24-Year-Olds).
Figure 4-5: Unemployment Rate by Age Group in Portugal, 2000 – 2012
Source: Eurostat online database, unemployment rates by age (%). 
The economic downturn thus plays an important role in the increase in youth  
unemployment in Portugal, but institutional factors affect youth employment as  
well. In the following sections, we focus on minimum wages, employment protection 








































4.3.3 The Minimum Wage 
Portugal has had a nationwide minimum wage since 1974. It is not high in absolute 
terms (566 euros per month) as compared to other European countries, but relative 
to the median wage in Portugal, it is one of the highest in Europe. Figure 4-6 shows 
the level of the minimum wage relative to the median wage for Portugal and the  
reference countries. Relative to the median wage, the minimum wage in Portugal is 
the second highest after France. 
Figure 4-6: Minimum Wage as a Percentage of the Median Wage, by Country, 2012
Note: The median wage is the wage of the employee at the middle of the wage distribution. Median  
wages refer to earnings of full-time employees. Source: OECD online database, LFS – minimum relative  
to median wages of full-time workers.
Whereas France and the UK also have comparatively high minimum wages, youths 
under 20 year-olds are subject to lower minimum wages in these countries. In 
contrast, in Portugal, the applicability of the minimum wage was extended to all age 
groups in 1998. 
First, the minimum wage for workers aged 17 increased by 50 % as it was raised from 
half to 75 % of the full minimum wage in 1987. Cardoso and Portugal (2001) evaluate 
this reform and find that the higher minimum wage has actually increased job attach-
ment of young workers. In fact, although teenagers make up a smaller proportion 
of job accessions after the reform and a larger proportion of the workforce in firms 
going out of business, these effects were offset by a reduction in separations from 
the employer. Teenagers eligible for a wage increase following the reform were thus 













Second, also in 1987, the minimum wage for workers aged 18 or 19 was raised from 
75 % of the minimum wage to the full minimum wage, therefore increasing by 33 %. 
This reform was evaluated by Pereira (2003), who finds that it led to a significant 
reduction in the employment probability of youths in this age group but increased 
employment of 20- to 25-Year-Olds. Centeno et al. (2011) show that the recent  
increases of the minimum wage in 2007 – 2009 had a negative impact especially on 
the employment stability of low-wage workers, of which many are youths.
The successive increases of the minimum wage for youths may have contributed to 
the lower employment probability, especially in sectors and regions with low average 
wages. In addition, in Portugal, collective agreements that apply to all firms at the 
sectoral and regional level may set their own minimum wage above the national one. 
This can contribute to youth unemployment because firms cannot adapt wages to 
their firm-specific circumstances. 
4.3.4 Duality of the Labour Market
Similar to the Spanish and Italian labour markets, the Portuguese labour market is 
characterised by a high proportion of temporary employment among youths. This 
proportion started increasing in 1994 from 25 % to close to 60 % in 2012. Portugal 
now has the highest proportion of temporary contracts among youths after Spain. An 
important point is that these contracts are not apprenticeship related as is the case 
for most youth temporary contracts in Germany. Some 77 % of Portuguese youths 
claim that they have a temporary contract because they could not obtain a permanent 
position. Moreover, the expected time required to find a permanent job after leaving 
school – more than four years –is highest in Portugal as compared to the other  
considered countries (Brunello 2010). 
The strong level of employment protection for permanent contracts contributes to 
the high proportion of youths with temporary contracts in Portugal. Portugal has one 
of the most restrictive employment protection legislations for permanent workers 
in the OECD. In particular, procedural inconvenience for firms upon dismissal of 
permanent workers and the rise of severance payments with tenure are very high in 
Portugal. Table 4-8 shows the severance payments that apply upon dismissal of  
workers by type of contract. Before 2011, firms had to pay very high severance pay-
ments in case of dismissal of permanent workers. These payments amounted to the 
income of 15 – 45 days times the years of seniority of the worker in the firm and no 
maximum amount was specified. This meant huge dismissal costs for workers with 
high tenure and can be expected to raise temporary employment rates and to reduce 
the overall hiring rate.
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In 2004, a reform of the Portuguese labour code extended the protection of perma-
nent employment, which previously applied only to larger firms, also to firms with 
11 – 20 workers. Centeno and Novo (2012) show that the more stringent employment 
protection of permanent workers enforced through the reform induced the affected 
firms to increase the proportion of employees with fixed-term contracts.
Table 4-8: Severance Payments by Type of Contract, Portugal
Permanent contact Temporary contract
Before 2011 15 – 45 days per year of  
seniority plus procedural costs.  
No maximum level.
3 days per month of seniority 
but no procedural costs.
After 2011 12 days per year of seniority. 
Maximum of 12 months.
The use of temporary contracts in Portugal is fairly regulated as well. The maximum 
cumulated duration of a temporary contract is 36 months and temporary contracts 
are automatically converted into permanent contracts if this duration is exceeded. 
Moreover, the use of temporary contracts is restricted to particular situations (see 
OECD 2012c). As a result, firms may try to avoid the employment protection rules on 
regular fixed-term or permanent contracts by hiring workers under legal or illegal 
forms of service provision contracts (Recivos Verdes). This form of contract is not 
subject to minimum wage or severance payments and has been increasingly used in 
recent years. 
In Portugal, tripartite agreements between government, employers and unions are 
the basis for labour market and social policies. The negotiation culture between  
unions and employers’ organisations is often not consensus-based. This may  
increase the threat for firms of being taken to court in the case of dismissals and  
thereby create an incentive to use service provision contracts. Nevertheless, unions 
are less powerful in Portugal than in Italy. Recent restructuring and concentration  
of both Portuguese employers’ organisations and the most relevant union is expected 
to lead to more effective bargaining and coordination.
4.3.5 The Educational System
Educational attainment has increased very fast since 2000 in Portugal. Figure 4-7 
shows the proportion of 25- to 34-Year-Olds who obtained at most a lower secondary 
education degree, an upper secondary degree and a tertiary degree between 2000 
and 2012. The proportion of 25- to 34-Year-Olds with at most a lower secondary 
education strongly decreased from nearly 70 % in 2000 to 40 % in 2012, whilst the 
proportion of 25- to 34-Year-Olds with an upper secondary or tertiary degree has 
increased accordingly. 
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Despite these developments, the proportion of upper secondary graduates in  
Portugal still lags far behind the proportion in other European countries. In 2010, 
only 52 % of the 25- to 34-Year-Olds attained an upper secondary education as  
compared with 65 % in Spain and 70 % in Italy. The proportion of early school-leavers 
is one of the highest among the considered countries (21% in 2012). Portugal is  
also among the countries with the lowest proportion of adults (17 % of 25- to 64- 
Year-Olds) with a tertiary education degree. 
Figure 4-7: Educational Attainment (25- to 34-Year-Olds) in Portugal, 2000 – 2012
Note: ISCED 0–2: up to lower secondary education, ISCED 3–4: upper secondary education or post-
secondary non-tertiary education, ISCED 5–6: tertiary education. Source: Eurostat online database, 
proportion of 25- to 29-year-olds with lower secondary/upper secondary/tertiary education attainment 
by sex and age.
The Portuguese education system is mostly academic-oriented. Its organisation is 
presented in Table 4-9. 
Table 4-9: The Portuguese Educational System
6 – 15 year-olds 16 – 18 year-olds 18 years and older
Basic Education Secondary Education Higher Education:  
University 64 % 
Polytechnic 36 %











































All pupils follow the basic education track until the age of 15. After completing basic 
education, 73 % of 16- to 18-Year-Olds pursued a secondary education before 2009, 
when the compulsory schooling age was raised from 15 to 18 years. The secondary 
education lasts three years and gives access to higher education. It is possible  
to attend either academic or technical courses, but the core curriculum and the  
obtained degree are the same. There is no vocational track with a compulsory  
on-the-job experience in regular secondary schools. In 2011 – 12, 64 % of higher  
education students followed a university education, the remaining a polytechnic or 
applied higher education. However, in order to access polytechnic or applied higher 
education, the secondary school degree is a prerequisite. This means that besides 
directly entering the labour market, there is no alternative for pupils who do not 
manage to obtain the general secondary school degree.
4.3.6 Survey of Policies and Initiatives
Labour Market Policies
Portugal has made considerable progress in reducing employment protection of  
permanent workers. With the 2011 labour market reform, severance payments for 
the dismissal of permanent workers were decreased from one month to 12 days per 
year of tenure. More importantly, the reform introduced a maximum severance  
payment of 12 months regardless of tenure. This considerably reduced the threat of 
high firing costs for permanent workers.
Portugal has a relatively strict sanctioning and monitoring system of social welfare 
recipients, who are encouraged to actively search for a job or training (Baglioni and 
Mota 2013). How effective this monitoring is however remains unclear. Centeno et 
al. (2009) evaluate an active labour market programme implemented at the end of 
nineties that provided compulsory job search assistance to unemployed under the 
age of 25. They find that the programme had only modest effects on the probability 
of shortening unemployment though higher educated workers benefited more. As in 
Spain and Italy, recent active labour market policies have focussed on giving finan-
cial incentives to support youth employment and reducing employment protection. 
The Impulso Jovem programme supports the employment of young workers (18- to 
30-Year-Olds) by the partial reimbursement of social security contributions. When 
hiring a person aged 18 to 30 (part- or full-time) on a permanent contract, firms are 
reimbursed 100 % of social security contributions for a duration of 18 months. The 
reimbursement is 75 % for temporary contracts. Therefore, the incentive to give  
permanent contracts rather than temporary contracts is not very high.
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Educational Policies and Initiatives to Improve Vocational Education
Increasing the overall level of educational attainment has been a central focus of 
Portuguese educational policy in recent decades and yielded a significant increase 
in the average level of education. In order to decrease dropout rates and to increase 
the level of educational achievement, the compulsory schooling age was increased 
from 15 to 18 years of age in 2009. The proportion of 25- to 34-Year-Olds with at least 
an upper secondary degree increased from 32 % to 56 % between 2000 and 2011. The 
proportion of early school-leavers, which was the highest of all countries considered 
with 39 % in 2006, decreased to 21% in 2012. Moreover, specific opportunities for 
adults to obtain a degree were created in 2005, leading to 30 % of graduates from  
upper secondary education in 2011 who were older than 25 years of age (OECD 2013a). 
However, on the other side, the austerity measures following the financial and debt 
crisis had a significant impact on the resources available for education. Amongst 
others these measures included salary cuts for personnel working in public education  
and a rationalisation of educational expenditure at all levels of the administration.
The EPIS (Empresários pela Inclusao Social) programme is a large-scale private 
sector initiative aimed at fighting early school-leaving. The programme addresses 
15,000 seventh and eighth graders (13- to 15-Year-Olds) and has been in place in  
85 schools since 2007. This represents about 10 % of the seventh and eighth grade 
students in Portugal. The programme aims to improve the non-cognitive skills of 
poorly performing students through individual coaching and small group training 
sessions. An evaluation of the project by Martins (2010) shows that the programme 
reduced grade retention by at least ten percentage points.
Moreover, several educational programmes for school dropouts aged 15 to 23 are 
provided within the EU Youth Guarantee framework.
In addition, policy measures were taken to support the hiring of apprentices. In 
2000, the Ministry of Education started the Novas Opportunidades programme,  
offering dual vocational training in the so-called Novas Opportunidades Centres. 
200 of these centres were created from 2005 to 2012 and 400,000 persons obtained 
a vocational education degree. The programme provided a second chance to early 
school-leavers. The programme was, however, stopped in March 2013 with the  
argument that the quality of the training provided was too low, because centres  
were paid according to the number of graduates.
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The Garantía Jovem programme started in January 2014 within the framework  
of the EU Youth Guarantee which aims to ensure that all young people under 25 –  
whether registered with employment services or not – get a good-quality, concrete 
offer within four months of them leaving formal education or becoming unemployed. 
In this framework, dual vocational training is provided through the regional Centres 
for Employment and Professional Education (Centros de Emprego e Formação  
Profissional). The Garantía Jovem programme finances three-year dual vocational 
training for youths until the age of 29. 40 % of the time has to be spent on the job. 
However, there is no standard for the quality of the training provided in firms and 
youths are paid only 40 euros per month as a “scholarship”. 
At present, there is no strong support from the side of employers to invest in dual  
vocational education or apprenticeships. This may be partly due to the sectoral 
structure that requires few technically trained workers as well as to the lack of  
financial means to invest in the current economic situation at all. 
Besides the EU-funded initiatives supported through the Youth Guarantee, small 
initiatives run by private companies or non-profit organisations try to support  
unemployed youths through internships and give advice on becoming self-employed.  
A list of some of these initiatives can be found in Table 4-10. The small number of 
proposed internships are only symbolically remunerated, very short and with no 
clear qualification objective. 
Table 4-10: Private Initiatives to Tackle Youth Unemployment in Portugal
Initiative / Programme What is offered? Organiser
Qualificar para Empregar:  
Entrepreneurship for  
Employment
Dual vocational training in  
technical occupations for  
400 unemployed in 2014.
Instituto de Soldadura ISQ  
(Private Company)
Programa de Estágios Jovens 
Animadores do Museu da  
Eletricidade (PEJAME)
Six-months interships for  
youths aged 18 – 25  
(240 Euros per month).
Fundação da Juventude  
(Non-profit Organisation)
Programa de Estágios de Jovens 
Estudantes do Ensino Superior 
nas Empresas (PEJENE)
Three-months interships for  
students (without remuneration).
Fundação da Juventude 
Associação Nacional de Jovens 
Empresários
Training and information of 
young entrepreneurs; design  
and divulgation of facilitation  
instruments for business start-up.
ANJE and associates
A empresa, Start Up Study projects of four to six 
months in secondary schools 
and universities on the topics  
of financial literacy, work- 
readiness, and entrepreneurship. 
136,500 pupils participated 
since 2005.




5.1 Overview and Policy Recommendations
Youth unemployment stems from several sources cutting across general economic, 
labour market and education conditions that are mostly determined at the country 
level. Therefore, strategies for tackling youth unemployment need to be developed 
and impemented at the national level. Accordingly the country reports above contain 
country-specific recommendations. In the following, we nevertheless want to state, 
by way of conclusion, the key elements of a general course of action for Europe. The 
elements highlighted below are relevant for all European countries seeking to tackle 
the youth unemployment problem, although the individual parts require weighting 
according to the special circumstances of each country.
Considering how to design a better way forward for labour market integration of the 
youth in Europe, it is essential to address five key issues.
First, young adults in particular are suffering from the current failure of countries 
to create new and better jobs in sufficient numbers. Structural reforms aimed at 
improving global competitiveness and the dynamics of job creation are therefore 
fundamental. Where labour market entrants will not benefit from more job openings 
becoming available in the economy, additional structural measures to overcome the 
labour market divide between younger and older workers are in order.
Second, the difficulties among both unskilled and skilled young people to integrate 
into the labour market are a reflection of skill mismatch: part of human capital  
embedded in the young generation is not in accord with the demand of employers.  
Working against skill mismatch requires modernising education and training 
systems. A key element in this is to bring human capital development closer to the 
private sector.
Third, while some active labour market policies seem to be effective in integrating 
young people into the labour market, the evidence is not satisfactorily strong to 
warrant youth guarantees on a large scale. Instead, active labour market policies 
need to be selective. Individual targeting and quality measures implemented within 
local structures are key success factors, which may easily get lost when active labour 
market policies are extended quickly and on a large scale.
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Fourth, adapting the general economic, labour market and educational framework 
takes time, and therefore short-term remedies are in order as well. Among these, 
migration is probably the most effective short-term valve. It requires additional 
support at all levels, as geographical mobility remains low despite a unified European 
labour market.
Fifth, successful youth employment strategies require involving all relevant stake-
holders, including the young people themselves. Part of the challenge is to structure 
and organise activities among employers, social partners, case managers, education 
providers, etc. Obstacles to cooperation call governments to take the lead in coor-
dinating and financing partnership models. Still stakeholders must actively engage 
themselves to identify their interests and contribute their experience in respect 
to setting up a comprehensive policy agenda to fight youth unemployment. Non-
governmental organisations may support the process by acting as mediators and 
moderators.
A General Course of Action for Tackling Youth Unemployment in Europe
1.  Create More Jobs for Labour Market Entrants 
– Ensure economic growth that leads to more and better jobs 
– Fight segmentation between older and younger workers in the labour market 
– Lower high entry wages and strengthen hiring incentives through wage subsidies
2.  Better Align Skills and Labour Market Needs 
– Fight early school-leaving 
– Foster the quality of vocational education by stronger (dual) training at the workplace 
– Make academic training more applied
3.  Use a Careful Selection of Active Labour Market Policies 
– Improve upon counselling and job search assistance 
– Provide publicly sponsored training to unemployed youth, if possible at real workplaces 
– Avoid public job creation
4.  Support Mobility Across Borders 
– Encourage international mobility for training and employment in scarce occupations 
– Improve upon information 
– Lower language and psychological barriers to mobility
5.  Involve All Relevant Stakeholders 
– Establish cooperative industrial relations 
– Engage firms in setting up dual vocational training structures 
– Set up and monitor comprehensive youth employment strategies
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5.2 Create More Jobs for Labour Market Entrants
The single most important condition to support easy entry of the youth into the 
labour market is for the economy to create an ample number of job openings. While 
young adults are generally in a vulnerable position due to their qualification needs 
and lack of experience, empirical evidence shows that their labour market prospects 
are strongly tied to general employment growth. One channel that brings about this 
connection is that firms recruiting experienced workers tend to recruit less experi-
enced workers who are also required for complementary tasks. A second channel is 
that as labour gets scarcer in a thriving economy, employers become more willing to 
make concessions and to provide young people with job and training opportunities 
that would be unavailable in a less tight labour market.
Thus, sustained job creation is a key to ensuring that youth can improve their relative 
position in the labour market. The key to steady job creation, in turn, is economic 
growth. If economic growth stems from innovation and adaptation of new technolo-
gies, the chances improve that young people also end up in high-quality employment.
Defining general economic growth policies to promote creation of more and better 
jobs is beyond the aim of this report. Preferred strategies should seek to improve 
the rank of the economy in global competition and modify the regulatory framework 
such that the environment becomes more conducive to entrepreneurship and inno-
vation. This brings cross-cutting themes – notably the corporate tax environment, 
the quality and quantity of physical infrastructure, energy costs and the amount of 
red tape on businesses – to the fore.
In this perspective, the austerity measures that have been imposed onto some  
European member states in response to the sovereign debt crisis may eventually 
substantially benefit youth employment. Governments therefore should not delay 
measures correcting weaknesses in the regulatory framework that could put them  
on a higher structural growth path. At the same time, they need to be very careful  
in designing the required tax increases and spending cuts such as to minimise the 
risk of any additional employment losses.
In addition, active promotion of entrepreneurship and risk taking by provision of 
basic business skills training and adequate capital can help in developing the start-
up and expansion of small- and medium-sized businesses as engines of job creation. 
Sponsoring institutions may especially align such entrepreneurship programmes 
with job creation goals, by focussing on sectors with high labour requirements, such 
as services (Dencker et al. 2009).
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While the prospects of young people benefit from general employment growth, the 
number of job openings specific for first-time jobseekers as well as the retention 
rates in early career jobs have a more direct effect on the labour market position of 
the youth. Governments seeking to improve upon these variables need to consider 
labour market segmentation between younger and older workers as well as the  
relative wages of labour market entrants.
Concerning labour market segmentation, careful design of fixed-term contracts and 
employment protection legislation is critical. The possibility of hiring on fixed-term 
contracts may make employers less cautious to hire young workers in an economic 
upturn. At the same time, if the transition rates from temporary to permanent  
employment are constantly low, the young must bear most of the burden from  
cyclical fluctuations and are frequently excluded from better paid employment,  
stable employment, and intensive firm-specific training or advanced learning at  
the workplace. Such adverse perspectives, in turn, may reduce individual effort  
and foster social exclusion.
Therefore, countries affected by strong duality in the labour market should seek 
to facilitate the transitions between temporary and permanent jobs. One measure 
to consider is to restrict the use of fixed-term contracts, in particular by limiting 
consecutive fixed-term arrangements and regulating service provision contracts. An 
alternative is to facilitate dismissal from open-ended contracts. The most effective 
strategy would be to overcome the distinction between temporary and fixed-term 
contracts altogether. This can be achieved by making all contracts permanent and 
granting employers a general right of dismissal, but imposing a scheme of severance 
payments that gradually increase in the individual duration of job tenure.
In regards to the relative wages of labour market entrants, minimum wages are a 
matter of concern. There is evidence consistent with the view that national minimum 
wages may cause employment losses among young workers, even for those coun-
tries that have adopted specific sub-minimum wage provisions for youths. Although 
positive effects are not guaranteed, a lower minimum wage for young workers in real 
terms, relative to the median wage (or the minimum wage for established workers) 
might help in creating more employment opportunities for the youths.
113
Effective wage levels for young workers are not only a matter of legal minimum  
wages however. In many cases collective bargaining agreements fix wages. Hence, 
industrial relations play an important role in achieving a degree of wage differenti-
ation that makes it attractive for firms to hire young people who probably still need 
some training on the job. In cases where collective bargaining outcomes substantially 
compress the wage distribution from below, i.e. where the lowest wages are rather 
close to the average wage, parties should rethink their bargaining targets to promote 
employment of less productive workers, which includes the young. Shifting  
collective bargaining to more decentralised levels, or allowing escape clauses into 
collective agreements that enable individual agreements on lower wages, are more 
formal steps that could help in eliciting more employment friendly wage-setting 
behaviour.
Policymakers may complement such endeavours through temporary wage subsidies 
for private firms employing additional youth. Age-targeted hiring incentives are 
best combined with additional constraints, in particular training requirements or 
the requirement to hire from a specific pool of hard-to-place agents. The empirical 
evidence suggests that hiring subsidies are effective in bringing more young people 
into employment in the short run, if the targets are well defined. On a comprehensive 
scale, hiring subsidies are not recommended. The cost-benefit ratio could be poor, 
as employers would often hire subsidised candidates anyway. Substantiating that the 
subsidised position is an additional one and does not replace another non-subsidised 
position often proves difficult.
An attractive feature of hiring subsidies is that they place young jobseekers in private 
market jobs. A tempting, but most problematic alternative is the creation of public 
jobs. Despite the obvious short-term unemployment reducing effect for those who 
get publicly employed, the empirical record of the measure is clearly negative (Card 
et al. 2010; Caliendo et al. 2011). On the one hand, meaningful public employment 
tends to crowd out private sector employment. On the other hand, public jobs that do 
not compete with private jobs are poor stepping stones to private sector jobs. They 
tend to provide agents especially with non-marketable skills and do not prevent  
depreciation of marketable skills. Private employers thus often perceive employment  
in a publicly created job as a negative ability signal. As the effectiveness of public job 
creation schemes to cope with aggregate unemployment is not substantiated, they 
are not recommended as an approach to fight youth unemployment in Europe. Even 
as a temporary bypass to keep young people attached, they should be approached 
with the utmost caution.
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5.3 Align Skills and Labour Market Needs
To be able to embark on successful labour market careers, young people require 
adequate human capital. An empirical regularity is that better educated individuals 
have access to better paid jobs and benefit from both higher employment and lower 
unemployment rates. Still, expanding general education is by itself not a guarantee 
for smoother labour market integration of youths. A crucial factor is that the  
provided skills meet employers’ needs.
While education and training systems in Europe remain heterogeneous, some  
settings appear better suited to avoid skills mismatches than others:
::  Employer-provided training at the workplace helps ensure a properly applied  
component better than school-based training.
::  Certified training delivers recognisable qualifications that are transferable  
between employers and is better than informal training.
::  A combination of general and firm-specific skills is superior to the specialisation in 
one of the two, as either is required to accomplish tasks at the modern workplace.
In view of these arguments, dual vocational training, which combines school-based 
general training with workplace-based, firm-specific training, appears an effective 
model for organising upper secondary education. In fact, cross-country comparison 
suggests that countries where the dual apprenticeship system makes up a substantial  
part of vocational training experience less friction in the transition process from 
school to work and lower NEET rates. 
Developing a dual vocational training system that is strongly embedded in firms is an 
appealing option for countries struggling with youth unemployment stemming from 
skill mismatch. Nevertheless, the development and implementation of functioning 
concepts hinge on the specific institutional and economic environment, as well as the 
prior conceptions and experiences of the diverse actors to be involved. 
A general road map for changes in the education system aimed at facilitating school-
to-work transitions and less skills mismatch contains three core elements:
::  Promote completion of basic education.
::  Strike a better balance between training at school and training at the workplace.
::  Fight skills mismatch of university graduates.
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Concering the promotion of basic education, the educational targets of the European 
Union rightly stress the need to reduce the proportion of early school-leavers who 
fail to complete lower secondary education. An adequate minimum level of general 
skills is the basis for successful inclusion into further training opportunities and 
the labour market. Possible measures to promote basic general education include 
prolonging compulsory schooling, developing the provision of social and psycho-
logical support within schools, increasing parental involvement through improved 
communication between schools and parents, and especially personalised coaching 
for pupils with an increased risk of dropping out early.
The ways how to best strike a better balance between training at school and training 
at the workplace depend on the initial conditions. Where vocational training is pre-
dominantly school-based, this requires active steps to be taken to integrate longer 
periods of practical work, at least through internships but preferably through  
extended phases of regular contracted work, notably in the later phase of the upper 
secondary training phase. The development of a formal curriculum for the working 
phases is essential to ensure the quality of the training provided by firms. Where 
vocational training takes place predominantly on the job, this requires developing 
vocational schools and vocational schooling curricula, in order to promote develop-
ment of complementary general skills. In either situation, active coordination  
between employers and government or private institutions is highly desirable, in 
order to fix a reasonably balanced overall vocational training curriculum.
Steps in the direction of a better aligned dual apprenticeship scheme do not neces-
sarily need to be taken at the national level. In fact the attempt at modernising the 
system from top to bottom can turn out to be difficult. Conflicts of interest and lack  
of resources may impede the necessary large-scale cooperation between different 
actors with different interests in different elements of vocational training compo-
nents. The alternative approach is to start from local associations of especially  
interested parties. The initiators of bottom-up activities could be regional govern-
ment or labour market authorities faced with especially high levels of skill-related 
youth unemployment, or local associations of firms faced with a need of special  
occupational skills not satisfied by the existing vocational training possibilities.
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A core step in setting up regional vocational training clusters is the development  
of a legal framework that determines a curriculum and an examination scheme, 
secures recognition of certificates, and regulates the organisation and financing of 
supra-firm-level training components. Government involvement can facilitate such 
an agreement. First, public authorities may lend credibility to the system by guaran-
teeing and controlling standards. Second, the willingness of firms to pay for training 
of transferable skills is limited, because they may not manage to recoup the invest-
ment from mobile workers. The public sector may thus need to provide financial 
means to pay for the transferable skill part in the curriculum, at least to the extent 
that apprentices would not finance it, for example, through paying a tuition fee or 
accepting a lower wage.
In a next step, if several local vocational training clusters come into life, there is a 
need for employers’ associations or government institutions to coordinate between 
the different initiatives. Achieving a standardisation of training contents and quality 
is important to facilitate mutual recognition of vocational training outcomes, and the 
resulting more widespread reach will make joining the scheme more attractive for  
local employers and young people hitherto uninvolved. A method of supra-regional 
coordination and standardisation will also help to attract imitators from new localities.
Concerning university graduates, it is necessary to more carefully monitor skills  
mismatch and secure more applied academic training. In some European coun-
tries, there is substantial evidence for overeducation at the tertiary education level, 
meaning that a substantial proportion of agents obtaining academic training has 
difficulties to find a proper job and ends up in a job that does not demand their level 
of education. One approach to solving this problem is to create an economic environ-
ment creating more vacancies for the academically trained, but achieving such  
structural adjustment may consume considerable time. An alternative approach that 
may facilitate labour market integration is to make tertiary education more labour-
market oriented. Possible means to make progress on this goal are obligatory intern-
ships as part of the academic curriculum, increasing the number of (fully) working 
students and strengthening universities of applied sciences and polytechnics. 
Yet another approach may be to work against deterioration of returns to higher  
education by reducing the number of students at the tertiary level. One may achieve 
this through better information on later employment prospects, but more effectively 
by developing high-quality vocational education that is a real alternative to higher 
education. If such alternative educational tracks exist, raising tuition fees (depen-
ding on individual achievement) to discourage especially the least able and redirect 
them into a more vocationally oriented education career can also contribute to  
reducing skill mismatch.
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5.4 Use a Careful Selection of Active Labour Market Policies
Even in a vibrant economic environment, with a carefully (de-)regulated labour 
market and well-functioning educational institutions, a certain proportion of young 
people experiences more difficulties when making the transition from school to 
work. Characteristics that often set up extra hurdles to entering the labour market 
are the lack of basic and in particular non-cognitive skills, a migration background, 
health-related problems and sometimes gender. Active labour market programmes 
supporting specifically disadvantaged groups among the youth can be useful  
complements to the broader strategies discussed above. However, a meta-analysis 
 of existing evaluation studies suggests that active labour market policy measures 
targeting the youth tend to be less effective than active measures targeting the  
remainder of the working-age population. 
Active labour market policies can thus only be a short-term complement to structural 
policies to tackle youth unemployment. 
Active measures targeting disadvantaged young people tend to be more effective if 
the intervention occurs at an early stage. The available empirical evidence provides a 
justification for interventions even before the entry into the labour market. One core 
element in this respect is career guidance. Young people must have the opportunity, 
in school, to discover what they enjoy doing and identify their aptitudes for different 
kinds of careers. One should also raise awareness for the career impact, and the  
economic value, of acquiring specific education and training credentials.
Particularly effective active labour market policies, although they are often not 
considered – and financed – as such, target the early educational investment or the 
development of non-cognitive skills of pupils at risk of dropping out from secondary 
school. The power of such intervention strategies stems from the dynamic nature  
of human capital formation, a process fostered and accelerated through self- 
productivity (“learning how to learn”) and complementarities between the generati-
on of non-cognitive and cognitive skills.
Turning to the more conventional domains of active labour market policies, one 
should be careful with naming a particular best practice. Apparently successful  
measures operate under particular institutional and economic framework conditions,  
and may develop different effects if they are transferred to another context.  
However, an overview review of numerous individual assessment studies suggests 
that in general two sorts of interventions are rather effective.
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First, measures enhancing the effectiveness and intensity of the job search tend  
to reduce the unemployment rate of young people at least in the short term. By  
implication such interventions should preferably take place at an early phase of an 
unemployment spell. This, in turn, implies that labour market authorities should 
make an effort to ensure that unemployed youth actually get registered, as a  
prerequisite to obtain access to any active policy measures.
A key to effective search is intensive individual counselling by placement agencies. 
In order to develop tailored solutions, it is important to acknowledge the hetero-
geneous needs of jobseekers depending on their level of labour market readiness. 
Diagnosis of personal needs should translate into individualised action plans, which 
can serve as a basis for offering timely and comprehensive information on suitable 
job openings as well as alternative (educational) options. At the same time, sticking 
to an activation policy principle is important to effectively promote search effort. 
The evidence clearly supports the view that the combination of adequate counselling 
with sanctions for non-cooperative behaviour such as reductions in financial assis-
tance is effective to support the transition into employment. Such disciplinary means 
tend to work even ex ante via an announcement effect.
Second, active provision and financing of training opportunities for unemployed 
young people lacking skills can also contribute to promoting employment chances 
in the medium term if the provided training is of sufficiently high quality. Consistent 
with our previous considerations concerning the development of vocational  
skills in line with labour market needs, publicly sponsored training programmes  
that provide learning at real workplaces have turned out to be especially effective.  
In consequence, the resources for active training measures devoted to young  
people have been shifted from school-based measures to employer-based (or dual 
apprenticeship-like) measures in many countries.
In comparison, active labour market measures focussing on supporting the tran-
sition to employment or training the employed appear less successful in reducing 
unemployment. The immediate recommendation to be derived from this observation 
is that countries in which such measures are rather prominent, like Spain, should  
reconsider their policy mix and devote a larger proportion of resources to the  
training of unemployed individuals who experience labour market difficulties due  
to lack of adequate skills. Ideally, such publicly sponsored training schemes should 
get the employers actively involved. Therefore, the combination of hiring and  
workplace training subsidies can be a winning tool.
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The review of the evidence on effective active labour market policies should also be 
taken into account into designing “youth guarantees”, a concept first implemented in 
the Nordic European countries in the 1980s and 1990s, which has gained prominence 
(and financial support from the EU) as a means to fight the current youth unemploy-
ment crisis. The concept of a youth guarantee is to entitle all young people in need to 
a job, training or education within a given period of time. Government employment 
services are obliged to provide the entitlement by offering services or programmes 
to any youth satisfying some pre-established criteria. 
In principle, a range of measures is within the scope of such a guarantee: job-search 
assistance, subsidised general education and vocational training, subsidised em-
ployment, business start-up programmes and public works. In practice, countries 
with a youth guarantee have been using any of these measures. One can observe a lot 
of variation in local practice and frequent redesign in response to experiences with 
implementation and effectiveness. While empirical evidence on the specific effects of 
youth guarantees is limited, the experiences altogether seem to confirm the general 
findings on the relative success of different types of active labour market policies in 
support of young people. First, timely interventions tailored to the specific needs  
of specific needy groups are a factor of success. Second, intensive counselling and 
obligations on the part of the participating young unemployed enhance effectiveness.  
Third, providing access to compensatory vocational training, especially at real  
workplace, is more effective than just providing jobs.
Much harder to establish are specific effects associated with establishing such  
measures under the unifying roof of a youth guarantee. First of all, youth guarantees 
are a challenging instrument. Implementation requires a well-functioning labour 
market administration that has the experience and capacity to manage active labour 
market measures in an efficient manner. This includes the ability to build strong 
cooperation with partners at the municipality level. Alignment with local require-
ments and active engagement of actors, such as employers’ organisations, trade 
unions, NGOs and educational institutions, has transpired to be an important factor 
of success.
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Another success factor is the availability of sufficient financial means, especially if 
the eligible population is defined in a broad manner. According to ILO estimates, 
youth guarantees can induce an annual cost in the range of 0.5 – 1.5 per cent of GDP. 
Even if such costs are recovered later via the long-term positive effects of avoiding 
unemployment and inactivity, such a financial burden can be hard to bear for  
governments put under pressure by economic recession and fiscal austerity  
programmes. Finally, youth guarantee services are not automatically in demand by 
the unregistered unemployed. Thus, specific effort and outreach activities may be 
necessary to extend the participation of young people disconnected from the labour 
market and education. 
In sum, while youth guarantees may help connect young people to labour markets 
and promote their employment prospects, the possible extension of such guarantees 
to the whole of Europe appears a challenging and potentially costly approach. In 
particular countries with less-developed public employment services and relatively 
little experience with the design of efficient active labour market policies should 
consider more pragmatic and less risky approaches to make progress on active 
labour market policies. For instance, a first step is to critically review the structure of 
existing measures and then shift resources consistently toward those measures with 
proven positive effects. In addition, public employment agencies should gradually 
focus more intensively on the neediest young people who are currently often out of 
the reach of their services.
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5.5 Support Mobility Across Borders
The approaches to reducing youth unemployment and increasing youth employ-
ment described so far are of structural nature. Therefore, any positive reform effect 
is unlikely to arise in the short term. The implementation of structural reforms, in 
particular where more fundamental adjustments are required, in itself can be a time-
consuming process. This shows in the sluggish amendment of framework conditions 
in many of the crisis countries in Europe. In addition, there is often a considerable 
impact lag following implementation of structural reforms impacting on labour  
markets, as the actors on these markets need time to adapt to new circumstances.
Therefore, there is a need for measures that would take some pressure out of youth 
labour markets in the short term.
The experiences with some of the seemingly attractive short-term remedies indicate 
that they are indeed inappropriate. Early retirement programmes generally do not 
open up additional opportunities for young workers. Public job creation schemes 
generally only build weak bridges to regular employment and hence do not create 
lasting effects. Relatively more promising is education extension. In fact, in many 
countries a substantial proportion of young people currently excluded from the 
labour market have responded by staying longer within the education system and 
targeting higher qualification levels. This can be a successful tunnelling strategy  
provided that the labour market develops positively in the meantime and creates  
a sufficient demand for high-skilled workers. However, if this does not happen,  
the outcome might be even worse concerning skills mismatch than at present, which 
would aggravate employment problems.
The most effective policy instrument to elicit immediately positive effects, then, 
seems to be geographic mobility. Migration can serve as a short-term valve within 
countries characterised by substantial regional labour market disparities, like  
the lasting differences between the North and South of Italy. It can also alleviate  
imbalances between countries, especially in the current European crisis where  
some differences in (youth) unemployment rates across member states are much 
larger than differences within countries. 
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International migration may not only reduce numerical imbalances, but also act 
against skills mismatch. In a thriving economy like Germany, there are increasing 
signs of labour shortages in particular labour market segments. Therefore, hiring 
suitably qualified workers from abroad, or attracting young workers for training in 
scarce occupations, can be immediately beneficial without jeopardising employment 
perspectives of the incumbent youth. At the same time, sending countries do not 
necessarily suffer from a brain drain if mobile young people with qualifications not 
in demand on the national labour market gain access to employment opportunities 
abroad. In the longer term, if international mobility is combined with access to good-
quality vocational education, the sending countries may even benefit from an exten- 
sion of skills relevant in their own labour market upon return of their citizens from 
temporary migration. Personal exposure to effective vocational training schemes in 
other countries may furthermore help in transferring institutional knowledge, which 
can facilitate the development of better educational institutions in the sending country.
In view of the massive imbalances in youth unemployment rates across Europe, 
the current rates of international mobility from ill-performing to well-performing 
member states appear very low, however. The fact that only a small proportion of the 
European youth disconnected from their own labour market is on the move indicates 
that mobility costs often remain too large, or perceived individual mobility gains too 
small, despite free mobility of labour within the European Union. There are several 
margins to work on.
First, invest in foreign language skills, especially in the medium-skilled population. 
This is not only a responsibility in the sending countries, but also in the potential 
receiving countries. Many establishments experiencing labour shortages at present  
could not easily provide a foreign-language work or training environment. The  
requirement to first learn how to communicate in the receiving country language 
may be an important barrier and reduce the expected net gains from international 
mobility for both workers and employers. More generally, inexperience with  
handling cross-cultural navigation both on the sending and the receiving side may 
induce psychological costs lowering the individual benefits of migration. Therefore, 
programmes to provide agents with temporary mobility experiences early in life 
deserve support.
In order to achieve short-term effects, it is important to overcome information 
problems. One aspect is to improve upon the international matching of jobseekers 
to vacancies. While the European Portal for Job Mobility (EURES) is a first step to 
setting up a uniform information portal, it is important to get case workers in public 
employment services actively using this central information in the job placement and 
counselling process. Many foreign jobseekers will have difficulties processing and  
interpreting the enormous amount of information in a correct manner on their own. 
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A second aspect is that legal harmonisation within the European Union has made 
some good progress, but the practical issues associated with cross-border mobility  
can still look daunting from the perspective of individuals who are considering 
migrating. Central portals ensuring transparency of legal and practical relocation 
matters may make migration decisions easier.
A third information aspect is that despite progress on removing bureaucratic hurdles 
in recognition of foreign skills and standardisation attempts within the European 
Qualifications Network, qualification recognition problems remain severe in practice.  
Again, the problem affects both potential migrants and potential employers. For 
agents intending to move for training, it is difficult to assess the quality of the  
various educational options, in various potential receiving countries. Agents  
intending to move for work might be confused by country-specific employer habits  
in describing jobs or skill demands. From the employer perspective, standardised 
skill descriptions are often unintelligible, and reveal too little about actual capacities 
to succeed in performing certain task. The development of a standard for profes-
sional qualification at a European level is not very advanced.
Overcoming such information problems is not only a task to be performed by the 
European Union, national government and public employment services. Companies 
and associations of employers that realise a surplus from hiring from abroad, but also 
unions or NGOs trying to alleviate the problem of unemployed youth, should engage 
in creating more transparency at all levels, too.
In general, supporting temporary migration policy and labour mobility as a strategy 
to reduce high youth unemployment in the short term is a multifaceted task that  
requires active involvement from many different actors and at different regional  
levels. This creates a certain risk that the clarity of the overall strategy gets lost in 
many parallel activities.
This tendency can be illustrated with the German case. There are a lot of activities  
in a similar vein, like a German–Spanish government agreement for hosting young  
people from Spain for training, Federal State level programmes backed with funds 
from the European Social Fund (ESF) to support matching of young unemployed from 
the crisis countries to firms providing apprenticeship training, and local initiatives 
backed by employers’ associations and job centres to cope with labour shortages by 
attracting foreign apprentices. The presence of numerous small different initiatives 
make options less transparent for the target groups, and may easily prevent the  
realisation of scale and learning effects. In this situation, there would be a clear role 
for government entities and private institutions, notably employers’ organisations 
and NGOs, to engage in coordination and harmonisation activities, to obtain a more 
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stringent overall strategy and make mobility across Europe more effective as a short-
term remedy against regional imbalances in youth unemployment.
5.6 Involve All Relevant Stakeholders
Developing and implementing national strategies against youth unemployment is a 
complex task. Quick progress will only be achieved if all relevant stakeholders make 
adequate contributions:
::  Governments need to reconsider their general economic policies, labour market 
policies and education policies. National governments, responsible for a conducive  
institutional framework and efficient allocation of financial means, need to take  
the lead. However, government bodies at decentralised levels have to act as well,  
in order to ensure that active policy measures and programmes are adapted in a 
way that meets the local conditions.
::  Unions and employers’ associations need to overcome conflict, become aware of 
their joint social responsibility in ensuring the labour market integration of youths 
and act accordingly. This includes finding collective agreements that lower real 
labour costs to gain competitive strength, thereby providing lower entry wages and 
stipulating exacting standards for apprenticeship training.
::  Individual firms need to be aware of the positive social externalities of integrating  
youths, which is a reason to engage beyond their immediate own economic interest. 
In particular, larger employers with apprenticeship experience have a responsi-
bility to convince others of the benefits of firm-based training and engage in fixing 
standards to facilitate recognition of firm-based training. The role model and  
communication function could even work across borders – firms that operate  
transnationally are in a favourable position to bring standards of apprenticeship 
training to countries where systematic qualification at the workplace is not yet  
fully developed.
::  Young people need to be flexible and adapt their choices to opportunities. This  
requires being ready to be mobile both within countries and across borders, as 
well as adapting education choices to fit areas of growing labour demand. It also 
demands actively engaging in and supporting new education and training activities 
with the aim of improving qualification and reducing skill mismatches.
125
::  Non-governmental organisations can support the steps to be taken by the core 
stakeholders by taking complementary action on suitable niches. Given limited 
resources, their realm is first of all to support the transmission of information.  
More specifically, non-governmental organisations should distribute examples of 
best practice, act as mediators between employers’ organisations and unions and 
foster local networks involving the relevant stakeholders and target multipliers.  
If non-govermental organisations must routinely (co-)operate across borders,  
such as larger foundations for example, they may provide platforms for building 
bridges across borders that can be difficult to arrange for government bodies.  
Non-government bodies should generally be conservative in regards to implemen-
ting active labour market interventions on their own. These can easily compete 
with existing public measures and be too small to achieve relevant impact.  
If non-government bodies do engage in providing their own support to youths,  
it is important to target specific groups that are not a priority of public labour  
administration.
An advisable approach to get the relevant stakeholders involved and coordinate 
action to work against the challenge of youth unemployment would be to set up an 
autonomous task force for settling an agreement to collaborate steadily and con-
sistently on a comprehensive national strategy for better employment prospects 
of young people. Such an agreement must build on consensus reached through a 
consultative process that allows the integration of experiences and perspectives of 
all stakeholders.
As the empirical knowledge about the functioning of youth labour markets is often 
rather limited, the impact of changes in the environment is difficult to judge before-
hand. This calls for making amendments cautiously. It also calls for being prepared 
to realign strategies along the way, in order to integrate lessons from implementation 
failure and impact assessment. This is an issue demanding leadership from national 
governments. They need to make the stakeholders involved agree on clear and  
consistent targets to measure progress as well as to make sure the resources required 
for monitoring purposes are provided.
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To be effective, a national youth employment strategy should contain a number of 
elements: a set of concrete and realistic consensus goals; a list of concrete measures 
building upon a critical assessment of previous practices, an underpinning theory  
of change, as well as empirical evidence of possibly good practice; a reflection on 
knowledge gaps and a strategy to systematically fill these gaps; and an agreement 
how to institutionalise proper impact assessment and effort-to-outcome analysis, 
including a commitment to regular publication of progress reports.
Any plausible commitment must also go along with assigning adequate resources, 
that is resources sufficient to translate the contents of the agreement into practice.  
Put differently, in countries where resources are scarce, ambitions need to be  
downsized accordingly. Focus should be put strictly on investment in potential  
high-impact measures. In general, a large proportion of the necessary resources will 
come from public coffers. Yet it would strengthen commitment to a national youth 
employment strategy if businesses, social partners, educational organisations and 
other stakeholders, in line with their respective capacities and financial means,  
agreed upon contributing a certain part of the budget.
The collected resources would flow into two different channels. First, the envisaged  
instruments themselves, for example, enlarging certain active labour market  
programmes or investing in better quality of education, may involve a direct cost. 
In addition, dedicating an office with its own budget and personnel may facilitate 
coordinated implementation. Second, the concomitant monitoring, documentation 
and evaluation effort through the financing of adequate research personnel and data 
collection. The progress monitoring task might be assigned to some government-
financed research agency. However, in order to ensure independent assessment and 
credibility of the assessment process, it is advised to outsource the task to changing 
evaluators winning acceptance through a competitive process.
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